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Do American political institutions comport with accepted norms of democratic representation?
The three arguably most important American political scientists of the 20th century—Harold
Lasswell, V.O. Key, and Robert Dahl—each held that if policymaking does not generally respond
to the policy attitudes of constituents, then democracy in America is a fiction. The institutional
design of the House of Representatives, which emphasizes frequent elections and small
constituencies, makes it a likely locus of responsiveness in our political system. However, the vast
literature investigating House responsiveness has failed to provide unambiguous answers about
the phenomenon’s nature and extent. One reason for this is a data problem: measuring the
constituency half of the constituent-representative dyad is difficult in the absence of large-n,
geographically comprehensive social surveys of House district attitudes. Scholars have relied on
survey disaggregation and proxy variables as substitutes, but these respectively proved unreliable
and invalid. Multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP), which calculates the attitudinal
propensities of demographic groups in national surveys and adjusts these propensities by their
demographic composition per jurisdiction, is a new and promising method for imputing districtlevel attitudes. A new generation of MRP responsiveness literature claims to, at last, precisely
measure the attitudinal signals constituents are sending to legislators. I nonetheless take issue with
three features of conventional MRP measures: they are cross-sectional (and assume public opinion
is stable); they are derived from the general population (and not voters); and they are issue-focused
(which poses problems when the issue agenda is unstable). In response, I generate longitudinal
MRP measures of ideology using state and national exit polls from 2004 to 2010. Exit polls have
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larger biennial ns than widely-used social surveys like the Cooperative Congressional Election
Study, and sample only voters. Employing my measures, I find evidence of heterogeneous
ideological change and growing polarization in the districts. I also find that candidates and
legislators do not respond to the preferences of median voters. Instead, and in violation of
conventional democratic theory, they respond primarily to their party subconstituencies,
particularly when district attitudes are widely dispersed. I offer directional voting as a formal
explanation for this behavior.
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Chapter 1. The Search for Representation
The Puzzle of Responsiveness
Representation is now a core concept to both democratic theorists and election researchers.
Whereas the Western philosophical canon (for instance, Mill 1861) and some modern participatory
democrats (Barber 1984) have held that representation works at cross-purposes with direct popular
sovereignty, representation is now understood as an election-driven mechanism by which citizens
govern themselves (Pitkin 1967; Dahl 1989). Even as no reasonable observer in the complex world
of 21st century politics expects a democratic government to always and purely express the “general
will,” growing interest in representation has tracked higher democratic expectations. Our accepted
political norms now demand there be at least some mass-elite connection in American politics. To
Harold Laswell (1941, 15), the “open interplay of opinion and policy is the distinguishing mark of
popular rule.”
How to look for links between constituencies and representatives is not immediately
obvious, because representation is definable in many ways. Hanna Pitkin (1967, 8) once observed
that representation is not a “single, [albeit] highly complex concept,” but rather a set of distinct
ideas that frequently receive the same classification. Nonetheless, the demands of testability and
simplicity have led Political Scientists to converge on a single conceptualization of representation.
This conceptualization is “responsiveness,” or the degree to which the behavior of legislators
corresponds to the attitudes of their constituents. Responsiveness is the natural expectation in any
political system that features free and fair elections, as voters are likely to elect representatives
who share their political traits. In addition, the nature of the promissory voting contract, whereby
constituents vote for a representative in exchange for a promise to obey their expressed desires, is
likely to produce responsiveness (Mansbridge 2003). Constituents can sanction representatives for
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shirking from the voting contract by withdrawing their support in the next election.
Representatives, who prefer continuing their careers in office, will act in accordance with
constituent demands even against their own will, and despite the fact that few democracies contain
mechanisms to legally coerce elected officials to act responsively (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes
1999). When public attitudes change, we therefore expect policy change to follow.
Formal models of electoral competition—that is, abstract, mathematical proofs drawn from
microeconomics and that explain political phenomena—build on this familiar and intuitive set of
predictions. The best known, the Median Voter Theorem, posits a Nash equilibrium that requires
competing parties or candidates to present identical platforms that coincide with the constituent
median (Downs 1957a; Black 1958). While this result requires conditions that are unlikely to
obtain in reality—that is, an electorate where voters have only single-peaked, unidimensional issue
preferences and never vote strategically—, it does explain why moderation does confer advantages
to candidates (Gelman and Katz 2007), and why electoral competition seems to promote
responsiveness (Griffin 2006). The median voter theorem is the accepted explanatory framework
in many historical studies of responsiveness. If American institutions are representative,
responsiveness scholarship goes, then the median voter of national, state, and House constituencies
should exercise an enormous pull over legislation.
Responsiveness is thus the standard metric for thinking about the representativeness of
American political institutions. Its assumptions are grounded both in common sense and abstract
mathematical expressions. It requires no strong normative assumptions about what constitutes
good policy, privileges all constituent preferences equally, and comports with most people’s pretheoretical notions of legitimacy. As Robert Dahl (1971, 1) put it, “a key characteristic of
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democracy is the continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens,
considered as equals.”
Political Science’s well-articulated expectation that responsiveness obtains in the United
States has unfortunately led to increasing disappointment. Elections, it seems, are not enough to
guarantee representation. A large body of comparative political research suggests that elected
officials in democratic systems still enjoy broad independence from public opinion (Skocpol
1995). A possible explanation is that responsiveness is possible only if citizens possess the efficacy
and sophistication to form political attitudes, as well as monitor representatives to detect and
sanction shirking. It is questionable that they do. In the 1920s, Walter Lippmann (1922, 273)
ridiculed traditional democratic theory as requiring an omnicompetent citizen who was “fitted to
deal with all public affairs” and “consistently public-spirited and endowed with unflagging
interest.” It is unlikely that voters have become substantially more sophisticated since then, even
by rubrics more modest than “omnicompetence.” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997). Voters seem
far removed from the rational utility-maximizers of formal models of representation. Indeed, the
leitmotif of political behavior scholarship is that raw, emotive group identifications—not policy
preferences or worldviews—drive voter decision-making (Achen and Bartels 2016); how is a
congruence between representative and constituent views possible when the latter are, in the main,
vague and inchoate? The strong expectation for responsiveness also runs up against the growing
inequalities of power and resources in the United States and other democratic countries (Gilens
2005; Bartels 2008). Furthermore, an emerging body of subconstituency politics literature holds
that constituent preferences carry unequal weight, as when groups actuated by strong identity
beliefs or possessing unique access to power override the will of constituencies (Bishin 2009). In
sum, the “electoral connection” that is the supposed guarantor of democracy appears broken to
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many observers, who hold that “legislators are largely free from popular control and are influenced
instead by interest group wishes, party loyalties, peer pressures, or their own judgments” (Page et
al. 1984, 741).
One would hope that the mountain of responsiveness research that has arisen since the early
1960s would be able to address the critics of the conventional democratic model. After all,
responsiveness is a popular conceptualization of representation because it is seemingly easy to test.
To do so, it is enough to see whether the measured policy preferences of representativeconstituency pairs, or “dyads,” covary when placed on the same scale. If an electorate grows more
conservative, then so too should the voting preferences of its representative. There is no need for
researchers to ask whether representatives are voting well, or even if enacted legislation is
consistent with constituent preferences. (If [say] a Senator voted totally in accordance with her
district’s desires, she may be outvoted by 99 other legislators and fail to deliver policy congruent
with her representatives’ opinion).
In practice, measuring constituent opinion—the first step in a model of responsiveness—
is a fraught exercise. To be sure, there is no shortage of public opinion polls, whose original raison
d’être was to help the government assess and respond to constituent demand (Gallup 1938). There
is plenty of academic and journalistic analysis of whether the presidency, the Senate, and even the
Supreme Court react to the country’s changing policy mood that interminable commercial polls
capture (Stimson 1999). A problem with standard survey instruments emerges when we interrogate
the question of responsiveness more closely. For one thing, polls on most issues are quite
nonspecific when it comes to gauging just what policies constituents want (Wlezien 1996). For
another, there may be no single national policy mood (Best 1999), whereas the coverage frame of
most polls gauging policy attitudes is national. When a President claims to represent hundreds of

4

millions of people in conditions of ineluctable pluralism, in what way can one meaningfully speak
of constituency responsiveness? The same is likely true of many Senate and gubernatorial
constituencies.
To look for policy responsiveness to constituencies of millions, tens of millions, or
hundreds of millions of people is to look for it in the wrong place. If there is any evidence that
national politicians respond to public opinion, we are likely to find it in the House of
Representatives. House constituencies are smaller (with just over 700,000 residents, on average),
more homogenous, and express their preferences more frequently than constituencies of any other
federal office. The Framers thus assumed that the House would be the most direct organ of
sovereignty, and that a House representative would more than any other elected official exercise
accountability. Federalist 52 predicts that Congress would have an “immediate dependence on,
and an intimate sympathy with, the people”—or, in more social scientific vocabulary, be
responsive to district attitudes. House responsiveness scholarship is therefore the best positioned
to answer whether or not American political institutions comport with democratic expectations.
Unfortunately, House responsiveness scholarship has faced a historic Catch-22. The
dispositions of Congressional districts, while more likely than those of states or the country at large
to engender responsiveness, are also many times more difficult to measure. Political Science has
yet to find a satisfactory approach to getting around this problem. As a result, responsiveness
literature presents the scholar with a tangle of contradictory findings. In the heyday of the
“textbook” Congress, where party polarization was relatively low, many studies found strong
linkages between constituent attitudes and representative behavior (Miller and Stokes 1963).
Congress scholarship in this era treated representatives as masters of appealing to district
constituencies; it was supposed that they responded to public opinion even when so doing went
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against partisan considerations (Fenno 1978), the institutional relevance of Congress (Fiorina
1989), and the goal of good policy (Mayhew 1974a). Some (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002; Carson et
al. 2010) still agree with this view, and present evidence that constituents sanction representatives
in the manner that dyadic representation supposes. Others hold that this is an illusion perpetuated
by selective biases in candidate emergence (Burden 2007), and that (say) party considerations
explain most of the variation in legislative activity. Whether dyadic representation is declining in
an era of party polarization has been suggested (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Ansolabehere et al.
2001), but remains an open area of debate.

Signal Versus Noise
Dyadic representation obtains when supply (legislative behavior) meets demand (the changing
attitudes of constituents). On the supply side, valid and reliable measures of legislative behavior
exist. While legislative ideology is not directly observable, the fact that roll call votes are a matter
of public record leaves open many avenues of estimation. Scholars have historically used scores
that interest groups assign to various legislators. In more recent years, Poole and Rosenthal’s
(1997) DW-NOMINATE scores, generated by scaling most roll call votes taken since the 1st
Congress, have become standard. The overwhelming consensus is that House representatives vote
on a single spatial dimension, which is interpretable as member partisanship or ideology and which
readily lends itself to studies of responsiveness.
On the demand side, Political Science has struggled to assign ideal points to House
districts. Our basic notions of representation tell us that House representatives read constituent
signals and vote accordingly. No survey instrument, however, adequately captures the aggregate
attitudes of all Congressional districts, nor is one likely to ever exist. In the absence of good data,
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how does one discern the constituent signal, and distinguish it from the noise of measurement
error? For over half a century, Political Science has proposed a number of ways around the
problem. Initially, the tack was disaggregating the low-N social science surveys that University of
Michigan researchers began conducting in the late 1940s (Miller and Stokes 1963). Unfortunately,
this approach failed to produce estimates for most Congressional districts, and also was plagued
by obvious measurement error (Achen 1978). Later research shifted from the direct measurement
of individual attitudes to district-level demographic proxies (for instance, race and rates of college
education) that are available in the decennial Census, as well as presidential vote by district
(LeoGrande and Jeydel 1997). Each imaginable proxy, however, proved to be a poor substitute for
the constituent signal. Fenno (1978, xiii) once asked, “what does an elected representative see
when he or she sees a constituency?” It is unlikely that a representative, when factoring public
opinion into a voting decision, imagines her constituents as “an undifferentiated mass that is 40%
college educated.” The inadequacy of any particular proxy led to later approaches that simulated
district-level ideology using many proxies (Erikson 1978; Ardoin and Garand 2003). This still left
research at an impasse, however. In a textbook case of the ecological fallacy, researchers selected
proxies on the basis of their ability to predict ideology at the individual level, without evidence
that they predicted the ideologies of whole constituencies.
Recently, a new statistical technology has emerged that promises to break the
methodological impasse: MRP, or multi-level regression, imputation and post-stratification (Park,
Gelman, and Bafumi 2004; 2006). MRP takes large-n national surveys, models the attitudinal
propensities of demographic groups, and then weights these propensities by their demographic
composition per district. In this manner, it incorporates both the individual-level approach of early
behavioralists and the jurisdictional-level approach of later scholarship. While unassailable as a
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disaggregation method, it is only as good as the data it operates on. When combined with the new,
yearly Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), which has polled online respondents in
every district since 2006, MRP seemingly solves the missing data problem (Warshaw and Rodden
2012). A review of the responsiveness studies the method begat would tell us that MRP produces
valid, reliable estimates of constituent preferences, correlating highly with existing district polls
and corresponding electoral preferences.
In fact, MRP’s promise to find the constituent signal remains unfulfilled. MRP requires
large-n surveys to generate good estimates for every district. While the CCES is large enough to
estimate each district’s attitudes cross-sectionally, it is not so large that in can generate yearly
estimates. Recall, however, that testing dyadic representation means testing whether changes in
constituent attitudes produce changes in legislative action. Static measures are wholly unsuited to
the task, particularly in the face of suggestive evidence that aggregate ideology evolves subnationally. Another problem is that the national polls query the entire general population, whereas
it is voters who authorize representative control and hold them accountable for shirking from their
preferences, and much available evidence suggests that these voters differ systematically from
nonvoters. Including a “voted” item does not solve the problem, since rates of self-reported voting
far outstrip actual voter turnout. In the CCES, it does so by as much as 30% (Ansolabehere and
Hersh 2012).
The measurement problems call into question the veracity of most studies of House
responsiveness undertaken since the early 1960s. A new approach is needed to generate valid
estimates of district ideology that vary from year to year, and which capture the attitudes of voters.
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Exit Polls: A New Place to Look
My dissertation proposes that exit polls are a promising solution to the problem of the constituent
signal. Exit polls have existed since the 1940s, but became a well-financed and widely-reported
phenomenon in the 1970s. Warren Mitofsky, head of the elections unit at CBS News, applied
probabilistic sampling to select precincts across the country and sent pollsters to interview voters
as they left the voting booth. Thus, CBS could generalize about the entire presidential electorate
and make forecasts well before the official results. In the 1980s, CBS expanded its exit poll
operation and began polling voters in states with interesting electoral contests. Only recently have
scholars used historical exit poll data to study longitudinal trends with the intention of explaining
rather than predicting election results (Best and Krueger 2012). No one has yet made systematic,
social-scientific use of the state-level data.
Exit polls enter the discussion because they are a hitherto untapped resource and transcend
the main limitations of CCES-derived MRP measures. Exit polls contain enough cases to produce
longitudinal measures, rather than static measures that are the result of collapsing several years.
Exit polls’ vast biennial sample sizes allow for estimates that are sensitive to changes in public
opinion and to the unique dynamics of election cycles. This is an important advantage, given strong
intuitive and empirical reasons to suspect that public opinion is unstable. Another strength of exit
polls there is no issue of teasing out voters from the survey sample: in exit polls, all the respondents
are voters. If we adopt the sensible assumption that rational representatives will respond to
political participants who can in principle remove them from office, we cannot underestimate this
advantage. While past scholarship has tested whether constituents with “voting power” enjoy
greater policy representation (Bartels 1998), no one to date has produced and made use of direct
measurements of House district electorates. I hope to be the first to do so.
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Lastly, most MRP studies have looked at responsiveness through the lens of individual
issue positions, in the face of evidence that representation is a “global” phenomenon requiring
constituent measures across the general contours of policy (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995).
In this case, the issue-specific properties of constituent attitudes are “noise,” and do not signal
meaningful information to legislators. Departing from the corpus of MRP studies, I plan to use
MRP to disaggregate the exit polls and produce biennial, district-level measures of symbolic
ideology: that is, the extent to which districts identify as liberal, moderate, or conservative. I argue
that symbolic ideology in this context furnishes superior measure of district attitudes because it
embraces all issues on the Congressional agenda and remains stable over many years, whereas the
lifespan of most issues is short.
Exit polls, which have unique properties suited to gauging the signals that constituents
transmit to legislators, will enable me to unveil previously unknown insights about the behavior
of district electorates. In the following chapters, I will describe the creation of my MRP exit poll
measures, establish their validity and reliability, and detail how they overcome the shortcoming of
previous survey-based opinion measures. I will then use them to study public opinion change and
longitudinally explain House roll call voting in recent Congressional sessions. With the evidence
in place, I will at last be able to precisely assess the extent to which the House of Representatives
is beholden to public control, and address supporters and critics of the traditional model of popular
representation in the United States.
Organization of This Manuscript
My task is to find the constituent signal in exit polls, and use this measure to take a fresh look at
responsiveness that is unencumbered by old limitations. Towards that end, I divide my analysis
into four main sections.
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In Chapter 2, I flesh out the approaches to identifying the legislative signal in the context
of dyadic representation. As noted above, these approaches include direct measurement, the use of
indirect proxies, bottom-up simulations, top-down simulations, raw survey disaggregation, and
finally MRP. I will discuss the body of research associated with each approach, keeping in mind
the question of why social scientists—smart people fully cognizant of their limitations—
nonetheless chose them. I will discuss the problems with each, and why they were ultimately
modified or supplanted.
Chapter 3 will propose my alternative measures: district-level symbolic ideology imputed
from the National Election Pool exit polls in the previous decade, and post-stratified using the
Census Bureau’s new annual American Community Survey. As with any methodological
undertaking, generating these measures required a number of discretionary choices, each of which
I will do my best to explain and defend. I find that my measures are reliable and exhibit crossvalidity with district-level measures of ideology and issue attitudes derived from the CCES, as
well as with presidential and House election results.
Chapter 4 proceeds from the insight that, in a country where up to 20% of households move
annually, demographic change alone will likely cause district-level ideology to change from
election to election. I select a test for identifying districts that, independently of national political
trends, undergo aggregate attitudinal change between the 109th and 112th Congresses. Given that
this time-span featured three notable wave elections (2006, 2008, and 2010), which one would
expect to pull district electorates in strong national directions, this is a strong test. I find that, even
in this short period, many districts exhibit monotonic change, and that the changes are bimodally
clustered in the most ideologically extreme districts—in other words, districts are polarizing. I find
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that changes in demographic, economic, and crime indicators at the district-level significantly
explain aggregate ideological change.
Finally, Chapter 5 comprehensively tests House responsiveness using my measures. Within
the accepted framework of spatial theories of voting, particularly the Median Voter Theorem, I
operationalize the median district voter as the ideology measures derived in Chapter 3. I test
whether both candidates and legislators change their positions in accordance with changes in
median voter ideology. I also test whether legislators respond to partisan subconstituencies, which
is the expectation of the Median Voter Theorem’s cousin, the Directional Voting Model. Due to
the overwhelming influence of partisanship on legislative behavior in contemporary American
politics, I bifurcate my analysis by party. I find evidence that candidates and representatives do
not respond to their geographic constituencies, and are instead sensitive to the attitudes of their
party supporters. This is a confirmation of the party responsiveness hypothesis, which has a long
history in Congress scholarship but has not received a systematic empirical treatment over multiple
Congresses. I conclude by discussing partisan representations’ troubling implications for
normative theories of democratic representation.
Accounts of democratic legitimacy demand that public opinion has a role in the formation
of policy. It must have this role not only on particular issues or votes, but generally. Good exit poll
data, harnessed with the statistical power of MRP, will enable Political Science to determine House
of Representatives is truly “the people’s House,” or an out-of-touch institution separated from
voters by a wide democratic deficit.
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Chapter 2. Measuring District-Level Ideology
The Problem
If the representation of public opinion is an important feature of any democracy (Key 1961), and
if the House of Representatives is supposed to be the most representative branch of American
government, then the development of valid and reliable measures of district attitudes should be a
priority of Political Science. Ideally, a test of legislative responsiveness would have at its disposal
a national survey that frequently interviews large-n samples in all 435 House districts (Aroin and
Garand 2003). No such survey exists, nor—but in the unlikely event that House incumbents
authorize the National Science Foundation funding to study their own performance—will it ever
exist. Congress scholarship has therefore relied on small-N district samples that are disaggregated
from national surveys, as well as other indirect stand-ins for the true and unobserved value of
district-level opinion. Does this tack necessarily call the scholarship’s veracity into question? The
answer is that it likely does. Achen (1978) notes that such measures possess high rates of error,
which harms econometric models of legislative responsiveness. Because measurement error in an
individual predictor biases its regression coefficient to zero, a regression of legislative behavior on
an imperfect measure of district-level ideology is likely to result in a finding of nonresponsiveness. Significantly, a large portion of historical responsiveness research since the early
1970s consists of null findings (see, for instance, Bernstein 1989).
This chapter will review most of the ways in which scholars operationalized district-level
ideology. I discuss, first, the approach of the early behavioralists who were the first to gauge the
effects of constituency pressure. They derived measures of district policy attitudes from a
University of Michigan study of the 1958 midterm election. Second, in light of the problems with
these and similar measures, I catalogue the proxy measures (demographics, vote shares,
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simulations, and others) that researchers have offered as alternatives. Proxy measures
unfortunately diverge, both conceptually and empirically, too greatly from ideology to serve as
adequate substitutes. Third, I discuss simulation approaches that impute district ideologies using
many proxies. While constituting an advance, these suffer from many of the same problems as
disaggregation and proxy methods they seek to refine. Finally, I discuss multilevel regression
imputation and post-stratification (MRP), the state-of-the-art methodology for estimating subnational public opinion. This recent scholarship applies a Bayesian approach to individual survey
responses, calculates the attitudinal propensities of demographic groups, and then weights these
propensities by their demographic composition per district. While accepted as valid and reliable,
even MRP-derived estimates of district-level ideology, I argue, import contentious assumptions
about public opinion.

Survey Disaggregation
Miller and Stokes (1963) founded the modern House responsiveness literature, and were the first
to develop an empirical test of dyadic representation. They generated district-level measures of
public opinion on social welfare, foreign affairs, and civil rights with survey disaggregation.
Disaggregation entails taking one or several large-n national surveys and breaking down the
sample to sub-national geographic levels, for instance states or House districts. The only data
available to Miller and Stokes was the 1958 American National Election Study (ANES). This
survey was the second wave of a four-year panel study that tried to identify the long-term
determinants of voting behavior. Unfortunately, case attrition and budget constraints reduced this
study’s sample size to only 1,450, making the ANES a poor candidate for survey disaggregation.
As a result, Miller and Stokes tried to correlate measures of representative behavior—based on
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scores of roll call votes, as well as private interviews with legislators—with district aggregations
of ANES responses with an average sample size of only 11. Moreover, Miller and Stokes could
only measure attitudes in 116 districts. Erikson (1978) and Achen (1978) criticized Miller and
Stokes’ methodology on account of its obvious proneness to sampling error. The former found that
error caused Miller and Stokes to overestimate the covariance of constituent and representative
opinion, while the latter found that they underestimated it.
Is the problem with Miller and Stokes’ groundbreaking work, however, merely a data
problem? More modern studies of sub-national public opinion have disaggregated commercial and
social-scientific polls with ns many times the sample size of the 1958 ANES. Erikson, Wright, and
McIver (1993) pioneered the creation of measures of state-level ideology by merging and
disaggregating over 100 CBS/New York Times surveys. At the district level, Clinton (2006)
revived the Miller and Stokes approach by disaggregating the 1999/2000 National Annenberg
Election Study (NAES), which includes ten times the number of cases as the 1958 ANES. The
NAES also uses a random digit dialing sampling method as opposed to the cluster sampling of the
ANES, and therefore has greater geographic coverage and representativeness than the latter. (For
a discussion of the perils of cluster sampling for survey disaggregation, see Stollwerk 2012).
Increasing the sample size by even 1000% may not be enough, however. Erikson (1978)
finds that even the largest national surveys contain too few cases to provide valid, reliable measures
of district-level opinion. Clinton’s paper reports that the average district sample size is only 41. To
get around the n problem, scholars who employ disaggregation typically concatenate surveys
administered over many years, which is problematic if aggregate public opinion is unstable.
Erikson, Wright, and McIver—in Statehouse Democracy and follow-up studies—vigorously argue
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that subnational public opinion has been glacially stable since World War II. This interpretation is
questionable, a point to which I will return later.
Survey disaggregation also has limitations that the mere addition of cases does not fully
resolve. Because disaggregation operates on surveys with a national coverage frame—that is,
sampled and weighted to project the results to a national population—, the disaggregated samples
are unweighted by the population characteristics of the desired geographic area. This is particularly
problematic for small states, where surveys have only a few PSUs (primary sampling units) that
are disproportionately concentrated in population centers. The raw tabulation of responses are
unlikely to be representative of the state populations and are thus rife with sampling error (Berk
1983; Hill and Hurley 1984). One can only imagine that the disaggregated estimates for House
districts, with population sizes comparable to the least populated states, are even more biased.
Adding to the bias is the fact that many surveys, including the NAES, oversample minorities. Once
survey weighting is removed, it becomes impossible to interpret the results as random samples of
national, state, or district populations.

Alternatives to Direct Measurement
In the years between Miller and Stokes’ seminal study and Clinton’s revival of survey
disaggregation, most studies of House responsiveness relied on proxies for district ideology. The
proxies are variables that do not gauge the actual disposition of House constituencies, but that bear
a close enough relationship to district ideology to serve as surrogates. I will here analyze three sets
of proxies that have appeared in responsiveness literature: demographics, presidential returns, and
ballot initiative returns.
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First, many scholars have used decennial Census figures for this purpose. These include
district demographics like education, income, age, social class, occupational distribution,
urbanization, and rates of home ownership (Pool, Abelson, and Popkin 1965; Sinclair-Deckard
1976; Weber and Shaffer 1972). If there is a systematic relationship between constituent
demographics and policy preferences, this line of research reasons, then representatives will use
demographics as approximations of said preferences in their voting behavior. If this is the case,
then the influence of demographics on roll call voting is a “good enough” indicator of legislative
responsiveness.
Are the assumptions of the demographic proxy line of scholarship true? Auguste Comte
famously said that “demographics is destiny,” but this is sadly not the case in politics.
Demographics empirically have weak, nonlinear, or uncertain correlations with district ideology
(Bishin 2000). Conceptually, it is difficult to imagine how the Census could reliably signal to
legislators how to vote on most issues:
Knowing, for instance, that a district has a high proportion of its citizens with a college
education does not necessarily give a legislator clear, unambiguous signals about the policy
preferences of constituents, since this demographic characteristic, like others, is not
perfectly related to policy preferences (Ardoin and Garand 2003, 1169).
Still, even if a demographic could unambiguously signal constituent opinion to legislators, how
would we know? There is no obviously best metric by which to select demographic predictors in
a responsiveness model. Because the relationship between aggregate demographics and aggregate
public opinion is unobservable for House districts, researchers choose those variables that predict
ideology at the individual level. They thereby commit the ecological fallacy, as they cannot assume
that individual-level predictors are reliable aggregate-level predictors.
Second, district-wide presidential returns have served as a proxy for district-level ideology
(Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Canes-Wrone, Cogan, and Brady 2002). This makes
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sense, since presidential vote is an observed political variable. It is also frequently updated, such
that it permits longitudinal analysis (Kernell 2009). This proxy is nonetheless problematic because
campaign-specific factors govern the outcomes of presidential elections (Levundusky, Pope, and
Jackman 2008), and the ideological intensity of some elections is stronger than others (for instance,
the 1976 presidential election was comparatively unideological). Even more crucially, ideology is
not the only structural determinant of voting: the leitmotif of political behavior ever since The
American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) is that partisanship and other deep-seated group affiliations
explain vote choice better than issue attitudes. In light of this, it is hard to agree with the strong
assumptions required to interpret presidential vote as a proxy for district attitudes, namely that
“issue positions espoused by the two parties’ presidential candidates are perceived similarly by
everyone and that all voters vote according to the spatial model” (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and
Stewart 2001, 40). Attempts to refine the presidential vote proxy by removing short-term forces,
moreover, are problematic. The resulting measures of district ideology can only be ranked
ordinally (not cardinally), and even then only on the assumption of equal variance across districts
(Kernell 2009).
Finally, a third proxy of constituent ideology has been referenda votes (McCrone and
Kuklinski 1979). The advantage of ballot initiative returns as opposed to presidential returns is
that they are clearly interpretable as indicators of public opinion. I might vote for a presidential
candidate on the basis of non-attitudinal characteristics like looks and trustworthiness, but I am
unlikely to vote for a referendum because its font on the ballot was aesthetically pleasing. Gerber
and Lewis (2004) made excellent use of this proxy when they disaggregated election data in Los
Angeles County, whose voters they subdivided into State Senate, state Assembly, and House
districts. Voting on 1992 ballot initiatives served as proxies for district ideologies, to which they
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found representatives responsive only in homogenous districts. Their data and measures, however,
are limited to states and years with ballot initiatives that suitably track ideology. They foreclose
any inquiry that looks at responsiveness nationally, and over multiple elections.

Simulations
Dissatisfaction with both survey disaggregation and proxies led researchers to see if they might
have better luck by combining both approaches. Recall that survey disaggregation builds measures
using individual survey responses, whereas proxies are aggregate measures. Would it not make
sense to create a measure of district ideology that incorporates individual- and aggregate-level
data? Erikson (1978) thought so, and used this insight to simulate district attitudes. First, using the
ANES panel study, he regressed individual ideology on individual demographic characteristics.
Then, he multiplied the unstandardized regression coefficients by district demographics. Erikson’s
measures are more strongly related to representative behavior than are Miller and Stokes’ raw
tabulations, thus establishing good face validity. This innovative approach nonetheless suffers
from the limitations of previous approaches. Owing to their exclusive reliance on demographic
variables, the simulated models’ fits (R2) are unfortunately low. Therefore, like Miller and Stokes’
raw measures taken from the same dataset, simulated measures are prone to measurement error.
Ardoin and Garand (2003) refer to Erikson’s simulation as “bottom-up,” since is begins at
the individual level and proceeds to higher levels of aggregation. Their alternative is a “top-down”
simulation, whereby they first model predictions for state-level ideology (as operationalized by
Erickson, Wright and McIver [1993]), and then substitute the aggregate district-level predictors
for the aggregate state-level predictors. Estimating aggregate variables using a model from an even
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higher level of aggregation seems counter-intuitive. It makes sense, however, since aggregatelevel regressions tend to explain more variation than individual-level ones.
I nonetheless identify four major problems with top-down simulations. First, the state-level
attitude measures used in the first aggregate-level regression must themselves be valid. As I
discussed previously, Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s measures are simply the unweighted state
means of responses in national commercial surveys, and their measures for small and
heterogeneous states are likely to suffer from bias. Second, given that Erikson, Wright, and
McIver’s numbers are collapsed over many years (for instance, one set of estimations for the
1980s, and another for the 1990s), the top-down model problematically assumes that ideology at
the state level is constant, as are the effects of demographic variables on state-level ideology. Third,
aggregate variables might have different effects at different levels of analysis (Gelman 2009). As
the authors themselves acknowledge, a majority black district will be more liberal than a majority
white district, but states with larger black populations tend to be more conservative. For this reason,
Ardoin and Garand discard race from their simulation, despite the fact that racial composition is a
strong covariate with district political ideology (Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman 2008). Finally,
fourth, both top-down and bottom-up simulations produce unknown errors (Clinton 2006).
I have documented why methods that people have historically employed to estimate
district-level public opinion are unworkable. Measures derived from survey disaggregation suffer
from catastrophic sampling error. Demographic proxies fail to explain the majority of variance in
political attitudes, save for rare niche issues that unusually correlate with a demographic or set of
demographics (see, for instance, Bailey 2001). Election proxies fail because election outcomes are
susceptible to the influence of factors other than ideology. The various simulation methods make
strong measurement and parametric assumptions that are unamenable to testing. Ten years ago,
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responsiveness literature was at an impasse. Unable to clearly measure constituent inputs in House
representative behavior, the literature’s biggest contribution was perhaps environmental: entire
forests gave their lives in the service of methodological critiques.

The MRP Revolution
Luckily, research has since taken an unexpected and salutary turn. A new statistical technology
has emerged to fulfill Miller and Stokes’ promise of empirically testing responsiveness. This
method, multilevel regression imputation and post-stratification (MRP), has rapidly become social
science’s state-of-the-art method for disaggregating survey data (Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006).
MRP bears three major similarities with older simulation techniques. First, it proposes to directly
measure public opinion, rather than rely exclusively on surrogates. Second, like simulations, MRP
synthesizes the disaggregation and proxy approaches in its incorporation of both individual- and
aggregate-level predictors of ideology. A third similarity is that, like simulations but unlike raw
disaggregation, it does not strictly require national surveys with large ns.
Where MRP differs from older simulations is, first, in its use of random geographic effects
to help model state- and district-level ideology. Aggregate fixed effects (such as, say, the district’s
African-American population) in turn help model geographic effects (Lax and Phillips 2009b).
Second, MRP incorporates a powerful probability adjustment using individual-level Census data.
The result is that MRP is exceptionally sensitive to between-district variation in public opinion,
and discards the problematic assumption of “top-down” simulations that demographic indicators
have the same regression coefficient at every level of aggregation.
MRP proceeds in two discrete steps. First, using national survey data, a multilevel model
estimates a dependent individual-level political variable (for instance, ideology) using
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demographic (for instance, age and income) and geographic (for instance, state and congressional
district) predictors. The incorporation of geographic effects is a novelty that deserves brief
expatiation. MRP assumes that each level of American politics (national, regional, state, and House
district) contributes to political attitudes in some way. If (say) I am a respondent in a national
survey, the model tries to predict my response using various character traits (white, male, aged 2529, earning between $18,000 and $30,000, and residing in a rural area). My response (“liberal”)
affects the prediction of everyone else in the model. But because I am nested within Maine’s First
Congressional District, the multilevel model also applies the effect of that variation unexplained
by demographics to other cases in my district, state, and region. MRP here differs starkly from the
exclusively demographic approach, which might predict that Maine’s 95% white (but solidly
Democratic) 1st District is conservative.
After the model generates a prediction for every possible demographic and geographic type
(or “cell,” in the literature’s parlance), MRP requires a second step. This step performs a
probability adjustment by weighting the cell predictions by the actual proportion of these cells in
each district. In more technical language, the step requires the researcher to use an inverse logit
function that, given the derived multi-level regression coefficients, assigns a predicted value (say,
the likelihood of an individual self-reporting as liberal) for every case in an individual-level Census
dataset. These predictions are then weighted and averaged at the state or district levels. The
probability adjustment, crucially, produces reliable and unbiased aggregate estimates of public
opinion at the district level, even from national surveys with relatively small sample sizes (Lax
and Phillips 2009a). MRP outperforms all previous methods of estimating state- and district-level
public opinion, including top-down simulations, irrespectively of sample size (Warshaw and
Rodden 2012b).
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We can see how MRP defeats raw disaggregation when we think about how the method
corrects for data deficiencies. For Congressional districts with few cases in the national survey,
the raw district average of ideology does not carry much information. Thus, in the first MRP step,
the multi-level model endogenously pulls the predicted value of cases towards state, regional, and
national averages, a phenomenon called “shrinkage towards the mean” (Pacheco 2009). In the
second MRP step, post-stratification uses the nationwide regression coefficients of both
individual- and aggregate- demographic covariates with ideology to produce an estimate. This
adjustment corrects for non-representative samples of states and districts in the national survey,
while preserving the prediction information of the individual-level model. In contrast, for districts
with large ns, and in which the survey selected a reasonably representative sample of PSUs, MRP
is unlikely to produce an estimate that meaningfully differs from the results of raw disaggregation.
How has MRP spoken to the question of legislative responsiveness thus far? Lax and
Phillips (2009a) found that state policies towards eight gay rights policies were highly responsive
to MRP-imputed public attitudes towards them, more-so even than ideology. However, in a wider
study of 39 policy issues, the same authors found that state policies were congruent with majority
opinion only half the time (Lax and Philips 2012), with troubling implications for statehouse
democracy in the United States. Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) use MRP on a massive
sample—275,000 cases, pooled from multiple sources—to impute constituency opinion at the
state-legislative and city levels. They find a “strong link between public opinion and city taxation
regimes.” In the Senate, Kastellec, Lax and Philips (2010) find that state-level public opinion was
a significant predictor of Supreme Court confirmation votes.
The path of state-level MRP is now well-trodden. In the still-unplowed lands of House
research, Warshaw and Rodden (2012) use MRP on the Cooperative Congressional Election Study
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(CCES), a large-n online survey designed by Harvard researchers and conducted by YouGov, to
produce district-level profiles along seven different policy domains. These domains emphasize
“moral” issues such as stem cell research and abortion. They find that representatives are
unresponsive to district attitudes on moral issues, owing to partisan and activist pressure at the
national level. Wichowsky (2009) uses MRP to determine whether a citizen agrees with his or her
House representative across a wide set of issue domains. She finds that incumbents are sanctioned
for their disagreements with constituents, especially where electoral competition is robust and
varies by policy. Incumbents respond to constituent preferences even if citizens are not actively
monitoring them, because challengers can appear at any time. Given that citizens know little about
legislators’ roll call votes, elites (namely, electoral challengers) must publicize these
disagreements to affect voting behavior at all. Therefore, according to Wichowsky, competition
incentivizes responsive behavior, as it triggers sanctioning. Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013)
find that representatives respond to party pressures independent of district-level opinion, thus
identifying a key mechanism for shirking. Lastly, Bishin and Smith (2013) use MRP of national
polls to estimate district-level opinion for the Defense of Marriage Act (1996) vote. They find that
subconstituency politics—the presence of intensely motivated groups, operationalized as the
presence of LGBT or evangelical communities within each district—explain why some Democrats
“shirked” majority public opinion to support minority rights. MRP is therefore at the forefront of
responsiveness research, and has helped research amend Downs’ (1957a) parsimonious demand
model of representation, wherein representatives respond exclusively to their median constituent.
The advantage of these newer studies is that they match direct measures of district-level
ideology with appropriate counterparts at the elite level. It is plausible to interpret a relationship
between (say) a House representative’s vote on the Affordable Care Act and her district’s average
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MRP-imputed attitude towards healthcare reform as legislative responsiveness. In contrast, older
approaches would have tested the relationship between the same vote and a proxy such as districtlevel poor or uninsured populations, when in fact it is not clear that representatives would interpret
this information as constituency pressure for or against healthcare reform. Another advantage of
MRP responsiveness literature over predecessor approaches that it can test a wider range of issue
positions. Raw disaggregation requires the concatenation of hundreds of surveys to generate
meaningful measures of subnational ideology, whereas MRP can do just as well with one tenth the
number of cases (Lax and Phillips 2009b). As a result, even if just one national poll of an average
size includes an item for an issue position, it may still be possible to assign dispositions towards
the issue at the desired geographic level.
While MRP has ushered in a new generation of scholars who approach the study of
legislative responsiveness with unprecedented confidence, current MRP research is not without
problems. I will focus on three of them: the fact that they do not measure the attitudes of known
voters, their assumption of attitude stability, and their inability to test responsiveness in general.

Bringing Voters Back In
It is naïve to think that MRP is a panacea for bad and missing data. In the words of one set of
critics, “one should not presume that the properties of the MRP model are sufficient to produce
the desired opinion estimates from conventional national survey samples” (Buttice and Highton
2013, 465). The following critiques are therefore not of the statistical technology of MRP-derived
measures, but rather of the number and types of respondents from which the measures are imputed.
Flaws in the data threaten to distort our understanding of constituents. This distortion, in turn,
potentially frustrates the ability of Political Science to assess the question of representation.
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The first flaw is that these studies disaggregate samples of the general voting-age
population, and not of the electorate. Commercial polls, as well as social-scientific surveys like
the CCES, fail to distinguish voters from nonvoters in their samples (Silver et al. 1986). They are
administered days, weeks, or months before or after elections, and dramatically over-report voter
turnout due to social desirability response bias (Traugott and Katosh 1979) and the fact that
politically engaged individuals self-select as survey respondents (Burden 2000). While the latter
individuals are more likely to vote than the disengaged, they are also more likely to misreport
having voted (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012). The CCES therefore reports voter turnout to be as
high as 90% for some years. In the past, poll disaggregators’ inelegant solution to this problem
was simply to dispense with survey weighting, on the theory that unweighted tabulations more
closely approximate voters than weighted ones (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). Luckily,
better solutions now exist. The administrators of the CCES, and formerly the those of the ANES,
have thus undertaken the costly exercise of validating responses using county-level registration
and turnout records. Is this satisfactory? Some have raised concerns that this matching process
systematically misclassifies respondents due to poor recordkeeping and flawed matching
technology (Berent, Krosnick, and Lupia 2011). Moreover, where matching software is
inconclusive and for jurisdictions that do not keep records, voter validation lowers the number of
usable cases in the survey. The CCES Voter Validation Study could not validate 20% of its sample,
including every respondent in Virginia, from 2006 to 2010. Using MRP with known voters in the
CCES is certain to produce less reliable estimates than with the entire CCES sample.
Should we care? In the context of responsiveness, the answer is yes. An inquiry into
legislative responsiveness must have a theoretical expectation about whom legislators are
responding to, and it is unsound to assume without proof that they would respond to everyone.
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More likely, they respond only to voters: either all voters in the district, or perhaps to some subset
of especially loyal voters, as Huntington (1950) and Fiorina’s (1974) “subconstituency hypothesis”
holds. The voters-only view is plausible because every obvious linkage of constituent preferences
and roll call behavior involves political participation. According to Griffin and Newman (2005),
these links include voters selecting likeminded representatives, voters communicating their
opinions to policymakers, and representatives proactively inferring voter preferences. If this is
true, we would expect that competitive elections increase the extent to which representatives
respond to voters, and there is indeed evidence for this “marginality hypothesis” in the House
(Griffin 2006).
Taking a broader view, we see that Congress scholarship has long taught that the “electoral
connection”—the transmission of attitudes from the public to lawmakers through voting—looms
large as a determinant of floor votes. In Mayhew’s (1974) classic model of distributional politics,
representatives are single-minded reelection seekers who devote their resources (which include
votes) to advertise themselves, claim credit for popular policies, and take positions to ingratiate
themselves with constituents. Fenno (1978) similarly believes that even electorally safe
representatives focus on expanding and maintaining their “reelection constituencies” (rather than
trying to appeal to their “geographic constituencies,” which may contain nonvoters and
irreconcilable opponents who are politically useless) and emphasizes that they do so by connecting
with voters through a “home style.”
Fenno and Mayhew tell us that voters matter. But would they lead us to believe that voter
ideology matters, at least to the extent that it deserves a privileged position vis-à-vis public opinion
as a whole? After all, Mayhew models representatives as concerned with policy only inasmuch as
policy allows them to distribute concentrated benefits to their districts, and Fenno holds that style
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outranks substance; a representative’s ability to credibly explain her votes to constituents can lead
to reelection no less than robotically adhering to the voting public’s preferences.
We have reason to think voter ideology does matter, however. The securement and
advertisement of concentrated benefits in Congressional districts is one way to court voters, but it
has never been the most important one. According to Stein and Bickers, the pork barrel is primarily
the refuge of very vulnerable representatives, and “most members of the general public remain
indifferent to alterations in the flow of new awards [to their districts]” (1994, 377). Pork has
declined in importance in an era of mounting deficits, and after the 112th Congress’ likely
permanent elimination of earmarks. Moreover, the electoral conditions that prevailed in the days
of Mayhew’s electoral connection have radically changed. Fenno himself predicted that, as
districts necessarily become larger and more complex due to national population growth, policy
responsiveness would replace schmoozing as the best strategy to build and reinforce trust with
constituents. His insights were prophetic, but size and complexity are not the only ways that district
electorates have changed. The biggest change has been polarization. The partisan realignment of
the South catalyzed a sorting process whereby liberals have increasingly identified as Democrats
and conservatives increasingly identified as Republicans (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011).
Polarization has undermined distributional explanations for representative behavior and has
increased the importance of ideological connections to the mass electorate. The correlation
between voter ideology and House vote has therefore dramatically increased (Jacobson 2013, 128),
and this sea change in voting behavior has—more-so than institutional changes like (say) the
phasing out of the old seniority- and consensus-driven “textbook” Congress—engendered a
corresponding change in elite behavior (Abramowitz 2010a). Figure 2.1 highlights the divergent
voting behavior of self-identified liberals and conservatives in House races.
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Figure 2.1: Ideology and Two-Party House Vote
National Exit Polls (1976-2010)
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In the wake of these changes, Congress is now unrecognizable to the scholarship if the
sixties and seventies. No longer is the institution an irrelevancy compared to the modern
presidency (Huntington 1965) or a corrupt establishment, “oblivious to the changing political
sentiments of the country” (Fiorina 1989, 15), whose main purpose is chasing down constituents’
Social Security checks in exchange for votes. Members of a now-transformed Congress have
deemphasized localized, distributional politics and have instead emphasized national ideological
issues (Pietryka 2012). They now govern as members of responsible, polarized parties-ingovernment. Parties, not committee chairs, rule Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993), and it is
likely that changing voter behavior bears some responsibility this change.
The growing correlation between ideology and House vote has arguably attenuated the
ability of representatives to appeal to “shirk” from voter opinion. The same scholars who once
worried about the “vanishing marginals”—viz., the proliferation of representatives who, election
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after election, face no significant challenge irrespective of their voting records—have now revised
their views, and find that representatives out-of-step with district-level policy attitudes face grave
electoral risks. In an institution well-known for high reelection rates and low challenger quality,
incumbent representatives of districts with opposite party majorities now incur defeat in over half
of their elections (Schaffner 2015). Voters can and do hold representatives to account for their
floor voting behavior (Ansolabehere and Jones 2010), and even when voters are largely ignorant
of major votes, incumbents understand that challengers can at any time publicize votes that diverge
from the policy preferences of district electorates (Wichowsky 2009). According to Bafumi and
Herron (2010), representatives—cognizant of the need to strengthen their perceived identity with
their closest supporters, or face defeat in primary or general elections—have recently grown more
ideologically extreme than their constituents as a whole. In competitive races, ideologicallymotivated voters may have outstripped the median constituent in importance. When member
replacement occurs, a politician of one extreme replaces her mirror image on the other so as to
“leapfrog” the median constituent. In his literature review of Congressional responsiveness,
Shapiro (2013) speculates that representatives may in fact be over-responding to voters and elite
political participants at the expense of non-voters.
What are such trends’ implications for MRP research? The main implication is that,
because we have a strong theoretical expectation that policy responsiveness has supplanted
distributional (Mayhew) and interpersonal (Fenno) reelection-maximizing strategies, it is now
more necessary than ever to predict congressional behavior with measures of voter attitudes, not
those of the general population. Voter ideology decides House elections, and voter ideology is
what representatives are likely to respond to. The new line of responsiveness literature needs to
operationalize constituent attitudes as voter attitudes. To date, it has not.
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The above discussion would not distort MRP-derived measures if voters’ were politically
indistinguishable from those of the general population. This is not the case. A certainty of Political
Science is that the American voter’s attitudes systematically differ from that of nonvoters. Voters
are older, more educated, and have higher socioeconomic statuses (SES) than nonvoters
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), the latter of which correlates with the civic skills necessary for
formal and informal modes of political participation (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995).
Importantly from the standpoint of responsiveness, these voter characteristics map onto political
attitudes. Griffin and Newman (2006, 1223) write of state-level electorates:
Voters are more conservative than nonvoters, and voters are better represented by elected
officials … Our results based on state-level differences between voters and nonvoters
suggest that increases in turnout may lead to greater policy liberalism.
The differences between voters and the general population are likely to have grown as
representatives’ election constituencies are increasingly sorted into ideologically-divergent party
blocs.
Moreover, the profile of the electorate varies from cycle to cycle in ways that the general
population does not. According to Wattenberg and Brians (2002, 408), “Democrats are more likely
to have demographic characteristics associated with low turnout and therefore are more inclined
to drop off in a low stimulus election.” Midterm elections are lower stimulus than presidential
elections, and thus feature more smaller electorates (see Figure 2.2 for Census-derived turnout
data, and Figure 2.3 for the demographic breakdown of voters in federal elections from year to
year). These smaller electorates, consistent with Wattenberg and Brians’ prediction, are more
conservative; according to national exit polls from 1976 to 2010, midterm year voters are 4.5%
more likely to self-identify as “conservative” than presidential year voters.
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Figure 2.2: Voter Turnout, Voting-Age Citizens
Current Population Survey Voter Supplement
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Figure 2.3: Frequency of Voter Demographic Traits
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Not only do previous studies employing MRP globally miscategorize the traits of
constituents, but they also assume that the universe of constituents does not change from elections.
This assumption requires testing: responsiveness, after all, is a dynamic process that centers on
changing political conditions. Legislators, who are reelection-seekers more than they are
popularity-seekers, could therefore be responding to short-term fluctuations in electoral
preferences that are invisible in the public opinion polls used by conventional MRP approaches.
My next chapter will explore how I might synthesize MRP with Lijphart’s time-tested insight that
“who votes, and who doesn’t has important consequences for who gets elected and for the content
of public politics” (1997, 4).

The Misplaced Assumption of Stability
A second limitation of extant MRP literature is that, in order to attain a sample size large enough
to cover all 435 House districts, researchers have had to collapse survey data across several years.
Attitudes towards specific policies, in particular, force researchers’ hands; such items appear in
fewer datasets, and in fewer years, than items like ideology and partisanship. In collapsing data,
social scientists trade off precision for higher ns—that is, they must assume that the attitude or set
of attitudes they are simulating are stable. They also arguably lose sight of what they are trying to
study. Responsiveness is not a phenomenon amenable to static measures, either of constituents or
legislators. It takes place over time, as representatives gradually make policy that takes constituent
pressure into account. A cross-sectional analysis of legislation is therefore more likely to
underestimate responsiveness than a longitudinal one (Lax and Phillips 2012, 157-8).
More importantly, the assumption that constituent attitudes are stable is too strong to safely
make. Good but largely untested reasons exist to suppose that public opinion in subnational
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geographic jurisdictions are unstable. One of them is that demographic compositions, which
predict ideology in the aggregate, change. In a country where as much as twenty percent of
residents move annually (Census 2012), population replacement alone could account for the
instability of public opinion in Congressional districts. In this case, new district residents would
replace older residents with different political attitudes. In this vein, one of the many notable
hypotheses for polarization in the U.S. is “partisan sorting,” whereby individuals with similar
characteristics and similar patterns of political behavior are choosing to live in the same areas; the
net result are political homogenous congressional districts (Bishop 2008). Moving beyond
migration, we might also expect local economic performance, which is often independent of
national economic trends, to produce district-level ideological instability (Brace et al. 2004, 530).
It would be surprising if district preferences were completely static, and the assumption of
stability runs up against mounting evidence that attitudes are unstable at the national (Stimson
1999) and state levels. In the latter research area, the once-dominant image of stable, glacially
shifting state-level electorates—researchers used Elazar’s (1966) static “subcultures” as workable
measures of state-level ideology for many years—has been overthrown. Berry et al. (1998; 2007)
have found a wide temporal variation in the interest group scores of state House delegations and
their electoral challengers, which they operationalize as state-level ideology. Brace et al. (2004)
found temporal variation in the state-level ideologies of 20% of American states between 1960
and 1993 using a measure derived from the General Social Survey and American National Election
Study. Pacheco (2014) finds that while state-level symbolic ideology is relatively stable,
preferences towards certain policies (such as state government spending and the death penalty)
exhibit both dynamism (change) and heterogeneity (having state-specific trends that differ from
the changing national policy mood). Whether constituent ideology, let alone voter ideology, is
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stable at the district level is unknown. Granting this, the fact that election-driven member
replacement, and not changes in the behavior of House incumbents, is responsible for most of the
historical change in House floor voting (Theriault 2006; Poole 2007) suggests that district
preferences must change at least occasionally. And if district-level ideology is variable, then the
results of all extant district-level MRP simulations (which generate only one estimate for each
district, at one point in time) are quickly outdated.

The Case for Symbolic Ideology
Two competing conceptualizations of ideology exist in American public opinion literature. The
first, operational ideology, refers to individuals’ attitudes towards discrete policies or policy
domains. Most MRP responsiveness research tests measures of operational ideology. Indeed,
MRP’s advantages is that it expands the universe of issue positions amenable to survey
disaggregation.
However, it is important to not lose sight of the forest for the trees. My final critique of
conventional MRP research is its excessively narrow focus on issue attitudes. This focus threatens
to cloud our understanding of responsiveness in general and over multiple election cycles. The
threat comes from the fact that the lifespan of most issues is short (Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner
and Jones 1993). Even if issues do linger on the national agenda, their context and meaning may
change. For example, the domain of gay rights has evolved from attitudes towards anti-sodomy
laws, to laws against workplace and housing discrimination, to the legalization of civil unions, and
finally to the recognition of gay marriage. Suppose we wanted to measure policy mood on gay
rights over time. An MRP researcher would struggle to do so, since the issue, as well as the items
that surveys choose to include on questionnaires, underwent several rapid transformations.
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An alternative approach is the measure ideology more broadly, and rely on the symbolic
conceptualization of ideology. Symbolic ideology refers to individuals’ self-placed ideological
beliefs. Behavioralists traditionally interpret symbolic ideology as a simplifying belief system that
“constrains” individuals policy positions, such that one political attitude coheres with another
(Converse 1964), but symbolic ideology has other roles. Media-driven issue framing is another
antecedent of ideological self-identification, as are apolitical associations, as when individual
identify as “conservative” because the word refers to moral rectitude in everyday speech. While
some scholarship has held that symbolic ideology refers mainly to affective attachments to abstract
symbols, and therefore not directly related to issue attitudes (Conover and Feldman 1981), recent
work has shown that symbolic ideology is an important independent determinant of political
behavior. This is particularly true among the educated, to whom the meaning of abstract
ideological concepts are most readily accessible (Popp and Rudolph 2011). Ideological selfidentification helps independently explain vote choice (Levitin and Miller 1979; Stimson 1975),
issue attitudes (Jacoby 1991; Sears et al. 1980), and favorability towards government spending
(Jacoby 1994; 2000; Rudolph and Evans 2005).
Some argue that symbolic ideology is less precise than its operational counterpart, but I
counter that it is better adapted to historical analysis of responsiveness. Whereas the policy agenda
unpredictably fluctuates, and it is impossible to know what America’s policy agenda will be in
advance, self-reported ideology measures the same thing over many decades. Attempts to measure
operational ideology over long periods of time are of limited utility. For instance, the policy items
in the GSS and ANES have not changed in a lifetime, and therefore may not accurately track policy
mood on the most important, salient issues of the day. The domain of civil rights issues, in one
example, declined dramatically in salience in the 1970s (Best 1999), perhaps rendering time-bound
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Miller and Stokes’ finding that representatives are especially responsive to constituent opinion on
race. In contrast, while the ideological composition of the American electorate changes, the
meanings of ideologies are stable despite the efforts of political elites to modify them—most
famously when Republican strategists turned “liberal” into an epithet (Jacoby 1995). Only
measurements of symbolic ideology offer the chance of studying attitude stability and instability
independently of accidental, agenda-setting factors.
Symbolic ideology, being more constant and comprehensive than its ideological
counterpart, make it a better conceptualization of district dispositions. Representatives cannot
know in advance what their constituents think of particular issues that appear de novo on the
national agenda. The proportion of liberals to conservatives in their districts, however, can predict
issue opinion in the future. When they cast particular roll call votes, it thus makes sense for
representatives to gauge constituent attitudes using this information. If MRP scholarship wants to
speak to the question of House responsiveness in its entirety, and not merely to responsiveness on
one vote in one Congress, it should take a longer view of the research question and test measures
of symbolic ideology.

Moving Ahead
Having established itself in the most prestigious journals of American Political Science, MRP must
now come of age. It behooves its practitioners to test the assumptions they have too readily
assumed. I do not propose to join the faultfinders who claim that the absence of direct district-level
survey data will prevent any successful attempt at observing district-level ideology and constituent
influence in the House. I instead propose that MRP-generated exit poll estimates are a corrective
to all of the weaknesses I identified.
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Chapter 3. Disaggregating the Exit Polls
A New Approach
The previous chapter documents the need for a direct measurement of House district ideology.
Multi-level regression imputation and post-stratification, or MRP, is a state-of-the-art survey
disaggregation method that promises to meet this need. It is still only as good, though, as the data
that goes into it. MRP responsiveness literature currently disaggregates commercial polls, as well
as Harvard’s Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), and from them imputes districtlevel public opinion. I identified three data problems implicated in this approach. First, this data
measures the dispositions of the district populations and not district electorates, when only the
latter exercise constituent pressure on roll-call voting. Second, this data contains too few ns to
generate longitudinal MRP estimates of district ideology. Researchers have collapsed surveys over
many years to achieve satisfactory samples, and have made a problematic assumption that district
ideology is stable. Finally, the new generation of scholarship studies measures constituent attitudes
on only specific issues on the national agenda. This limits the breadth of our understanding of
responsiveness.
I put forth exit polls as a promising alternative to the current, limited approaches. Uniquely
among survey instruments, exit polls directly measure voter attitudes and behaviors. They do so at
one point in time, and—in contrast to data concatenated from many sources collected at different
time points—are interpretable as snapshots of public opinion on election day. Exit polls also collect
questionnaires from far more individuals than commercial surveys or even the CCES. This
eliminates the need to collapse surveys over time. These advantages mean that, when combined
with MRP, exit polls can generate biennial district-level estimates of voter ideology.
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I pursue the unexplored exit poll avenue in the subsequent pages. My plan for this chapter
is thus as follows. First, I describe the exit poll phenomenon, and how I believe it will revitalize
literature in legislative responsiveness. Second, I discuss the disadvantages of exit polls, and I how
I propose to ameliorate them. Third, I specify, in detail, every step I take in generating my estimates
of district-level ideology from the exit polls. Finally, fourth, I describe the results, which I hold to
be valid and reliable.

Why Exit Polls Matter
Exit polls interview voters right as they leave the voting booth. They predict returns on election
day even before every vote is cast, and they offer insights into the election immediately after.
Journalists rely on exit polls to explain the most important issues on election day, how different
groups voted, and how voters evaluated candidate traits (Best and Krueger 2012). The first
sporadic exit polls were conducted in the 1940s, but Warren Mitofsky receives credit for
popularizing them (Moore 2003). As director of CBS News’s elections unit in the late 1960s, he
developed a method for randomly selecting precincts in the exit poll’s sampling frame. The
purpose of the first systematic exit polls was to project election results on television, but soon arose
the idea to ask a broader set of questions in order to explain the results. In the early years, this was
impossible due to technical limitations, but by 1972 CBS was able to conduct a nationwide exit
poll with a lengthy series of demographic questions. Journalistic and public interest in exit polls
swelled. In addition, a media arms race emerged in the 1980s: CBS, ABC, NBC, and the Los
Angeles Times all funded their own, separate exit polls in an attempt to be the first to call the
election. Since 1990, news agencies have formed consortia to oversee exit polls and save costs.
These organizations include the now-defunct Voter News Service (VNS) and the extant National
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Election Pool (NEP). They do not themselves conduct the polls, a task they outsource to
specialized polling firms.
The growing market for exit polls has led agencies to fund them even for off-year elections.
Since 1982, CBS News and successor polls have administered state exit polls that are separate
from, but compliment, their national ones. These exit polls administer questionnaires tailored to
each state’s gubernatorial, Senate, and (in small states) House elections as well as ballot initiatives
to voters in all or most states.
The public is widely aware of exit polls, but their inner workings are inaccessible to most
voters. Their most abstruse feature is their complex probability structure. In order to be
generalizable to electorate, an exit poll must select respondents in such a way that every voter in
the country (or, for state exit polls, the state) has an equal chance of receiving a questionnaire. It
must also include a representative mix of demographic and geographic groups across the coverage
frame. To achieve these goals, exit pollsters must A) randomly sample voting precincts and B)
randomly sample voters exiting them. Exit pollsters categorize precincts in each state by two size
strata, to ensure that small precincts have a chance of being selected. Within these strata, they
classify precincts by proprietary sub-state regions to minimize coverage error. Lastly, they classify
them by their vote percentage for one of the major political parties in a previous election, to ensure
that political minorities achieve representation. Pollsters then randomly sample precincts from the
above strata to get a representative set of precincts in both the state and national coverage frames.
On election day, interviewers stand at a specified length away from the booths and are instructed
to intercept and interview every tenth voter. While even in the best of circumstances there is the
possibility of sampling error—not every voter has an equal chance of being approached for the
survey, and not every voter approached has an equal chance of completing the questionnaire—,
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this concern is often rendered harmless once responses are weighted to the actual election returns
(Best and Krueger 2012, 12-13).
Exit polls naturally receive attention on election night, when news desks report the
preliminary turnout rates and frequency distributions of vote choice in the exit poll. The polls are
subsequently quick to fade from the public imagination. Only recently have scholars used them to
study longitudinal trends, with the intention of historically explaining rather than predicting
election results (Best and Krueger 2012). Even now, this intention has confined itself to studying
the national polls. In the field of responsiveness, some researchers have used state exit poll
distributions to validate their own MRP measures of state ideology, but in no instance have they
used exit polls to generate the measures themselves.
Exit polls offer four major benefits for measuring state- and district-level public opinion.
First, exit polls directly measure voter behavior and solve the overreporting of voting that plagues
conventional polls. They allow researchers to dispense with complicated reclassification and voter
validation schemes to prune nonvoters from the sample. If we adopt the sensible assumption that
rational representatives will respond to political participants who can in principle remove them
from office, then exit polls are uniquely suited for analysis of Congressional behavior. In contrast,
the weighted frequency distributions of the voter-validated CCES are at wide variance with
election returns.
A second advantage of exit polls is temporal. Their respondents are known voters who
complete interviews immediately after casting a ballot, when they unlikely to misremember their
vote choice.1 This means that exit poll results are interpretable as a snapshot of public opinion. In

1

Additionally, to account for early and no-excuse absentee voting, exit pollsters have since 1996 conducted randomdigit-dialed phone interviews, the sample size of which is based on the expected ratio of early to election day voting.
The results of these are combined with election day interviews.
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contrast, MRP studies have typically relied on concatenations of survey instruments (say, two
years of the CCES) that are administered over a substantial time-frame. In that case, it hard to
interpret when a House district was 40% liberal; it is possible that public opinion shifted from year
to year. It would therefore be fraught to interpret such a measure as a precise constituent signal to
representatives. In contrast, any relationship between an exit poll-derived measure and
Congressional behavior captures responsiveness to voter ideology on the exact day that voters
authorize incumbent representatives to continue their careers.
A third advantage is that exit polls are self-administered in person. Exit poll respondents
read the questionnaire themselves and confidentially record their own answers, militating against
the social desirability response bias that afflicts phone surveys. Moreover, live administration
makes the exit polls immune to concerns about the increasingly common opt-in Internet survey
mode, which the CCES employs. According to a recent taskforce that the American Association
of Public Opinion Researchers commissioned, the proneness of Internet surveys to measurement
error is not fully understood (AAPOR 2010).
Finally, a fourth advantage of the exit polls is their massive case size, which is far in excess
of conventional telephone surveys and all other prominent academic surveys with a multi-decade
time series. They also collect more questionnaires than the large-n CCES. Table 3.1 shows
compares the ns of the combined state and national exit polls from 2006 to 2010 to the CCES.
After the voter validation study eliminates CCES cases unmatched to voter rolls, we can see that
exit polls have sample sizes that are 150% (2010) to 350% (2008) as large as those in the CCES.
The massive ns permit me to run separate MRP models for each year, whereas researchers running
MRP on the early CCES studies must merge them by year and so produce only one estimate of
district ideology for their time series. Running models for each year offers two advantages. First,
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previous MRP regression models in the House responsiveness genre treat “year” as a random
slope, fitting an effect size for each case grouped by year. While such models account for betweenyear variation unexplained by demographics and geography, they undersell the systematic
differences between midterm- and presidential-year electorates, and cannot account for (say)
different effect sizes for “race” from year to year. (It is probable that the effect of race on
presidential vote choice was more muted in the 1988 presidential election, where 25% of African
Americans voted for George H.W. Bush, than in the 2008 election). Thus I can create better
measures, which capture election-specific dynamics. Second, and more importantly, biennial
measures of district ideology permit me to study responsiveness longitudinally. In contrast, much
previous literature looks at House responsiveness only statically and cross-sectionally, on the
problematic assumption that constituent ideology is stable in the aggregate.
Table 3.1: Ns in the Exit Polls and CCES, 2006 to 2010

53,742

CCES (all
respondents)
36,119

CCES (known
voters)
26,084

2008

83,620

32,461

24,006

2010

55,027

54,857

37,583

Year

Exit Poll

2006

The Disadvantages of Exit Polls
Most critiques of exit polls center on whether or not they “get it right” on election night. Notable
gaffes in 2000 (when miscommunicated country-level election returns caused news networks to
prematurely call Florida for George W. Bush), 2002 (when the results of the state-level exit polls
were so unreliable that they were never released), and 2004 (when the exit polls overestimated
John Kerry’s performance in battleground states) undermined journalistic and public trust in exit
polling (Freeman 2004). These worries are not here relevant. The probability structure of exit polls
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is as sound as any other national poll, and post-stratification often eliminates the response bias that
caused the 2004 debacle (Edison Research 2004).
What is relevant for those who wish to disaggregate exit polls is the problem of missing
data. State exit polls—designed to sample states electorates, naturally, and not district ones—do
not begin to reliably include district-level identifiers until 2004. This limits the scope of their
ability to study responsiveness. Fortuitously, the 2004 election coincides with the election of the
109th Congress, and the true end of the post-2000 redistricting cycle. (The last decade featured
notorious out-of-cycle redistricting in Texas in 2002). The polls in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010
therefore include consistent geographic identifiers, and still afford us a good opportunity to
examine the evolving policy mood of Congressional districts, and the responsiveness of their
representatives.
More troublingly, state exit polls are also not geographically comprehensive. While a
national exit poll is always held biennially, poll administrators do not fund polls in every state
during off-year (and, in 2012, even presidential) elections to save costs. In 2006 and 2010, the
NEP thus restricted its state-level efforts to states holding Senate and gubernatorial elections.
Moreover, even the state polls they do conduct are not fully comprehensive of the Congressional
districts in their coverage frame. As I discussed above, the probability structure of exit polls aims
at geographic comprehensiveness by sampling precincts from a state subregional strata. Even so,
these state subregions (usually 3 to 5 per state) do not track congressional districts and are typically
less numerous than the latter. Whether the pollsters collect questionnaires from precincts in every
Congressional district is accidental, and it is extremely unlikely in populous states such as
California. The exit poll’s recent incorporation of a supplemental telephone survey in eighteen
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states increases the effective number of congressional districts in the biennial sample, but is far
from solving the problem.
It is true that MRP has a built-in mechanism for correcting for missing data: in districts
without a single case, the individual level model without a random slope for “district” generates
the estimate (Kastellec 2012). This raises the question, however, of why to bother using exit polls
as opposed to surveys with greater geographic comprehensiveness. My solution to this problem is
to merge the national exit poll with the state exit poll, dramatically increasing the size and coverage
(the percentage of districts in which there is at least one respondent) of our sample. While such a
merge is unacceptable for normal purposes—the sample of precincts in the national exit polls is
representative only of the national population, such that the weighting between the state and
national exit polls are inconsistent—MRP uses its own probability adjustment in lieu of proprietary
survey weighting.
I therefore merge the state exit polls with the national polls by year (taking care not to
double count respondents who were administered the national questionnaire, some of whom appear
in the state exit poll datasets). Table 3.2 shows the expanded jurisdictional coverage that the merge
accomplishes.
Table 3.2: Cases in the district-level Exit Poll MRP*
Year

Cases

2004

65,193

House
Districts**
379

87%

Average Cases
per District
172

2006

51,139

2008

77,031

377

86%

136

77

428

98%

180

129

2010

56,962

404

93%

141

82

Coverage

Median Cases
per District
103

2004 - 2010
250,325
435
100%
144
100
* Includes cases from both the state and national exit polls, where the variables ideology, race, gender,
income, and population density are not missing. These variables are necessary to create individual-level
predictions of ideology that can then be post-stratified using Census data.
** Includes at-large districts and Washington, D.C.
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Having achieved the sample size necessary for my purposes, I must assesses whether the
combined state and national exit polls meet the subtler data requirements for MRP to produce
valid, reliable estimates. Buttice and Highton (2013), who are skeptical about whether the method
is as panacean as its votaries claim, identify some. The most important requirement, in their
estimation, is that the ratio of the dependent variable’s variation across geographic units is high
relative to its variation within the units. Lax and Phillips (2009b) and Warshaw and Rodden (2012)
found that MRP produces reliable estimates of opinion on moral issues at the state and district
levels respectively, and this is largely because there is a greater level of district homogeneity for
moral attitudes than for other issues domains (Buttice and Highton 2013, 463). Likewise,
gerrymandering and the residential sorting hypothesis (Bishop 2009), as well as the fact that most
at-large districts (with the possible exception of Delaware) are ideologically heterogeneous
compared to most other states, lead me to expect concentrations of liberals and conservatives
within districts.

The Model
With the above considerations in mind, I have chosen to use MRP on a merge of state and national
exit poll data. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the survey item I impute and operationalize
as constituent opinion is self-reported ideology.
MRP begins with an individual-level model of the dependent variable. The goal is to
generate numeric probabilities of different demographic and geographic groups to hold certain
beliefs, in our case whether they self-identify as “liberal” or “conservative.” My model of ideology
must include only those predictors with corresponding variables in a post-stratification dataset,
and must therefore exclude political predictors such as party identification, interest, efficacy, and
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so on. I run two multilevel, mixed-effects binomial regressions to predict ideology for each year:
first, I predict whether or not a respondent is liberal; then, I predict whether or not a respondent is
conservative. Ideology is a function of an individual’s demographics, Congressional district, state,
and region.
It is important to note that the ideology model need not be theoretically useful, nor very
predictive, to work for my purposes. I simply choose my demographic predictors—race, sex,
income, age, and income—because many of these indicators have served as proxies for ideology
in previous literature (for instance Kalt and Zupan 1984; Peltzman 1984), and because MRP
literature has considered them “standard” beginning with the earliest studies (Park et al. 2004,
2006). I also use interaction terms given that the intersection of race and gender variables, as well
as those of age and income, may produce systematic changes in political behavior. Education is
also a standard factor in explaining ideology, but as this item inexplicably does not appear on every
state questionnaire in the exit poll from 2004 to 2010, I substitute the dummy variable “rural”
(whether or not the respondent lives in a Census-designated Metropolitan Statistical Area, or
MSA) in its stead. Theoretically, rural should predict conservatism at the individual level. Table
3.3 shows the result of a simple and none-too-adequate logistic regression of liberal using my
demographic predictors, or dummy recodes thereof. The results validate the common wisdom that
demographics are real, though not very powerful, predictors of individual ideology.
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Table 3.3: Binomial Logistic Regression, Liberal on Demographic Predictors, State Exit Polls
(2004-2010)
Fixed-Effect
Predictor

(1)
Liberal

Affluent

-0.297***
-0.259***
(-20.95)

AfricanAmerican

0.177***
0.232***
(13.68)

Female

0.312***
0.253***
(22.60)

Latino

0.077***
0.150***
(5.91)

Rural

-0.350***
-0.303***
(-24.41)

0.407***
0.581***
(33.60)
N
265,640
Pseudo R2
0.02
Standardized beta coefficients; unstandardized point estimates; robust standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Under 30

I now formally specify the model. For respondent i in a given election year—with indices
j, k, l, m, n, and o for race, age, income, an interaction term of sex and race, an interaction term of
income and age, and district, respectively—the probability of an individual responding “liberal”
is:
age
income
sex_by_race
sex
Pr(yi = 1) = logit-1 (β0 + αrace
+ αincome_by_age
+ αdistrict
⋅ sexi +
j[i] + αk[i] + α l[i] + α
m[i]
n[i]
o[i] + β
rural
β
⋅ rurali)

where:
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2
αrace
j[i] ~ N(0, σ race), for j = 1, …, 5
age
αk[i]
~ N(0, σ2age), for k = 1, …, 8
2
αincome
l[i] ~ N(0, σ income), for l = 1, …, 6

αsex_by_race
~ N(0, σ2sex_by_race), for m = 1, …, 10
m[i]
income_by_age
n[i]

~ N(0, σ2income_by_age, for n = 1, …, 48

The above are random effects. The ideology of each respondent is assumed to vary
randomly between the categories of each variable, so a slope is fitted to each category. Each effect
is modeled as drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of zero, plus some estimated variance.
Rural and sex are individual-level, linear fixed effects. The district effects are modeled as a
function of the state in which the district resides, plus district-level aggregate effects held constant
for every respondent in the district (percent of district residents in the bottom quintile of national
household income; percent of residents with a graduate-level education; percent of residents who
are military veterans; percent of residents who are African-American; and percent of residents who
speak English as a second language):
state
αdistrict
o[i] ~ (α p[o] + βpoor ⋅ pooro + βgrad_educ ⋅ grad_educo + βveteran ⋅ veterano + βblack ⋅ blacko + βretired
⋅ retiredo + βesl ⋅ eslo, σ2district), for 1, …, 436

Aggregate effects are necessary ingredients in MRP models. The size and significance of arealevel covariates can decisively increase the performance of imputed estimates (Buttice and
Highton 2013). Table 3.4 shows the correlations between these fixed effects and unadjusted district
ideology in my exit poll data. These correlations are robust, and in the expected directions. I made
the conscious decision not to include a lagged ideology variable among the district effects. Lagging
the dependent variable would mask year-to-year variation in my results, defeating my purpose of
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studying longitudinal trends in public opinion. It would also, in all likelihood, so strongly overpredict ideology as to crowd all other effects to insignificance (Achen 2000).

Table 3.4: Product-Moment Correlations, Raw Ideology Disaggregation and District-Level
Covariates (Source: State and National Exit Polls, 2004-2010)*
% Graduate
% Veteran
% Poor
% Retired
Educated
Ideology
-0.19
-0.31
-0.49
0.41
0.19
0.24
*District ideology is coded from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative). I generated the values using a raw,
unweighted disaggregation
Correlation

% Black

% ESL

The state effects are in turn modeled as the subregion (New England, Mid-Atlantic,
Midwest, Appalachia, Southeast, Southwest, Plains, Mountains, Pacific Coast, and Washington,
D.C.) in which the state resides:
region
2
αstate
p ~ (α q[p] , σ state), for 1, ..., 51

To reiterate, MRP assumes that every level of geography makes a random (“random,”
because drawn from a larger population of geographic categories) contribution to individual
ideology. Standard, therefore, in the most cited MRP literature is the inclusion of region, typically
the four Census-designated regions, in the individual model. Pacheco (2011, 435) holds that this
is unnecessary and even harmful. Region tends to slightly homogenize the aggregate estimates of
attitudes, because the model assigns the same random slope to every jurisdiction in a region.
Nonetheless, because we are working on the assumption that sub-national ideology changes from
year to year, and because scholars have hypothesized recent American ideological change to be
regional in nature (Bishop 2009), I still wish to include a regional variable in the model. I propose
a middle ground, whereby I include subregion. These subregions are chosen for their geographic
and ideological affinities, forestalling the inclusion of ideologically opposite states like (say)
Washington, D.C. and Alabama in the same area. Table 3.5 shows the breakdown of subregions,
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and the weighted frequencies of liberals by subregion in the 2008 CCES. The latter illustrate that
subregions differ in ideological composition in intuitively expected ways.
Table 3.5: Subregions and % Liberal in the 2008 Cooperative Congressional
Election Study
Region
New England
Mid-Atlantic
Midwest
Appalachia
Southeast
Southwest
Plains
Mountain
Pacific Coast
Washington, D.C.

States
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin
Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia,
West Virginia
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina
Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, South Dakota
Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Utah, Wyoming
California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington
Washington, D.C.

% Liberal
34.87%
30.92%
27.67%
27.08%
21.42%
23.33%
26.00%
24.17%
34.34%
64.97%

In sum, because my pre-empirical intuition is that ideological polarization in the US is
occurring by region (New England and the West Coast grow more liberal as the South grows more
conservative), I include region as the last modeled effect:
2
αregion
q[p] ~ (0, σ region), for 1, …, 10

This model, first, will predict whether exit poll respondents in a given year are liberal.
Second, it will predict the probability of non-liberals responding as conservative. To arrive at a
prediction of ideology for each group, or “cell” (c), of demographic and geographic variables, I
subtract the liberal prediction (derived from the inverse logit function, given the predictors and
their regression coefficients) from the conservative prediction thus:
ideologyc = Pr(conservativec = 1) ⋅ (1 - Pr(liberalc = 1)) - Pr(liberalc = 1)
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The conservative probability is weighted by the inverse of the liberal probability, to
account for the fact that the conservative model excludes all liberal respondents. This multistep
process, whereby I use MRP to estimate a variable with three or more possible categories, is known
as nested multinomial MRP (Kastellec et al. 2014). The direction of the estimates (-1 being most
liberal; 1 being most conservative) permits their visualization on a number line (the further to the
right a cell estimate is, the more likely it is to “right-wing”). My estimates will also correspond to
the scale of Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE scores, permitting us to more easily infer the
correlation between district ideology and representative behavior. If I wish to make my estimates
more interpretable, and more comparable to such measures in the policy mood literature as macropartisanship (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002), I can compute cell ideology thus:

macro_ideologyc =

Pr(liberalc = 1)
Pr(liberalc = 1) + Pr(conservativec = 1) ⋅ (1 - Pr(liberalc = 1))

The above estimates ideology as a function of the probability of being liberal out of the combined
probability of being liberal or conservative, much as macropartisanship is the proportion of
Democrats out of all partisan identifiers. If we aggregate estimated macroideology by district and
year, and observe that macroideology in Vermont’s at-large district has increased by 0.05 over a
decade, then I can instantly infer that the proportion of liberals to conservatives in the electorate
has increased by 5%.
Once I have generated an estimate of ideology for every possible combination of
demographic and geographic variables in the combined state and national exit polls, the most
crucial step in MRP—the probability adjustment—remains. This adjustment reweights the
ideology estimates by the proportions of each cell in each Congressional District. The American
Community Survey (ACS) will serve as my post-stratification dataset, as well as my source for
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district-level fixed effects in the model. The ACS is a monthly household survey, the largest the
Census Bureau conducts outside of the decennial Census, sent randomly to about 3.5 million
addresses each year.
Unfortunately, the full ACS is publicly unavailable. While the Census makes the full
aggregate results—say, pre-tabulated summaries of demographic information by state,
Congressional district, and county—available to the public on its FactFinder website, it limits the
release of individual-level results due to concerns about privacy and liability. The power of MRP,
however, consists in how it applies individual level predictions of a dependent variable to
individuals in a post-stratification dataset; the tabulations themselves do me no good. Warshaw
and Rodden (2012), who also reweight the MRP results by ACS data, did manage to simulate cases
in each Congressional district using the tabulations. This is an inelegant solution because it forbids
them from using certain key predictors for which cross tabulations are unavailable. Among these
unavailable predictors is age.
My solution for reworking the ACS is more ambitious. I begin not with the crosstabulations on the Census website, but rather with the limited individual-level ACS data
(“microdata”) the Census makes public. The Census imposes two serious limitations on its
microdata. First, the Census releases only 5% yearly samples of the ACS called Public Use
Microdata Samples (PUMS). Second, and what is worse news for my cause, the PUMS do not
identify cases by Congressional district owing the privacy concerns. The only geographic
identifiers they include are state and Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA). PUMAs are arbitrary
statistical geographic areas containing at least 100,000 residents. To adjust my estimates by PUMS
data, I need a way to assign individual a district to ACS respondents using only the respondents’
PUMA. Doing so is possible, as I am moving from a smaller geographic unit to a larger one
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(Congressional districts have an average population of about 700,000), but hazardous. What I plan
to do is assign all cases a probability for residing in each of the congressional districts in the
country.
To convert PUMAs into districts, I use the University of Missouri’s MABLE/Geocorr2K
correspondence engine, available online at <http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html>.
This web application produces a spreadsheet with columns for PUMA, state, congressional district
number (in my case, for the 109th Congress), and the percentage of the PUMA’s population that
resides in the district per the 2000 Census. I use this spreadsheet to generate a Stata-Do file that
inserts probabilistic district identifiers in the ACS. If an ACS respondent resides in a PUMA that
is allocated (say) 70% to Maine’s First District and 30% to Maine’s Second District, the Do-file
clones the respondent with the expand command. One clone’s Congressional district variable is
set to First District and its weight is 0.7; the other clone, in all other respects identical to the other,
has its district variable set to the Second District and its weight is 0.3. This creates a fuzzy
approximation of district-level geographic information—fuzzy because since most respondents in
the ACS have a chance of residing in more than one district, and because the accuracy of
MABLE/Geocorr2K’s generated correlations of PUMA and district populations decreases as I
move away from the 2000 Census. Another source of inexactitude is the fact that, prior to 2005,
the PUMS did include any sub-state geographic identifier, as the ACS was only in trial stage at
this time. I have no choice but to post-stratify the 2004 Exit Poll census-level estimates with the
2005 PUMS.
Once I merge the ACS from 2005 to 2010 and add the district probabilities, more work
remains. Since I am modeling ideology with voter data, I want the probability adjustment to, as
much as possible, reflect the electorate as opposed to the general population. I will first drop
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ineligible voters according to the age and citizen variables. There is no turnout data, unfortunately.
A logical solution is to weight the cases, incorporating a dataset that does include turnout and using
the ACS’s demographic and geographic variables, by their likelihood to vote. To do so, I model
voter turnout in the Census’s Current Population Survey (CPS)—a monthly survey, geared towards
employment data, that polls 50,000 American households—which, on November of each election
year, includes a Voter Supplement with registration and turnout questions. The voting model,
naturally, will use predictors in both the ACS and CPS. For each year of CPS data (2004, 2006,
2008, and 2010), I run a mixed-effects logistic regression, with accepted covariates with turnout
(socioeconomic status and social capital items) and geographic variables as my predictors: state;
income; age; race; Education (5 categories); sex; veteran status; marital status; whether or not
residing in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA); whether or not respondent is in a white-collar
occupation; whether or not respondent is in a blue-collar occupation; whether or not respondent is
a naturalized, as opposed to born, citizen; whether or not respondent has moved in the last year;
and, lastly, relevant interaction times (sex by age, and education by age).
To create a turnout weight in the ACS, I then use the inverse logit function given the
estimated CPS regression coefficients and their respective predictor variables in the ACS. The
final weight will be the CPS-derived turnout weight multiplied by the district weighting. While
the ACS includes its own weight, I decline to use it for two reasons. First, even the 5% sample of
the ACS is large enough to, unweighted, serve as a proxy of the actual district populations. Second,
since the weighting is designed to inflate the importance of groups that are systematically less
likely to receive or respond to questionnaires, and since we have intuitive reasons to think that
such groups are also systematically less likely to vote, the ACS weight does us no good in
reconstructing the electorate.
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Once I generate ideology estimates for each demographic-geographic cell, estimating the
means of ideology for each district is straightforward. Where YMRP is simulated aggregate
ideology, o is the district index, Nc is the frequency of each cell in the ACS, θc is the predicted
ideology value for the cell, and wi is the CPS-derived turnout weight for each individual in the
ACS:
Σ

Ncθcwi

c∈o
YMRP
o = Σ

Ncwi

c∈ o

As I run a separate model for each election, every Congressional district in the US will receive
four estimates, one for each election between 2004 to 2010.

The Results
The sheer number of estimates (436 ∙ 4 = 1,744) that the MRP imputation creates means that I
cannot display them all in a readable published table. The unwieldiness of the output led me to
create a web application that filters and outputs raw tabulations and summaries of my district-level
ideology

data.

The

application

is

available

at

the

following

link:

<http://cliffordvickrey.com/diss_files/php/mrp.php>. In the following section, I subordinate my
choice of tables to the need for assessing the concept validity and reliability of my exit-poll-derived
imputed estimates.
Table 3.6 shows summary data by year. The table includes the mean aggregate ideology
by year, the mean ideology in the National Election Pool’s (NEP) national exit poll by year (for
validation), information on the median district, the minimum (most liberal) district, the maximum
(most conservative) district, standard deviation, and the number of observations per year and
district. As expected, district voting populations grow more liberal in presidential years and more
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conservative in midterm ones, tracking the national trend evidences in the NEP average. The most
liberal districts are Massachusetts 8 (covering Cambridge, one of the most liberal cities in America
[Alderman 2005]), New York 8 (covering minority-majority precincts in Manhattan) New York
12 (covering minority-majority precincts in Brooklyn and Queens), and New York 16 (the South
Bronx, among the poorest urban areas in the country [Sisk 2010]). The most conservative districts
are Alabama 4 (majority white counties in the north-central part of the state), Georgia 9 (rural
northeastern Georgia), Texas 8 (engineered by state Republican leader Tom Delay to be
overwhelmingly Republican), Texas 13 (the most Republican district in the country [Wasserman
2013]). The relative ideological positioning of such districts comports fully with expectations.
Table 3.6: District-Level Ideology by Year, Estimated
Year

Mean

2004
2006
2008
2010
Pres. Years
Midterm Years
All Years

0.11
0.09
0.09
0.15
0.10
0.12
0.11

NEP
Median
Median
Mean
Dist.
0.13
0.13 NM 2
0.12
0.11 TX 30
0.12
0.11 NJ 4
0.21
0.20 IA 3
0.12
0.12 TX 18
0.17
0.16 NJ 3
0.14
0.14 OH 2

Min Min Dist. Max
-0.36
-0.47
-0.49
-0.59
-0.40
-0.39
-0.40

MA 8
NY 12
NY 8
NY 16
MA 8
MA 8
MA 8

0.38
0.41
0.39
0.49
0.37
0.45
0.40

Max
Mean
St. Dev. Obs.
Dist.
Dist. Obs
GA 9
0.15
65,193
150
TX 13 0.16
51,139
117
AL 4
0.16
77,031
177
TX 13 0.19
56,962
131
TX 8
0.15
142,224
163
TX 13 0.17
108,101
124
TX 13 0.16
250,325
144

Figure 3.1 shows a map of district ideology in the entire United States, averaged from 2004
to 2010. The more liberal a district, the bluer it is; the more conservative, the redder. Aggregate
liberalism is concentrated in New England, urban districts, the Black Belt, the Río Grande Valley,
and the coasts—again, perfectly consonant with popular and academic understandings of the
distribution of voters in American political geography.
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To test concept validity, I correlate my yearly measures with both alternate MRP
estimations of ideology, as well as measures bearing close conceptual resemblance with symbolic
ideology. The correlations appear in Table 3.7. First, I correlate my measures with the results of
raw disaggregation using the exit poll. My expectation is that they will be highly correlated—as
the two measures are drawn from the same data—especially in the years containing the most
survey respondents. When ns are smaller, MRP’s post-stratification step more powerfully adjusts
survey data. As expected, the correlations are very high except in 2010, where the NEP’s national
coverage was poorer than in previous years. Second, I ran my MRP model using the CCES—
substituting the random effect of education for my “rural” variable, which lacks a counterpart in
the CCES—for the years 2006 to 2010. The correlations with my measures are rather high, owing
to the fact that both MRP procedures used the same post-stratification dataset. Third, I correlate
my measures with those of previous responsiveness scholars. For this purpose, I average Warshaw
and Rodden’s (2012) estimates of district-level opinion various policy domains; this average
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constitutes an estimate of operational ideology. The high correlations with my symbolic
ideological measure suggest that the distinction between symbolic and operational ideology is
more conceptual than empirical. Fourth, I ran my same MRP model, only substituting party
identification for ideology as my dependent variable. My expectation is that both measures are
correlated, given the ideological sorting of voters into American political parties since the 1970s
(Fiorina et al. 2011), and this is indeed the case. The correlation is the highest in the ideologicallycharged 2010 midterm elections. Finally, fifth, I correlate my measures with election results, which
have served as proxies of district-level ideology in the past. The correlations suggest that, while
ideology is highly related to voting behavior, non-ideological factors do influence vote choice.
Table 3.7: Correlation of District-Level Ideology Estimates
with Related Aggregate Measures, 2004-2010
Variable

Exit Poll Ideology*
All Years 2004 2006 2008
0.81
0.91 0.90 0.88
0.89
0.83 0.91
0.85
0.77 0.79
0.81
0.75 0.87 0.89
-0.76
-0.77 -0.77 -0.78
-0.62
-0.56 -0.55 -0.56

2010
Raw Exit Poll Tabulations
0.67
0.91
CCES Ideology*
Warshaw-Rodden Ideology**
0.86
Exit Poll Party ID*
-0.82
Dem Pres. Vote†
-0.74
Dem. House Vote††
* Imputed using MRP.
** An average of MRP-imputed estimates of district attitudes towards
abortion, environmental policy, gay marriage, the minimum wage, Social
Security, and stem cell research.
† Percentage of two-party vote in the most recent presidential election.
† † Percentage of two-party House vote. General elections only.
Uncontested districts codes as 100% (Democratic) or 0% (Republican).
Votes for Bernie Sanders (I-VT at-large) coded as Democratic.

In sum, my measures are valid. The correlations are highest (.8 to .9) with other MRP
imputations of symbolic ideology, which directly measure the same intended characteristic as my
measure, only with a different population (the general population, not exit poll voters). They are
somewhat lower (.7 to .8) for imputations of policy mood, which is conceptually distinct from but
empirically closely related to symbolic ideology. Finally, the correlations are lowest (.5 to .7) with
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election returns, which are at a great conceptual remove from ideology. All of this comports with
what we would expect from a valid measurement.
Concept reliability refers to the replicability of a measurement over repeated samples. I
must establish reliability before I can say with confidence that my measures consistently capture
district attitudes. Measuring the reliability of aggregate measurements poses a special difficulty,
as statistics of individual-level consistency such as Cronbach’s Alpha are inappropriate (Jones and
Norrander 1996, 296). An estimate of reliability must account for both variation between different
individuals nested in each district, as well as that of aggregate means between different districts.
O’Brien (1990) conceptualizes aggregate reliability as the ratio of universe score variance—the
estimated mean of several aggregate samples of ideology—to the expected observed score
variance—which includes ideological variation both between and among groups. Where x is
ideology, i is district, and j is individual survey respondent, I can mathematically express aggregate
reliability for each year as:

2

𝐸𝜌 =

2
∑𝑖(𝑥𝑖2 − 𝑥̅ )2 − ∑𝑖 ∑𝑗(𝑥𝑖𝑗
− 𝑥̅𝑖 )

2

∑𝑖 (𝑥𝑖2 − 𝑥̅ )2

In the parlance of ANOVA, or analysis of variance, I divide the difference between the between
sum of squares and the within sum of squares by the between sum of squares. Table 3.8 displays
the yearly reliability of my measures. Reliabilities for each year are very robust (Eρ2 ≥ 0.7). The
high coefficients suggest that individual responses within districts are relatively homogenous, and
that differences between districts perhaps largely explains the phenomenon of ideological
polarization. As MRP works best when there is less response variability in districts, this is cause
for still greater confidence in my measures.
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Table 3.8: Reliability
Coefficients, Exit Poll
MRP Measures*
Year
Coefficient
2004
0.89
2006
0.88
2008
0.89
2010
0.87
* See O'Brien (1990) for a
discussion of the relevant
ANOVA-based formula for
deriving these aggregate
measures.

A Methodological Advance
Lack of constituency data has plagued House responsiveness literature since the 1960s. Only
recently, with advent of MRP, have political scientists had direct, district-level measurements of
public opinion at their disposal. The MRP Revolution, I have argued, has nonetheless been
incomplete. Exit Polls expand our knowledge of district-level ideology because they overcome
two limitations of previous research: its inability to precisely model voter opinion, and its
implausible assumption that ideology is stable in the aggregate. I have produced valid, reliable
longitudinal estimates of voting constituency ideology at the level of the House district from 2004
to 2010. This is in contrast to other MRP estimates that are pooled over several years, which likely
smooth over short-term variations public opinion that produce dramatic political change (Erikson,
Wright, and McIver 2006). Moreover, longitudinal estimates potentially allow us to track whether
changes in constituent attitudes produce changes in representative behavior, as in a first-difference
model. The time period that my measures cover is apt for such an endeavor, as the geographic
boundaries of each jurisdiction are constant during the years my dataset includes.
Imputed exit poll measures constitute a methodological advance. The following chapters
will prove whether or not they can provide Congress scholarship with substantive advances as
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well. In other words, do they help us answer important questions in American politics? I will
address two: the question of whether or not constituent attitudes are stable, and whether or not they
influence representative floor voting.
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Chapter 4: District Ideology from a Temporal Perspective
Do Constituencies Change Their Minds?
The main weakness of extant MRP literature is its reliance on district-level measures that are
collapsed over many years. The main strength of the exit poll approach is that it furnishes enough
cases to produce measures by election cycle, thus accounting for instability in sub-national public
opinion. So far, however, the discussion of instability has remained purely in the realm of concept.
Exit poll measures would lose some of their luster if district ideology did not vary between
redistricting cycles. This chapter, I hope, will show that my methodological efforts are not wasted.
Even in the short span of six years, districts underwent significant change to which static measures
of public opinion are deaf.
In this chapter, I, first, discuss the small corpus of literature relevant to district-level
ideological change. This literature provides few definitive answers as to whether public opinion is
unstable at the state level, let alone whether it is so at the district level. Second, I discuss the
stability of my MRP measure. Descriptive statistics applied to these measures, I find, would incline
reasonable observers to believe that there is great temporal variation in district ideology. Moreover,
strictly controlling for cross-sectional and national trends, 110 districts show linear ideological
change. Finally, third, I attempt to explain ideological change. Majority-minority status, as well as
population growth, economic stress, and demographic changes help explain district-level change.

Theoretical Expectations
What should one expect about changes in district-level ideology? The literature gives scarcely any
clues. Old responsiveness literature that looked at more than one Congress still relied mostly on
static measures. For instance, Glazer and Robbins (1985) used the natural experiment of decennial
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redistricting to assess the whether Congresspeople, when they found their constituency suddenly
changed, suffered reversals in their electoral fortunes. Fleisher and Bond (2004) created a
longitudinal measure of district ideology by standardizing district presidential vote relative to the
national vote (ostensibly because an unstandardized measure is more susceptible to short-term
political factors), and found a growing correlation between aggregate district ideology and House
vote, supporting what Jacobson (2013) found at the individual level. While they can tell us that
(say) a conservative representative will have an increasingly harder time getting elected in a liberal
district, the authors do not address the question of whether liberal districts are getting more liberal.
Even more sophisticated is Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman’s (2008) use of a latent factor analysis
of vote shares to generate partisanship scores in every Congressional district. However, because
latent factors other than ideology drive voting, and because their latent estimate is constant by
decade, they consciously resist the temptation to measure district-level changes in public opinion.
The paucity of studies tracking public opinion in the district behooves us to look elsewhere
for our expectations. We might look at the Congress literature, whose boilerplate thesis is that the
policy attitudes of members, when they enter Congress, are static (Asher and Weisberg 1978;
Stone 1980; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 2007). Even the roll call behavior in post-war
Congress, noted for passing the first Civil Rights legislation since Reconstruction and widely
perceived as undergoing revolutionary change, was remarkably stable. If any change does occur,
it seems, it is due to member replacement, thus implicating the changing minds of constituents—
not those of Congressmen—in the process (Theriault 2006). We therefore have a sketchy and
prima facie reason to suspect ideological change in the districts.
More might also profitably interrogate the literature on state public opinion. As I discussed
in Chapter 2, scholarship is divided as to whether state ideology is stable. The dominant thesis is
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that symbolic ideology in the past half-century is remarkably stable, and with a handful of
exceptions varies only nationally (Erikson Wright and McIver 1993; 2001; 2006; Brace et al. 2004;
Pacheco 2014). That is, the proportion of liberals to conservatives in Maine may have increased in
(say) 2008, but only because it increased everywhere. Meaningful change occurs, these authors
tell us, only when the rank ordering of states by ideology shifts, or when the most liberal and
conservative states diverge. The stability thesis thus casts state ideology as a static “thermostat”
whose role in influencing policy outcomes is passive, as when it corrects state policy that becomes
too liberal or too conservative (Wleizen 1995). Researchers at Florida State University (Berry et
al. 2007) counter that, by relying on alternative measures of ideology derived from the interest
group scores of legislative candidates and by relaxing the assumption that all change must be
wholly independent of national trends, ideological variation is more temporal (between time
points) than cross-sectional (between states). Indeed, they estimate that three-fourths of states
experience significant change in years that Erikson, Wright, and McIver cover. The Florida State
school’s findings are consonant with the policy mood literature, which suggests that changes in
state opinion is cyclical and reacts to recurring policies as well as the party of the president
(Stimson 1999), and other studies which show that party identification, issue positions, and
evaluations of the president exhibit substantial sub-national dynamism (Erikson, Wright and
McIver 2006; Pacheco 2014).
The exit polls shed some light as to whether state ideology moves. Table 4.1 shows the
average election-to-election change in state-level MRP measures of symbolic ideology from 1982
to 2010. The imputation process for states is more or less identical for that of the district-level
MRP, differing mainly by using the Current Population Survey (CPS) instead of the American
Community Survey as post-stratification data. Applying Brace et al.’s (2004, 533) stringent test of
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stability—where state ideology for each state and year is regressed on dummies for each state but
one and each year but one; if the model’s error terms are significantly related to time, then there is
change that is independent from national trends and from cross-sectional variation between
states—we find that trends in 21 states are significant. Figure 4.1 maps ideological change, casting
into sharp relief that ideological change is a regional phenomenon. States with unambiguously
liberal trends in public opinion are concentrated on the West Coast and to a lesser extent the
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states. The Southeast, Florida excepted, grew more conservative.
In sum, imputed exit poll measures of state ideology exhibit more movement than do measures
derived from the disaggregation of commercial polls, as well as measures derived from the
American National Election Study (ANES) and General Social Survey (GSS). There is prima facie
evidence of regional divergences, lending mild support to Abramowitz’s (2010a) and Jacobson’s
(2013) thesis that public opinion—not merely “partisan sorting,” or the viciousness of American
political leaders and intellectuals (Fiorina et al. 2011)—drives polarization. We might attribute
ideological instability in the exit polls to the fact that, from election to election, the political profile
of electorates varies to a far greater extent than does that of all voting-age citizens.
Nonetheless, the measures do not permit us to say, as Berry et al.’s Florida State contingent
does, that most states are characterized by large swings in ideology since 1960; only a handful of
states, too, change at a remarkable rate, and there seems to be no case of a state’s rank order
traversing from one extreme to another. The exit polls agree with Brace et al.’s contention that the
Berry et al. measure “is capturing something different from mass ideology” (2004, 537).
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Table 4.1. State-level ideological change in the exit polls, 1982 - 2010.
Avg. Election-toAvg. Election-toElection
Change
Election Change
State
p
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

0.006
-0.004
0.003
0.012
-0.010
-0.008
-0.003
-0.003
-0.021
-0.004
0.007
-0.022
0.012
-0.009
0.006
0.005
0.017
0.005
0.011
0.009
-0.012
-0.003
-0.003
-0.002
0.014
0.002

0.023*
0.561
0.571
0.017*
0.003**
0.933
0.074
0.111
0.188
0.091
0.006**
0.025*
0.049*
0.186
0.017*
0.120
0.004**
0.186
0.053*
0.113
0.100
0.016*
0.792
0.081
0.460
0.112

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas✝
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington✝✝
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

-0.001
0.008
-0.005
0.004
-0.008
-0.005
-0.009
0.002
0.009
0.001
0.005
-0.005
0.003
0.000
0.009
0.013
0.001
0.002
-0.002
-0.015
0.002
-0.010
0.005
-0.005
0.011

p
0.837
0.450
0.070
0.572
0.055
0.162
0.023*
0.771
0.060
0.560
0.115
0.049*
0.921
0.101
0.088
0.061
0.016*
0.048*
0.235
0.004**
0.953
0.008*
0.224
0.721
0.085

Table excludes 2002. H0 = state exhibits no linear change independently of national public opinion trends.
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01
✝ Curvilinear change
✝✝ Cyclical change
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Nonetheless, caution is advisable when interpreting the above. Exit poll coverage of states
in the 1980s was spotty, and the 1992 and 1994 state exit polls inexplicably omitted an ideology
item on their questionnaires in many states. Cases from the national exit poll—which codes for
state beginning in 1982, but which lacks representative state sample—were imported and used to
impute measures for most states during this period. The measures for 1982 are especially
problematic, since the national exit poll did not yet publish the states of respondents (meaning that
measures in 25 states are purely a function of regional and demographic predictors, and lack a
random slope for each state), and because the MRP model lacks an important aggregate fixed effect
(percentage of the state electorate in a labor union) due to its omission in the CPS. Even so, the
fact that the early CBS News and Voter News Service exit polls are post-stratified gives us more
reason to trust these numbers than we have to trust the measures of ideological change in Brace et
al.’s meta-analysis of state ideology. When my state measures are adjusted to exclude selfidentified moderates, their product-moment correlation with Pacheco’s (2011) measures of state
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liberalism using commercial polls from 1982 to 2006 is 0.67, suggesting some face validity.
Because the purpose of the state-level MRP is merely to provide expectations about district-level
change, I will not devote further discussion to the generation, reliability, and validity of my state
ideology measures.
If decades of previous research cannot establish whether state public opinion is stable, woe
unto anyone who asks the same question of districts. Suppose that we are agnostic on the debate
between Brace et al. and Berry et al.; the exit poll data, after all, suggests detectable but hardly
dramatic longitudinal changes in aggregate public opinion. What, then, might our theoretical
expectations of district-level change be? In all likelihood, since district-to-district migration flows
are logically greater than state-to-state migration flows (the 2014 American Community survey
suggests that 15% of households move each year, but only 25% of these moves are out-of-state),
districts will exhibit greater demographic change than states. This residential mobility could
produce ideology change in the aggregate (Tiebout 1956). Does this mean that Congressional
districts will grow more homogenous, as when people with similar traits and attitudes cluster
together (Bishop 2008)? Might transplants, who initially differ ideologically from their new
neighbors, gradually conform to their new milieu (Brown 1981, 1989), or might their early social
learning prove strong enough to resist this change in their core values (Finifter and Finifter 1989)?
Good questions all, but no answers abound. Against the importance of demographics, Brace et al.
(2005) identify only three states—California, Oregon, and West Virginia—that have undergone
substantial and independent ideological change since the mid-seventies, and only the first of these
has experienced any notable change in population characteristics. Warshaw and Rodden (2009)
are among the few to address the homogeny question at the level of House districts. They contend
that neither residential sorting nor gerrymandering is a factor in ideological polarization in the
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United States, identifying wide intra-district heterogeneity in public opinion on seven issue
domains. If right, their findings would militate against the role of demography in district-level
attitudes. Economic factors might also affect subnational opinion, especially in our federalist
system where state economies are more independent of national trends than in the past (Brace
1993). The economic upheaval of 2008 could plausibly have produced immediate effects on
district-level public opinion.
Confounding the utility of previous scholarship even further is the fact that they relied on
general public opinion measures, not those of voters. The changes I document at the state-level
convince me that the voter-derived character of my measures is critical. The systematic differences
between midterm and presidential electorates, as well as the fact that measures of elite public
opinion such as Berry et. al’s scores seem more labile than measures disaggregated from public
opinion polls, give me cause to think that districts will show marked instability between 2004 and
2010. Voters, after all, fall somewhere in between “general population” and “policy elites.”

An Empirical Model of Change
I first ask: are districts more different from district to district, or are they more different from year
to year? To address this question, I ran a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a repeated
measures design using aggregate district-level ideology from 2004 to 2010. Table 4.2 reports the
results, as well as the results for district-level partisanship, and for state-level ideology and
partisanship. Temporal variability equates to the mean sum of squares for between-groups (MSb),
whereas cross-sectional variability between districts equates to the mean sum of squares for within
groups (MSa). To give a picture of how much these districts move independently of national trends,
I correlated each district measure with every other district measure in the election; for the entire
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timespan, this meant correlating 284,490 pairs. The “average inter-item correlation of changes in
public opinion” column reports the result. A value of 1 indicates that there is no sub-national
heterogeneity in how public opinion moves; a value of 0, on the other hand, indicates that districtlevel change is random and that the ideological measure is totally unreliable.
Table 4.2. Analysis of Variance, Sub-National Public Opinion Across Time

Mean

Mean election-toelection change

Variance

Standard
deviation

0.110

0.014

% of variance
explained

Avg. inter-item
correlation of
changes in public
opinion

CD ideology
2004 - 2010 (n = 1,744)
Overall

0.028

0.167

Across districts

0.098

0.312

20%

Across time

0.396

0.630

80%

0.168

CD partisanship
2004 - 2010 (n = 1,744)
Overall

-0.081

-0.010

0.048

0.219

Across districts

0.171

0.414

24%

Across time

0.540

0.735

76%

0.159

State ideology
1982 - 2010 (n = 765)
Overall

0.145

0.005

0.013

0.114

Across states

0.128

0.358

61%

Across time

0.083

0.288

39%

0.400

State partisanship
1982 - 2010 (n = 765)
Overall

0.064

0.008

0.021

0.146

Across states

0.198

0.445

71%

Across time

0.081

0.285

29%

0.222

The results indicate that district ideological variation in the years 2004 to 2010 is more
temporal than cross-sectional. Historically, time explains a much smaller proportion of variation
in states. Moreover, while the tendency in districts was towards greater conservatism (partly
because of the 2010 wave election, which featured the most conservative electorate in the exit poll
era), ideological change from election to election is quite small. On average, the proportion of
conservatives to liberals in a district increases between elections by 0.01%. The biennial changes
indicate that short-term and nationwide election dynamics are at work: in 2006, the average district
electorate had 7.4% more liberals than in the previous election; in 2008, it had 3.24% more liberals;
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and in 2010 it had 10.95% fewer liberals. Nationally, ideology does not change as much as it seems
to regress to the mean. However, the comparatively low correlation of district-level changes with
changes in every other district tells us that changes in district electorate are heterogeneous, with
public opinion moving in different directions and at different rates.
Pacheco (2014) divides subnational change into four types: first, gradual, homogenous
change; second, rapid, homogenous change; third, gradual, heterogeneous change; and fourth,
rapid, homogenous change. Rapid change (types 2 and 4) is most likely a response to a sudden
political or economic stimulus (Erikson et al, 2002)—as when the equilibrium of public policy is
“punctuated” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993)—whereas gradual change (types 1 and 3) are most
likely the result of subtler demographic shifts. My exit poll measures do not give us much leverage
in addressing the rapidity-to-gradualness axis, given our limited timespan and the fact that the
substantial district-level change from election to election (in absolute terms, the proportion of
liberals to conservatives at an average of about 10% between elections) is consistent with the fact
that exit polls interview wholly different populations from election to election. (Chapter 2
discusses the comparative wealth, whiteness, education, and conservativism of midterm
electorates versus presidential ones). With much greater confidence can we say that the changes
in district ideology are heterogeneous, which means that local jurisdictions are either diverging
demographically (for instance, Democratic-leaning minorities relocating from one district to
another), or responding differently to national political stimuli. Table 4.3 shows more evidence of
heterogeneity. Nationally, the electorate grows more liberal from 2004 to 2006, more liberal from
2006 to 2008, and more conservative from 2008 to 2010; fewer than 20% of congressional districts
follow the national trend, and there is a relatively wide distribution of districts in all eight of the
possible directional trends. Comparatively few jurisdictions were more liberal in the 2010 election

72

than in the 2008 election. The heterogeneity is surprising given that our time series features three
wave elections, or elections where strong national political currents alter the balance of power in
Congress (2006, 2008, and 2010). In 2006, discontent with the Iraq War allowed the Democrats to
gain 31 seats in the House of Representatives, and in 2008 an economic near-collapse allowed
them to gain still 20 more as well as the White House (Jacobson 2010). 2010, on the other hand,
featured political conditions nearly identical to 1994—an unpopular first term Democratic
president, and a conservative grassroots insurgency mobilized by the healthcare reform debate
(Abramowitz 2010b)—and a nearly identical result: the total erasure of Democratic gains in
Congress. The presence of the three out of four wave elections since 1974 in our dataset should
nationalize district-level ideological change; it does not.

Table 4.3. Trends in disrict-level ideology, 2004 - 2010
Change type
Monotonic change
monotonic more liberal
monotonic more conservative
Subtotal
Oscillatory change
more liberal in 2006, more liberal in 2008, more conservative in 2010*
more liberal in 2006, more conservative in 2008, more conservative in 2010
more liberal in 2006, more conservative in 2008, more liberal in 2010
more conservative in 2006, more conservative in 2008, more liberal in 2010
more conservative in 2006, more liberal in 2008, more liberal in 2010
more conservative in 2006, more liberal in 2008, more conservative in 2010
Subtotal
Total

count

%

17

3.90%

32

7.34%

49

11.24%

87

19.95%

114

26.15%

39

8.94%

7

1.61%

25

5.73%

115

26.38%

387

88.76%

436

100.00%

*Follows national trend, per national exit polls

Which districts appear to be moving? We might (say) ask if districts are polarizing between
redistricting cycles, in which case dispersion would increase from year to year. Alternatively, it
could be the case that redistricting “packs” partisans in electorally uncompetitive districts, but that
migration blunts the ideological extremity of these districts and that variance decreases by the end
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of the cycle. Figure 4.2 shows the densities of our ideology measure by election. We find that in
every year the distribution of districts has a profound left skew—that is, the most liberal districts
are several more standard deviations away from the average district than are the most conservative
ones. While we might take this as evidence of recent polarization, this skew appears in Democratic
voting in each of the last six decades, and was perhaps even more acute historically (Levendusky,
Pope, and Jackman 2008). As Peress (2013) and Warshaw and Rodden (2009) find, and as my
plots show, the distribution of district ideology is not bimodal. Redistricting, rather than
geographic clustering or the growing fractiousness of American politics, is the likely explanation
for the left skew. An irresistible suspicion is that the liberal outliers are majority-minority
jurisdictions, and this is indeed the case: whites are a minority in New York 8 (Manhattan), New
York 15 (Harlem), Washington D.C., California 8 (Oakland), and New York 16 (South Bronx).
Interestingly, while the central tendency of aggregate district ideology moves with the electoral
context, the most liberal districts exhibit almost no movement and leave the left skew unaltered.
The largely minority-composed districts, then, are the ones that exhibit the most independent
trends. Table 4.4 breaks down my ANOVA analysis by quartile, finding that the most liberal
districts in 2004 largely resist the slight national trend towards conservatism. A near-zero
correlation between ideological change in these districts and ideological change in all districts, as
well as their primarily cross-sectional variance, starkly differentiate these districts from the rest.
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Figure 4.2: Density of District Ideology by Election
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Table 4.4. Analysis of Variance, Sub-National Public Opinion Across Time

Mean

Mean electionto-election
change

Variance

Standard
deviation

Avg. inter-item
correlation of
% of variance changes in
explained public opinion

Most liberal to 109th most liberal
district in 2004
2004 - 2010 (n = 436)
Overall

0.015

0.123

Across districts

-0.102

0.003

0.043

0.208

58%

0.058

Across time

0.022

0.149

42%

110th liberal to 218th most liberal
districts in 2004
2004 - 2010 (n = 436)
Overall

0.007

0.082

Across districts

0.081

0.012

0.110

24%

Across time

0.128

0.357

76%

219th liberal to 327th most liberal
districts in 2004
2004 - 2010 (n = 436)
Overall

0.018

0.178

`
0.006

0.076

Across districts

0.184

0.023

0.009

0.096

18%

0.254

Across time

0.191

0.437

82%

328th to least liberal district in 2004
2004 - 2010 (n = 436)
Overall

0.005

0.072

Across districts

0.276

0.013

0.010

0.101

23%

0.242

Across time

0.114

0.337

77%

Moving away from descriptive statistics, we need an empirical test that, for each district,
distinguishes real change from noise. In my discussion of states, I alluded to Brace et al.’s
significance test, whereby they employ a two-way fixed effects model controlling for inter-state
differences as well as nationwide longitudinal variances. If a state’s residuals are correlated with
time, then there is significant state-level ideological change. Might one apply this test to district
measures? Unquestionably, this is a conservative test that hardly appears in every study of subnational public opinion trends. For one thing, it cancels out national trends, when in fact such
trends—when reflected at the level of jurisdiction—might have important policy consequences,
even if the rank ordering of districts is unchanged (Berry et al. 2007, 116). For another, a model
with aggregate variables in a limited time span necessarily lacks the degrees of freedom of an
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individual-level model, making it harder for any predictor to significantly explain variance. If the
yearly estimates of ideology are even modestly reliable, the test is predisposed to type II error, or
the false conclusion that there is stability at the jurisdictional level (118). However, the high
temporal variance of my measures—which, I believe, owes to the fact that voter profiles differ
from midterm and presidential electorates, as well as the unusual abundance of wave elections in
the late 2000s—inclines me to minimize type I error and choose the most stringent possible test.
If there is change, then this test may not detect it; but if the test detects change, then there likely
really is change.
To model ideological change, I first regress ideology on district fixed effects and election
year fixed effects:
𝑛

𝑛

𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝐷𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐸𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑖=1

𝑗=1

where:
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = district ideology for each district i and each election year j
𝐷𝑖 = dummy variables for each district i, sans Wyoming’s at-large district
𝐸𝑌𝑗 = dummy variable for each election year j, sans 2010
𝜀𝑖𝑗 = error term for each state i and election year j
If district-level ideology is stable, then the error term should be randomly distributed within each
district. If the error term has as systematic longitudinal component, then temporal variation in the
district’s ideology is more than noise.
How do we identify this systematic component? Brace et al. propose using the Lagrange
Multiplier Test, more commonly known as a score test. The test quantifies the expected
improvement of fit when an excluded predictor is added to a “restricted” model, which lacks the
predictor. For each district, we therefore first regress the error term on nothing but the intercept:
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𝜀𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝑣𝑗
where:
𝜀𝑗 = error term from the fixed-effects model for each year j within each district
𝑣𝑗 = remaining variation in error
The unrestricted model includes an interval-level time series variable:
𝜀𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇 + 𝑣𝑗
where:
𝜀𝑗 = error term from the fixed-effects model for each year j within each district
𝑇 = the time series [1 = 2004, 2 = 2006, 3 = 2008, 4 = 2010]
𝑣𝑗 = remaining variation in error
If the test statistic (“score”) of the improvement of fit is significant for a district, then its variation
is a linear function of time. Brace et al. also test whether nonlinear relationship exists between
time and district-level ideology with quadratic equations of the second degree (testing for
curvilinear change) and third degree (testing for cyclical change). Our data, unfortunately, lacks
the time points necessary to model ideology as square or cubic functions of time.
Table 4.5 shows the rank order, magnitude of change, and a description of districts that
exhibit independent change at 90% confidence. The relative paucity of degrees of freedom in the
fixed effects model, which predicts a mere 1,744 cases with 438 factors, makes it hard for T to
explain variance unexplained by the many district and election year dummies. Only 14 out of 435
districts1 show change from 2004 to 2010 at 95% confidence, but this is hardly strange; only a
small minority of states using measures that span generations show such significant longitudinal
trends in the contemplation of Brace et al. When α is increased to 0.10—a reasonable response to

1

Georgia 9th is significant at 95%, but is excluded from this tally for reasons discussed below.
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the limitations of the exit poll time series—then we find that 111 out of 435 districts exhibit
independent change.

Table 4.5. Districts Exhibiting Independent Ideological Change
Rank
(1 =
most
libera
l)

p

Avg. %
change in
ratio of
liberals to
conservativ
es

1

0.10*

0.29%

2

0.06*

-0.79%

"People's Republic of Cambridge." High % graduateeducated
West side of Manhattan. Mostly white

California 9

6

0.05*

1.40%

Eastern San Francisco Bay Area

California 8

8

0.09*

0.40%

San Francisco

New York 11
Massachusetts
7
New York 18

12

0.07*

5.33%

Brooklyn. Majority black

17

0.06*

-6.10%

Eastern Massachusetts. Ed Markey's old district

18

0.06*

2.73%

Illinois 4

23

0.05*

-1.28%

New York 9

25

0.06*

-0.05%

Illinois 7

26

0.06*

-0.73%

Virginia 8

29

0.07*

-5.19%

California 36

33

-2.25%

Maryland 7

37

3.80%

Most of Baltimore. Historically a racial gerrymander

Minnesota 4

40

2.76%

St. Paul and surrounding areas

New Jersey 12

45

0.06*
0.05*
*
0.05*
*
0.08*

Westchester County. Affluent
Affluent Chicago neighborhoods. Notoriously noncontiguous
White ethnic neighborhoods in Southern Brooklyn and
Queens
Majority black Chicago neighborhoods
Arlington, Alexandria, and surrounding areas. Quite
Democratic
Riverside County

-8.00%

Central New Jersey. Increasingly trends Democratic

California 13

47

0.10*

8.42%

Oakland. Majority-minority

Maryland 4

49

0.09*

5.21%

Democratic, majority-minority gerrymander

Pennsylvania 1

53

0.09*

5.70%

Central and South Philadelphia. Majority minority

New York 6
Massachusetts
1
Connecticut 3

54

0.06*

0.65%

Queens. Majority black

55

0.05*

-13.69%

57

0.08*

2.09%

Central Connecticut. Includes New Haven

California 35

65

5.64%

Inglewood. Majority-minority

Rhode Island 2

67

-5.83%

Southwestern Rhode Island

Connecticut 2

71

0.08*
0.05*
*
0.08*

-7.11%

Eastern Connecticut

District

Massachusetts
8
New York 8

Notes

Rural Western Massachusetts
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Florida 18

72

0.06*

4.94%

Most of Miami. Heavily Latino

California 32

75

0.07*

2.41%

Eastern Los Angeles County. Heavily Latino

Florida 21

81

0.07*

-2.30%

New Jersey 8

83

0.09*

-7.39%

New York 19

85

0.05*

-5.45%

Central Miami-Dade County. Leaned Republican
Jersey City, Hoboken, Elizabeth, East Newark. Heavily
Latino
Putnam County

Georgia 5

92

0.07*

5.72%

Atlanta. Includes heavily black Dekalb suburbs

New Jersey 7

95

0.06*

-7.15%

Northern New Jersey. Competitive House races

Maine 1

96

-10.79%

Includes Portland, Augusta, and all of York County

Connecticut 5

100

-6.10%

Waterbury and surrounding areas

Rhode Island 1

102

California 50

104

0.10*
0.05*
*
0.05*
*
0.09*

-1.87%

Providence, Newport, and Bristol. Growing Latino
population
San Diego suburbs. Primarily white

Louisiana 2

105

0.10*

6.37%

New Orleans. Majority black

California 38

108

0.10*

-0.20%

Los Angeles. Gerrymandered to have Latino majority

California 39

117

0.10*

0.55%

Southeastern Los Angeles. Heavily Latino

Missouri 5

121

0.10*

5.18%

Kansas City metro area

Oregon 1

124

0.08*

6.01%

Includes downtown Portland

Minnesota 3
North Carolina
4
New York 25

125

0.06*

-10.45%

127

0.09*

-1.34%

140

0.06*

-13.64%

New Mexico 3

147

0.06*

-3.88%

Illinois 13

148

0.07*

-7.73%

Ohio 15

149

-16.64%

Tennessee 9

150

12.21%

Memphis. Majority black

California 40

151

-3.40%

Orange County. Primarily white

California 46

154

3.03%

Orange County, Port of Los Angeles, Long Beach

Ohio 12

165

0.07*
0.05*
*
0.07*
0.05*
*
0.06*

Northern Half of New Mexico. 1/3rd Latino
Chicago suburbs. Solidly Republican, but did vote for Obama
in 2008
Southern Columbus and Union and Madison counties

-4.68%

Black neighborhoods of Columbus

Washington 9

173

8.13%

Puget Sound Area

Florida 23

176

0.06*
0.05*
*

1.62%

Broward and Palm Beach Counties. Liberal retirees

Washington 3

179

0.05*

5.09%

Maryland 2

180

0.07*

5.48%

Nevada 3

183

0.10*

-5.63%

Southwest central Washington. Swing district in presidential
elections
Counties surrounding Baltimore, and parts of East Side
Baltimore
Clark County South of Las Vegas. Primarily white

Ohio 9

184

0.05*

-10.97%

Northern border with Lake Eerie. Democratic gerrymander.

Ohio 13

192

0.07*

-15.31%

Lorain, Akron suburbs

California 52

195

0.06*

-11.31%

San Diego suburbs. Primarily white

Washington 4

214

0.06*

1.76%

-7.72%

Mixed-income suburbs of Minneapolis
Chapel Hill, Durham and surrounding areas. Democratic
stronghold
Syracuse and Rochester suburbs. Electorally competitive

Rural areas surrounding Yakima. Leans Republican
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New York 26

215

0.05*

-17.01%

Buffalo and Niagara Falls

Ohio 17

233

0.07*

-9.77%

Northeast Ohio

California 25

238

0.07*

1.93%

Northern Los Angeles County. Relatively conservative

Tennessee 5

243

0.10*

7.45%

Nashville. Democratic stronghold

New Mexico 2

248

0.06*

-5.95%

Southern New Mexico. 1/3rd Latino

Ohio 16

249

0.05*

-4.41%

Area surrounding Canton

Florida 13

254

0.07*

-3.51%

Sarasota and counties further south

Alabama 7

268

0.09*

5.82%

Majority-minority (includes Birmingham)

California 19

269

0.05*

-10.81%

San Jose

Florida 14

271

-10.11%

Southwestern Florida, including Naples

Michigan 7

275

-10.87%

Southwestern Michigan

Ohio 18

284

-20.70%

West Virginia 1

296

0.07*
0.05*
*
0.09*
0.05*
*

East central Ohio. Swing district
Northern portion of the state. Solidly Republican in pres.
Elections

299

0.05*

-9.36%

Harrisburg and surrounding areas

301

0.07*

10.67%

Greater Atlanta area. Majority black

Ohio 5

309

0.06*

-11.85%

Bowling Green and northwestern Ohio

Ohio 8

311

0.07*

-9.30%

Western Ohio. John Boehner's district

Florida 15

312

0.09*

2.28%

Central eastern coast, including Melbourne

Michigan 2

315

0.07*

-7.08%

Western Michigan

Indiana 9

319

0.06*

10.37%

Southeastern Indiana

Texas 29

322

0.08*

6.33%

Eastern Houston. Majority Latino

Alaska 1

326

0.05*

-39.47%

Missouri 9
South Carolina
2
North Carolina
8
North Carolina
2
Illinois 19

333

0.09*

9.00%

Rural northeastern Missouri and Columbia

345

0.10*

-7.08%

Columbia and southern portions of the state

347

0.09*

7.58%

Southern North Carolina

348

0.07*

10.49%

349

0.07*

-5.13%

Ohio 4

350

-13.10%

Louisiana 6

351

Kentucky 1

353

0.05*
0.05*
*
0.08*

-11.50%

West central Ohio
Baton Rouge. District lost black voters after 2010
redistricting
Western Kentucky. Most voters are conservative Democrats

Texas 24

354

0.07*

-3.41%

Dallas and Fort Worth suburbs

Texas 3
North Carolina
3
North Carolina
6
North Carolina
10

362

0.09*

1.88%

Northeast Dallas suburbs

368

0.09*

0.61%

Atlantic coast and Outer Banks. 22% black

374

0.06*

10.45%

Central North Carolina

375

0.06*

7.77%

West Central North Carolina. Heavily Republican

Pennsylvania
17
Georgia 13

-10.01%

3.67%

At-large district

East Central North Carolina. Blacks gerrymandered out of
district
Rural southern Illinois
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Wyoming 1

377

0.07*

-17.53%

Tennessee 7

378

0.10*

5.57%

Kansas 1

379

0.05*

-13.59%

Massive rural section of Kansas. Highly conservative

Oklahoma 1

387

-20.23%

Arkansas 1

388

Iowa 5

389

0.05*
0.05*
*
0.06*

-10.38%

North Central Oklahoma. Solidly Republican
Mississippi Delta. Increasingly votes Republican in pres.
races
Western Iowa. Solidly Republican

Louisiana 3
South Carolina
3

405

0.06*

-12.05%

Eastern Louisiana Gulf Coast

407

0.09*

-23.60%

Rural northwestern South Carolina. Very conservative

Texas 2

410

0.06*

-2.71%

Houston Suburbs and Southeast Texas. 2002 Republican
gerrymander

Alabama 5

412

-8.08%

Northern Alabama

Texas 14

414

Texas 12

-13.96%

At-large district
Western Tennessee and Nashville suburbs

-4.46%

Greater Houston area and Galveston. Ron Paul's district

416

0.05*
*
0.05*
*
0.08*

-15.06%

Fort Worth suburbs

Arkansas 3

417

0.08*

-5.30%

Northwestern Arkansas. Solidly Republican

Alabama 4

423

0.08*

-16.56%

Northern Alabama

Texas 11

425

-6.10%

Central Texas and Waco. Solidly Republican

Georgia 9

426

0.08*
0.05*
*

6.84%

District was transplanted across the state in 2006. Ignore

Texas 19

431

0.08*

-4.66%

Lubbock and surrounding areas. 2002 Republican
gerrymander

Is there a pattern to district-level change? First, it is interesting to note that the one district
that was redistricted in this timespan—Georgia 9, which in the 110th Congress moved from the
northeastern to northwestern part of the state—showed among the strongest independent variation
in the dataset. This natural experiment is perhaps an indication that my measures are able to capture
actual change in the profile of Congressional districts, though I would be well-advised not to
oversell this. As for the remaining districts, the median rank order of districts that are unstable at
90% confidence is 183.5 out of 436, indicating that the most liberal districts disproportionately
show independent change. Consistently with Figure 4.2, the “left tail” of liberal districts proved
resistant to the conservative trends of the late 2000s. And, as Levendusky, Jackman, and Pope
(2008) suggest, a large number of these districts are majority-minority—either as the natural result
of their urban constituencies, or as the result of the conscious racial gerrymandering (for instance,
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in California 38th, Maryland 4th, Maryland 7th) that burgeoned beginning with the 1990 redistricting
cycle (Tate [2003], for example, defends this practice as a means of enhancing descriptive
representation). Maryland 7th, in particular, features the unusually low compactness typical of
gerrymandering (Barone et al. 2013). Figure 4.3 is a histogram of the rank order of the 111 unstable
districts, and visualizes both the left skewness and bimodal distribution of aggregate ideological
change. It would appear that the one-way ANOVA of districts by quartile did not capture what the
stability test shows: clear evidence of ideological polarization. Most districts do not lie on
ideological extremes; however, the most extreme districts are pulling in opposite directions.

Explaining Change: A First-Difference Approach
What accounts for the changes? In answering, I will proceed in two steps. First, consistently with
Pacheco (2014), I will select a sample of interesting districts and attempt to tell a “story” therein.
This story will try to show the extent to which the demographic profile of the electorate tracks
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ideological change. The second step will be to model ideological change using those demographic
changes that we suspect are implicated.
Table 4.6 shows a sample of the districts that exhibit the most unambiguous ideological
change, together with their demographic profile. The striking feature is that districts that exhibit
liberal change (or that, at least, fail to become more conservative) are, again, their
disproportionately African-American or Latino populations. Note that district-level demographics
operate in much the same way as individual-level predictors, as when low income or minority
status predicts liberalism; this is hardly the case for state-level demographics, which operate in
more counterintuitive directions (Gelman 2009). Other features of liberal-moving districts, then,
include a high population density, and comparatively high rates of poverty, unemployment, and
violent crime. Unsurprisingly, districts that exhibit conservative change tend to be rural and
homogenously white. It could be that the homogenization imposed by gerrymandering is a
predictor of nationally-independent changes in public opinion.
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Table 4.6. 6-Year Demographic Averages of Districts Exhibiting Strong Ideological Variation (2004 - 10)
Murders
Unemploye
per 100k
d
people*
Alabama 5
More conservative
21.9%
13.3%
1.0%
33.5%
4.1%
19.2%
8.5%
4.9%
1.9
Arkansas 1
More conservative
10.4%
11.4%
0.7%
18.4%
9.4%
15.4%
70.5%
5.6%
1.9
Louisiana 6
More conservative
22.1%
28.6%
1.4%
31.8%
10.1%
14.8%
12.4%
4.7%
3.2
Minnesota 3
More conservative
37.1%
2.9%
1.0%
46.5%
1.8%
11.3%
0.0%
4.1%
3.6
Texas 14
More conservative
25.8%
9.9%
13.3%
29.8%
4.6%
14.7%
19.4%
4.5%
1.6
West Virginia 1
More conservative
12.5%
1.7%
0.6%
24.2%
6.7%
19.6%
62.4%
4.6%
0.0
Illinois 7
Constant
28.9%
39.0%
8.2%
45.6%
12.6%
10.4%
0.0%
8.0%
11.8
Massachusetts 8
Constant
31.7%
16.7%
5.6%
54.5%
7.1%
9.5%
0.0%
5.8%
7.7
New York 6
Constant
29.4%
51.2%
10.6%
31.0%
9.9%
16.0%
0.0%
7.1%
4.6
California 9
More liberal
36.1%
21.1%
8.2%
54.9%
2.9%
14.0%
0.0%
6.2%
9.6
California 32
More liberal
26.7%
3.7%
43.0%
26.7%
3.7%
11.6%
0.0%
6.8%
9.2
Florida 18
More liberal
28.3%
10.1%
46.0%
43.1%
11.1%
10.6%
14.8%
5.0%
3.3
Florida 23
More liberal
22.5%
18.1%
8.2%
35.0%
6.3%
15.5%
1.1%
6.4%
4.1
Louisiana 6
More liberal
22.1%
28.6%
1.4%
31.8%
10.1%
14.8%
12.4%
4.7%
3.2
Maryland 7
More liberal
34.6%
37.0%
1.6%
44.8%
7.0%
15.2%
0.0%
5.0%
16.8
Minnesota 4
More liberal
29.1%
4.1%
2.3%
43.9%
3.6%
13.7%
0.0%
4.9%
2.9
New York 11
More liberal
28.1%
49.4%
7.4%
42.3%
13.1%
10.4%
0.0%
6.8%
9.0
New York 18
More liberal
51.9%
11.3%
6.5%
57.1%
2.5%
14.9%
0.0%
4.6%
2.4
Tennessee 9
More liberal
20.0%
48.9%
1.0%
34.0%
13.5%
13.5%
0.0%
7.7%
16.4
Average district
More conservative
24.4%
10.3%
6.9%
34.3%
5.6%
15.1%
21.1%
5.3%
3.8
* Homicide rates are taken from CDC's WONDER (Wide-ranging OnLine Data for Epidemiologic Research) utility at http://wonder.cdc.gov. These are
approximate in the extreme. For one thing, WONDER only yields county-level results, meaning that these had to reweighted by county likelihood of being in
a Congressional district. For another, the CDC does not publish homicide numbers for counties with fewer than 10 murders in a specified timespan. To get
around this, I coded counties having suppressed murder rates as having no murders. This means that I underestimate murder rates in rural jurisdictions.
Nonetheless, my numbers are the best district estimates of homicide rates that anyone can possibly generate. The remaining demographics are taken from my
American Community Survey post-stratification data (see previous chapter).
District

Trend

Affluent

Black

Latino

College Foodstamp
Educated
s

Retired

Rural

Is there a change in district-level demographics that might explain the unusual behavior of
districts that are ideologically unstable at or near 95% confidence? Recall that migration and the
changing demographic profiles of districts are the likely explanations for gradual attitudinal
change, whereas dramatic economic and political are likely behind sudden change. Figure 4.4
graphs the social and economic changes in a sample of districts that exhibit the strongest trends,
largely using the same post-stratification dataset with which I performed the probability
adjustment in the previous chapter. The racial composition of these districts, including the
majority-minority ones (for instance, the districts in Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, and New
York), remain largely unchanged. The plot of retirees shows that inner-city district are, in the
aggregate, aging at slower rates than the national population, which may furnish a partial
explanation for why they have failed to become more conservative. Miami and the Dallas/Fort
Worth suburbs show substantial population growth since decennial redistricting; the rest, either
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stagnation or decline. Migration itself tells us little about ideological change, though it is possible
that (say) growing affluent, conservative suburbs such as the Greater DFW Area either attract
conservatives or induce newcomers to conform. The most central relationship that the graphs
capture is nonetheless that between economic stress and ideology. Namely, unemployment and the
percentage of the population requiring economic assistance grew more sharply in districts that
became more liberal, or at least failed to become more conservative in the 2010 wave election,
than elsewhere.
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Figure 4.3. Demographic Change in Districts Exhibiting Strong Ideological Variation
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It goes without saying that the above furnishes only an impressionistic portrait of how and
why districts move ideologically. It behooves me to specify a regression model on this portrait’s
basis. A first difference model that regresses ideological change on changes in district-level fixed
effects makes the most sense. This treats my data like a panel study, with district as the panel
variable and election year as the time series variable. Theoretically, this approach is superior to a
model with just cross-sectional measures because ideological change, rather than ideological
composition, is what I seek to explain. Moreover, first difference models obviate the effects that
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omitted district-level variables may have on my ideology estimates (Liker, Augustyniak, and
Duncan 1985), in addition to reducing the correlations between predictors and thus
multicollinearity (Gujarati 2004, 367); in the latter, we might imagine that (say) unemployment
and levels of people seeking government assistance are highly correlated, but that the year-to-year
change scores for both measures are much less correlated.
Nonetheless, it seems logical, from the graphs in Figure 4.4, for the model to incorporate
the proportion of African-Americans and Latinos rather than their change scores because—at least
within the short time-span of the late 2000s—few districts undergo appreciable changes in their
racial composition. I include the race variables on the theory that majority-minority districts are
systematically more likely to become more liberal, and in particular to resist the strong
conservative tide of the 2010 wave election. The remaining predictors are changes in district
demographic social and economic characteristics, a dummy variable for “South” (which is
standard in Congressional responsiveness literature), a national change score to control for national
ideological trends, and finally voter turnout (hypothesized to predict change in the liberal
direction). I specify the model as follows:
∆ideologyij = β0 + β1 southi + β2 blackij + β3 latinoij + β4 ∆national_ideologyj + β5 ∆turnoutij +
β6 ∆populationij +β7 ∆affluentij + β8 ∆college_educatedij + β9 ∆eslij + β10 ∆graduate_educatedij +
β11 ∆retiredij + β12 ∆under_30ij + β13 ∆unemployedij + β14 ∆homicide_rateij + εij
where:
∆ideologyij = Ideology change score in district i and election year j from previous election year
southi = Whether district i is in the South (south = 1) or not (south = 0)
∆national_ideologyj = Nationwide ideology change score in election year j from the previous
election year, per the national exit polls
εij = Error term for district i and year j
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Table 4.7 shows the results, with standardized regression coefficients and standard errors.
Unsurprisingly, the national ideology variable is significant—but not overwhelmingly so, as it
explains only 6% of the variance in district-level change scores. The heterogeneity of ideological
change is again on display. Also with little surprise do we see that districts in the south became
disproportionately more conservative. Strikingly, district minority composition strongly predicts
liberal trends; this is not the case for the change scores of the black and Latino variables, which
are excluded from the model. Majority-minority districts exhibit different behavior than majority
white districts, and this difference is unaccounted for by demographic change between redistricting
cycles. Racial gerrymandering, as well as partisan gerrymandering that packs minorities into
Congressional districts, thus do much to explain the observed heterogeneity of ideological change.
Also interesting is that voter turnout is insignificant, despite the voluminous scholarship and
punditry that links high voter turnout to Democratic electoral success (Hansford and Gomez 2010).
Population increase also weakly predicts liberal change.

Table 4.7. First-Difference Model of District-Level Ideological Change
(1)
First-Differenced
Ideology
0.049**
0.00975**
(0.00357)

South

% Black

-0.153***
-0.112***
(0.0155)

% Latino

-0.072***
-0.0628***
(0.0173)

National
Ideology†

0.704***
0.949***
(0.107)

% Turnout††

0.058
0.0307
(0.0427)
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Population†

-0.064*
-0.000000261*
(0.000000117)

% Affluent†

0.037
0.202
(0.193)

% College
Educated†

0.230**
0.813**
(0.297)

% ESL†

-0.048
-0.358
(0.234)

% Grad Educated†

-0.300***
-1.579***
(0.361)

% Retired†

-0.095
-0.378
(0.277)

% Under 30†

0.300**
0.592**
(0.227)

% Unemployed†

-0.158**
-0.782**
(0.298)

% Veteran†

0.217***
1.184***
(0.338)

Murder rate†

0.059*
0.00469*
(0.00200)
1308
0.238

N
Overall R2

Standardized beta coefficients; unstandardized point estimates; robust standard errors in parentheses
Panel regression with random effects estimators.
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
† Predictor is first-differenced.
†† First-differenced percentage of the voting-age population (VAP) that voted in a House election. For Washington
D.C., House vote is coded as the percentage of the voters who voted for the highest office (taken from McDonald
2016). For districts with uncontested House elections, voter turnout was imputed from state turnout levels.

Of the other demographic covariates of ideology, aggregate college education predicts
conservative change with 99% confidence, while graduate education predicts liberal change at
99.9% confidence. Veteran, percentage of young people, unemployment, and (weakly) homicide
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rate are also significant. Notably, percent under 30 moves ideology in an unexpected direction (in
the individual-level model used to generate district estimates, age is negatively correlated with
liberalism), and changes in unemployment strongly predict district-level liberalism (perhaps voters
in depressed districts respond by favoring government intervention). Affluent, retired, and English
as a second language are insignificant.
A possible counter-consideration is that demographic covariates are endogenous to my
ideology measures, and that therefore any regression of my measures on demographic change is
“rigged” to show a significant result. They are endogenous, one might argue, because MRP first
uses individual- and aggregate-level demographics to model survey responses, and because these
responses are weighted to the distribution of demographics in congressional districts. The results
do not support this conclusion, however. My MRP model eschewed Latino, percent under 30,
unemployment, college education, and population size as district-level fixed effects—and these
are among the most significant factors of ideological change. Likewise, retired and ESL are used
to estimate ideology, and these factors are insignificant. The first-difference design of my model,
as well as the inability of any combination of non-political variables to explain most of the
attitudinal variance in Congressional districts, attenuates concerns about endogeneity.

Conclusion
The foregoing highlights the weakness of static measures of district-level ideology. Districts show
independent change between decennial redistricting cycles. This change is heterogeneous, even in
the face of three consecutive wave elections that should have exerted a strong homogenous pull
on district-level attitudes. Ideological change is bimodally distributed—the most liberal and
conservative districts exhibit the strongest trends—but is most pronounced in majority-minority
districts, which grew in relative liberalism from 2004 to 2010. Aggregate changes in population,
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age, education, and crime also help to explain ideological change. Demographic change plays a
more unambiguous role in district-level change than in state-level change, where states that exhibit
ideological instability share few obvious commonalities.
Having established that there is ideological change in the districts, I am now well-placed
to answer the question whether legislators respond to it. This will be the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 5. The Elusive Median Voter
Full Circle
I have thus far used recently-developed statistical technology as well as large-n state and national
exit polls to compute longitudinal measures of House district voter ideology. I have shown that
they are reliable, and correlate highly with existing proxies of district ideology (such as presidential
vote) as well as estimates of district-level issue attitudes. I have also shown that district ideology
changes between decennial censuses, and that this change is nationally heterogeneous rather than
nationally uniform. I have not yet shown, however, whether my measures give us any leverage in
understanding the phenomenon of representation. I have come full circle, and return my discussion
to the substantive questions that necessitate public opinion measures in the first place.
The purpose of this chapter is to fill this final gap and see whether members of Congress
(MCs) respond to voter attitudes, and, if so, which voter attitudes. I will, first, briefly discuss the
meaning of responsiveness; second, I will discuss two competing models of spatial voting—the
Median Voter Theorem and Directional Voting Hypothesis—that lead scholars to opposing
predictions about responsiveness; third, operationalizing exit-poll imputed ideology estimates as
constituency opinion, I will test whether candidate and legislator positioning correspond to the
expectations of the Median Voter and Directional Voting models; and, finally, fourth, I will
interpret the meaning of my results.

Responsiveness: A Primer
One of the oldest questions in Political Science is whether Congress responds to its constituents,
and therefore is legitimate as a popularly accountable institution. Since the 1960s, an expansive
literature on House representation has emerged. Therein, “responsiveness” emerged as a simple
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and testable operationalization of the broader concept of substantive representation. Whereas many
politico-theoretical definitions of representation emphasize the autonomy of representatives vis-àvis the represented—for instance Pitkin’s (1967) suggestion that legislators ought to advance their
constituents’ objective interests, as opposed to their mere demands—responsiveness starts from
the assumption that representatives will act as agents of the will of voters. A legislator is responsive
to the extent that her activity in Congress, most notably her roll call voting, covaries with the policy
preferences of her geographic district: if her district’s electorate becomes more liberal, so do her
roll call votes. Thus, responsiveness treats the constituency and the representative as single pair,
or dyad.
It is important to here note what responsiveness is not, and what realities this chapter will
not look for. Responsiveness is distinct from the related concept of congruence, which measures
the extent to which a district majority actually agrees with the enacted preferences of its elected
representative (Eulau and Karps 1977). Districts who elect responsive legislators are still not
certain to get what they want out of government, particularly in a political system with permanently
divided sovereignty. The state policy literature, which generally finds that state policy is consonant
with state public opinion (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Berry et al. 1998; Lax and Phillips
2009a), is thus of limited utility for understanding House responsiveness. Another limitation is
that dyadic representation captures only a portion of legislative activity, namely voting.
Representation can also take the form of policy specialization and bill sponsorship, an insight that
has spawned a parallel representation literature (see, for instance, Hall 1996) that I must here elide.
A final limitation is that conventional studies of dyadic representation consider only one-way
causation, where the theoretical possibility of reciprocal causation (voters educate MCs about what
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they want, but MCs also modify constituent demand by educating voters) exists on a subset of
policy domains (Hill and Hurley 1999).
As previous chapters discuss, Miller and Stokes (1963) inaugurated the responsiveness
literature that is central to our purposes. They were of the qualified view that legislators respond
to public opinion. Using the same low-n American National Election Study data as Miller and
Stokes, Stone (1982) found that the relationship between district public opinion and legislative
behavior was substantial and increased with time. This and a large number of subsequent
publications supported this view (Mayhew 1974a; Erikson 1978; Fenno 1978; Bartels 1991;
Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson 1996). A dissenting body of literature appeared in response to the
sunny responsiveness orthodoxy of Miller and Stokes. Achen (1978) was among the first to
question the new consensus, finding that incumbents are actually less responsive than challengers
in House races. Dozens of other studies have discovered no or limited evidence of Congressional
responsiveness (Bernstein and Anthony 1974; Bernstein 1989; Fiorina 1974; Page et al. 1984; Kau
and Rubin 1993; Lindsay 1990; Wilkerson 1990; Cohen and Noll 1991; Levitt, 1996; Hutchings
1998). Given the discipline’s bias against publishing null findings, it is unknown how many papers
in the non-responsiveness school remain unpublished (Gerber and Malhotra 2006; Bishin 2009,
9).
Why revisit the question of House responsiveness? I offer three answers. First, Political
Science cannot yet wax triumphalist about its understanding of the topic. No literature review can
illuminate a clear consensus about if, when, and how representatives translate public opinion into
legislation. Typically, studies that focus on a narrow range of salient issues find that the effect of
public opinion on policy is “awesome” (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993, 80), whereas those
looking at the entire corpus of legislation tend to find non-responsiveness (Burstein 2006). This
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tells us that responsiveness likely varies across policy domains (Wlezien 2004). Because I am
looking at responsiveness in general, any finding of responsiveness on my part has a good chance
of making a contribution to the literature. Second, Congressional scholars have typically relied on
static measurements of voter ideology to test responsiveness, when in fact representation is a
dynamic phenomenon that cross-sectional statistical models are unlikely to capture (Lax and
Philips 2012). Finally, most theories of responsiveness hold that representatives will only respond
to the preferences of voters (Griffin and Newman 2006), whereas most extant studies have not
utilized measures of voter attitudes. My exit poll measures correct for these limitations and make
possible a fresh look at the representation phenomenon.
To what hypotheses does the responsiveness question lend itself? To find my theoretical
expectations, I now turn away from contradictory empirical studies and towards the conceptual
literature. Below, I detail the contributions of spatial theorists of vote choice, and how I might
leverage them into usable hypotheses for Congressional responsiveness during the time series of
my measures. I identify two major conceptualization of voting behavior, with opposing predictions
for House legislative behavior. I propose to test these predictions.

Geographic Or Party Constituencies? A Tale of Two Models
Spatial models of politics derived from economics interpret elections as simple methods of
aggregating voter preferences. The most popular of these is the Median Voter Theorem (Black
1958; Downs 1957a), or MVT. The MVT is a simple and intuitive framework for mass-elite
linkage in American politics, and a logical starting point for anyone wishing to understand this
linkage. The MVT predicts a “median” result in any election where the spatial analogy of politics
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obtains and preferences are normally distributed.1 In other words, when voters consider candidates
on the basis of their proximity to themselves on a unidimensional policy continuum, the median
voter decides every election. Candidates will then position themselves at the center of the
continuum to capture the median vote. The MVT also predicts strong responsiveness, since
successful candidates—as single-minded, entrepreneurial election-seekers who must win in order
to realize any of their goals—must respond to the preference profile of the entire electorate, rather
than subsets thereof (for instance, party constituents). Candidates must also try to enact their stated
preferences once in office, as rational voters might use retrospective reasoning to place candidates
spatially, thereby punishing “shirkers” (Downs 1957a, 72). Rational representatives, in turn,
monitor public opinion even in the absence of electoral opposition, since challengers and other
elites might always emerge to highlight constituent disagreements with their representatives (Key
1961). Some evidence shows that legislators can respond even without intervening elections, so as
to prevent potential electoral coalitions from emerging (Arnold 1990; Bartels 1991; Stimson,
MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Wichowsky 2009). Even so, electoral competitiveness is central to
spatial voting, as it predicts that challengers will force the incumbent to assume the median vote’s
position. Against Bartels’ (1991, 436) claim that “representatives who win with 100% of the vote
appear to be as responsive to constituency opinions those who win with 51% of the vote,” Griffin
(2006) finds that electoral marginality is strongly linked with responsive behavior.
The MVT allows that symbolic ideology is crucial to responsiveness. Critics of public
choice who associate economistic accounts of voting with affectless super-rationality overlook the
later discussions in An Economic Theory of Democracy. In Downs’s model, individuals are not
issue voters, as issue voting imposes high information costs on an uniformed mass electorate.

1

This means that the MVT is not likely helpful where the distribution of public opinion is multi-modal, which is
highly possible in proportional representation systems, as well as extremely polarized societies.
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Voters instead offset these costs by relying on emotionally-charged ideological labels, which tend
to make politics intelligible by narrowing an otherwise multi-dimensional policy space (Enelow
and Hinich 1984). Representatives then use constituent ideology as a signal for how to behave
responsively, which would be much harder without the form and coherence that ideology imposes
on public demands (Sartori 1969). Hinich and Munger (1994) expand still further on the role of
ideology in public choice. Rather than functioning mainly as an instrumental heuristic, as in
Downs, ideology is in later public choice accounts is substantive. Candidates must present their
ideas in terms of the broad analogies, potentialities, and symbolisms that cohere in a mass belief
system—a system that often takes the form of a centralized party platform—and commit to making
policy in terms of these analogies. (This attenuates the MVT, however. If a candidate “flip flops”
in order to adopt the median preference, the utility of voting for her drops; voters can no longer
approximate her ideal point. The need for ideological credibility partly explains why candidates in
a given election do not adopt identical platforms). They predict that ideology will influence
representative behavior independently of constituent issue preferences.
My measures are therefore uniquely positioned to test the MVT, as they quantify the belief
systems of district median voters as they select representatives. If my data can show that
representative behavior responds to biennial changes in these measures, then I have gone a long
way in showing that Congress is a democratically responsive institution.
There are nonetheless reasons to question whether MVT will obtain. Non-constituent
factors like party discipline (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Lee 2009), the imperative of preserving
parties’ national “brand” (Aldrich 1995; Jones 2010), the need to appeal to interest groups for vital
financial and political resources (Schofield and Miller 2007), and legislators’ desire to enact good
policy as they understand it (Fenno 1973) are common explanations for why representatives
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“shirk” from constituent demand. Many of these factors are outside the scope of the MVT’s
parsimonious spatial model, and neither Anthony Downs nor Duncan Black would have ever
quibbled with their importance. More fundamental critiques of the MVT’s internal logic, however,
have abounded for as long as it has existed. Adherents of the Michigan Model, holding that emotive
sources of identity and not candidate positioning determine vote choice, express skepticism about
whether the model’s neat assumptions could ever obtain in the disorder of American politics.
Stokes (1963) doubted that all voters evaluate candidates using the same issues and the same scale,
that all political questions exist on an ordered dimension (nobody is “pro-corruption”), and that
voters reason using the same set of cognitive partisan and ideological cues. Ian Shapiro (2009)
argues that history has passed an unfavorable verdict on the MVT. If the median income in a
modern capitalist state is always lower than the average income (Pareto 1897), then would not the
MVT predict that electorates will always enact radically redistributive policies? This populist
result, a nightmare for the large number of public choice theorists of the classical liberal
persuasion, has not come to pass in advanced democracies, which Shapiro takes as a falsification
of the theory.2 Gelman and Katz (2007), more focused on the United States Congress, find that
ideological moderation confers only a 2% electoral advantage in a given House race—hardly
enough to make the median constituent’s preference profile the only one worth considering. In this
vein, Fiorina (1999) argues that partisan polarization is proof that House candidates do not
generally try to appeal to median preferences.
Dissatisfaction with the MVT has led positive political theorists to rethink the
microfoundations of voting. Attempts to bring spatial models in line with the facts of real-world

2

Downs, who denies that control over economic policy is equally distributed in any society, would vigorously dispute
this interpretation. Chapter 8 of An Economic Theory of Democracy contains a pithy discussion of the distinction
between mere voters and “influencers,” who are disproportionately attentive to and disproportionately benefit from
policy.
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political life have produced an alternative to the MVT known as the Directional Voting Model, or
DVM (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989). The DVM tells us that, while voters sanction candidates
for their ideological views as in the MVT, they care less about the proximity of candidate ideology
to themselves than they do about said ideology’s direction and intensity.3 This is particularly the
case with unsophisticated voters, who are better able to identify candidates’ broad ideological
leanings than they are equipped to estimate candidates’ proximity to themselves. Thus, in the
conditions of an uninformed electorate, and in an institutional setting with two polarized parties, a
rational candidate will assume the risk of alienating moderates and continually emphasize that she
is on the same team as ideological compatriots. Extreme positioning is especially likely among
candidates appealing to ideologically heterogeneous electorates, where the median preference does
not clearly describe the central tendency. As Gerald Wright puts it, “partisans are more
homogenous, probably more communicative, and hence easier to represent than the full
constituency” (1989, 469). Consequently and paradoxically, a moderate district where attitudes
are normally distributed is likely in the directional model to produce an extreme candidate
relatively unresponsive to the median voter (for a confirmation of this hypothesis in the Senate,
see Harden and Carsey 2012). Directionality may explain why representatives are far more
ideologically extreme than the district median voter (Powell 1982; Adams et al. 2004), and why
member replacement usually takes the form of extreme candidates replacing less extreme ones
(Bafumi and Herron 2010). Adams and Bishin (2004), in an individual- and aggregate-level

3

Yet another formal conceptualization that predicts extreme election outcomes is the discounting hypothesis.
“Discounting” voters evaluate candidates not on their ideologically proximity, but rather the expected position of
government taking into account the separation of powers, for instance the party they expect to control the legislature.
They will discount “extreme” issue positions when they deem them unlikely to influence policy outputs. In legislative
elections where the winner is unlikely to dramatically influence policy, the discounting motive is naturally greater
(Lacy and Paolino, 1998). The short time span of the exit poll data unfortunately makes an empirical test of discounting
prohibitively difficult. If the time series were longer, we might test whether historical changes in the configuration of
divided government has led to more extreme candidate positioning relative to district ideology.
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analysis of Senate races between 1988 and 1992, find strong evidence for the DVM. In their
empirical test, “the estimated coefficient for the proximity variable is in fact negative, which is
consistent with the proposition that ideological centrism depresses candidate support” (363).
An upshot of the DVM is that, in some elections at least, not all voter preferences are equal
when it comes to influencing policy. The DVM predicts that legislators will appeal to present or
potential ideological supporters at the expense of others. A new and growing body of literature,
embedded in the idea of subconstituencies, agrees with this insight. Subconstituency theory holds
that identity groups, smaller than entire legislative constituencies and harboring intensely-held
ideological preferences, will exercise a disproportionate effect on legislative outcomes (Bishin
2009; see also Devine’s [1970] distinction between attentive and inattentive issue publics, which
presages subconstituency theory). To take one subconstituency study, an examination of the
Defense of Marriage Act’s passage details how the district-wide presence of LGBT
subconstituencies caused some Democrats to “shirk” from a public opinion then largely hostile to
gay rights (Bishin and Smith 2013). Validating one of the DVM’s predictions, Bishin and others
other have found that subconstituencies are particularly powerful in heterogeneous districts.
Given our purpose of looking at representation in general, the question of which district
subconstituency to look for arises. In conditions of partisan polarization, measures of party
subconstituencies are necessary to understand legislative behavior on important roll call votes
(Kastellec et al. 2015). Clinton (2006) finds suggestive but time-bound evidence that
representatives might be especially attentive to the preferences of “partisan publics,” as when a
Republican legislator only responds to the median Republican voter in her district. This provides
recent evidence for Fenno’s (1978) first-hand observation that representatives devote personal
attention to their primary and general-electoral constituencies, both of which are likely to resemble
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partisan subconstituencies. Testing the significance of party subconstituencies is thus a good point
of departure for an analysis of directional voting.
A comparison of the MVT and DVM is not simply an academic exercise. If House elections
adhere to the median result—that is, candidates position themselves as proximately as possible to
the median voter, and vote accordingly once in office—then Congress meets accepted
requirements for representativeness. If the DVM obtains, then Federalist 57’s worry that
legislatures will violate popular sovereignty and “favor the elevation of the few on the ruins of the
many” may have proven prophetic. Instead of representing all constituents, House members might
exercise “segmented representation,” whereby different segments of the electorate—in particular,
the most intensely supportive constituents—receive more policy benefits than others (Druckman
and Jacobs 2012). The DVM, which predicts relatively extreme and unrepresentative candidate
positioning, also recommends itself as a suspect for growing levels of partisan polarization and
disaffection with Congressional elites (Fiorina, Pope, and Abrams 2011; Abramowitz 2010a).
Despite the stakes involved, Political Science has been unable to adjudicate the question of
whether House elections conform to the logic of either the MVT or DVM. For one thing,
constructing a test of both spatial models is difficult. Empirical literature is therefore divided on
whether voters favor candidates using proximity or direction, with results that say less about mass
and elite behavior and more about authors’ methodological choices (Lewis and King 1999). The
problems of deriving measures of district-level ideology are multiplied when measures of withindistrict groups are needed. Research under the aegis of subconstituency theory has thus mainly
confined itself to Senate responsiveness on discrete policy matters (Shapiro et al. 1990; Bishin
2009; Kastellec et al. 2015). The main research question of whether House representation
conforms to the logic of median or directional voting remains unexplored.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
The above review leads me to identify three separate questions on the subject of responsiveness
that 1) have important consequences for the popular legitimacy of “the People’s House;” 2) are
not resolved to anyone’s satisfaction; and 3) are amenable to answer using exit poll measures. 4 I
adumbrate them below.
1. Do median district preferences or median party subconstituent preferences better predict
candidate positioning in U.S. House races? The MVT predicts that candidates will locate
their campaign positions as closely as possible to the largest number of voters. Major party
candidate platforms will therefore converge on the median district preferences, though they
may not do so completely owing to nominees’ need to maintain credibility with voters and
eschew “flip-flopping.” The DVM says that voters reason using the direction and intensity
of candidate preferences. Particularly in districts where public opinion is heterogeneous,
candidates will receive an electoral bonus for appealing to their own partisan
constituencies. A good way to test this proposition is to see if district-level partisan median
preferences, operationalized in a manner similar to Clinton’s (2006) methodology, explains
more variation in candidate position-taking than does the district-wide median.
2. Do changes in median district preferences or changes in subconstituent preferences better
predict changes in House legislative behavior for each district? The MVT predicts that

I might also have asked, “are voters better represented than mere constituents?” After all, I consciously chose to
disaggregate exit polls the assumption that the answer is, indeed, “yes.” Unfortunately, as Chapter 2 makes plain, there
is not yet a longitudinal, district-level estimation of general population ideology in the timespan of my dissertation.
To compare the effects of my exit poll measures on elite behavior with the effects of competing MRP measures in the
House responsiveness literature (which do not go back to 2004, and are not suitable as biennial point estimates owing
to small ns) would be to compare apples and oranges.
4
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reelection-minded representatives will position themselves closely to the district median
after entering office. Policy therefore meets constituent demand. A new subconstituency
literature questions the “demand” model of representation, and holds that legislators make
minority-preferred voting decisions in order to appeal to intensely mobilized district
minorities, for instance partisan publics. While Bishin (2009) only mentions the DVM in
passing, it is still a possible framework to explain the “tyranny of the minority” in this
nascent Congressional literature. Which explanation has the most leverage in
understanding House responsiveness? It is necessary to approach this question
dynamically, as responsiveness is a dynamic phenomenon that seeks to understand changes
in policymaking. Thus, if changes in the district median preference predict changes in
Congressional ideology, then we have good evidence of constituent control over
representatives. If only changes in district subconstituency preferences predict changes in
Congressional ideology, then “the representativeness of the system and the legitimacy of
resulting outcomes may be lacking” (Clinton 2006, 397)—or, in the blunter language of
V.O. Key, “all the talk about democracy is nonsense” (1961, 7). Answering Question 2
does not tell us, however, if district ideological change owes itself to incumbents changing
their minds or to member replacement. For this, I turn to my final question.
3. Do changes in median district preferences or changes in subconstituent preferences better
predict changes in House legislative behavior for each legislator? If I answer Question 2
in the affirmative, I will need to identify a mechanism for changing roll call behavior in
the House. Spatial political theorists—as well as Congressional scholarship purporting to
show that representatives actively monitor public opinion—offer one such explanation:
that incumbents monitor public opinion in order to foreclose the possibility of electoral

105

risk. Is this the case? Even with my biennial exit poll measures, this is a harder question to
answer affirmatively than Question 2, because House representatives do not change their
behavior very much when in office (Poole 2007), and member replacement probably
explains most of the longitudinal variance in Congressional roll call ideology (Theriault
2006). I will nonetheless attempt an answer of whether incumbents respond to the changing
attitudes of the district median voter, the attitudes of their core supporters, or neither.
On the basis of studies that show members of Congress to be more extreme than their
district median voter (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001), and that candidates make appeals
primarily to constituents of their own party rather than converge on the median voter (Clausen
1973; Fenno 1978; Clinton 2006), I set my hypotheses thus:
1. H1: Candidates will spatially position themselves closer to partisan subconstituent
ideology, particularly in heterogeneous districts, than to the median ideology of their
geographic constituency.
2. H2: Changes in subconstituent ideology, not changes in the median voter ideology, will
better predict changes in congressional roll call behavior in a given district, particularly if
the district is heterogeneous.
3. H3: Individual legislators will respond mainly to the changing attitudes partisan
subconstituents, particularly in heterogeneous districts.
In other words, I expect directional voting to more accurately describe the phenomenon of
representation in the House of Representatives.
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Data and Measures
This study will test the effect of median district voter and district subconstituency policy
preferences on candidate and legislator ideology from 2004 to 2010. I will use panel data
regressions with random effects estimators to predict legislator and candidate ideology using my
district ideology measures. Owing to the overwhelming and growing correlation between
partisanship and legislator behavior (Poole and Rosenthal 2011), and previous findings that
responsiveness behavior varies by party (Clinton 2006), I will bifurcate my tests by party and run
separate models on Democratic and Republican elite behavior. The results of these tests will tell
us whether House representatives respond to constituent attitudes and, if so, which constituent
attitudes.
Measuring constituent ideology. District-level ideology will serve as my most important
predictor of candidate and legislator ideology. In the convention of traditional responsiveness
literature, which interpreted the average survey response in a district as the median voter
preference, I operationalize the median voter ideology using the exit poll measures I developed in
Chapter 3. Testing the directional hypothesis requires measures of partisan subconstituencies. To
generate these, I run an extension of my original MRP procedure. First, I run district MRP on the
“Democrat” response in the exit polls; second, the individual-level estimates of “Democrat” (that
is, the inverse logit of the individual’s demographic characteristics and their respective regression
coefficients) are used to reweight the post-stratification data, capturing a Census respondent’s
likelihood of being a Democrat; finally, the normal MRP model is run on ideology, using only
Democrats in the individual-level model, and post-stratifying the model using the Census data
reweighted. I repeat the process for Republicans.
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Figure 5.1 graphs the average measures of district Democratic voter ideology, Republican
voter ideology, and median voter ideology by year from 2004 to 2010. Democratic ideology and
Republican ideology are weakly correlated (R = 0.25), and differ from each other and from the
district median in the expected ways. The measures appear to be valid on their face. Of course, we
cannot lose sight of the fact that these measures are less reliable than the district-wide measures.
While number of exit poll cases used to model subconstituency opinion is still massive (97,637
self-reported Democrats and 82,542 Republicans filled out questionnaires in my time series), the
median number of modelled cases per district drops from 277 (all constituents) to 108 (Democrats)
and 99 (Republicans). The sampling errors of my subconstituency measures are unknown, though
certainly greater than that of my district-wide measure. The lack of research into the role of
subconstituency politics in House districts nonetheless compels me to use the measures. Even a
qualified conclusion in this area promises social-scientific utility.5

5

It is tempting to put the exit poll data in dialogue with the burgeoning literature on inequality in Congress. For
example, Gilens (2005) and Bartels (2008) have found that Congress responds mainly to the attitudes of the rich when
these attitudes diverge from those of lower income groups. While it is possible to generate district-level measures of
low- and high-income voters using the extension of MRP I discuss in this section, it seems to be the case that the
political attitudes of these groups within districts do not meaningfully vary from each other. It could be that, while the
ideological composition of different income groups is similar, the meanings of ideological symbols vary between lowand high-income groups, with (say) higher-income liberals emphasizing the social as opposed to economic
connotations of “liberal.” Alternatively, it could simply be that public opinion does not differ across income groups
on most issues (Soroka and Wlezien 2008). Anyone interested in the MRP-by-income measures can download them
at <http://www.cliffordvickrey.com/diss_files/php/mrp.php>.
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Figure 5.1: District and District Subconstituency
Median Voter Ideology, All Districts, 2004 - 2010
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District heterogeneity. A long-held suspicion of Congressional scholarship is that districts
with more heterogeneous public opinion profiles elect more extreme candidates than more
homogenous counterparts (Fiorina 1974). As with any district-level measure of voter attitudes,
measurement of this important concept has eluded Political Science. Luckily, as with my
subconstituency measures, Chapter 3 offers a readymade way to operationalize district
heterogeneity. Recall that MRP’s probability adjustment applies individual-level predictions of
ideology to individuals in a post-stratification dataset (in our case, the American Community
Survey). To determine heterogeneity, I simply take the variance of the inverse logit of the ideology
model (the predictions of ideology for each demographic and geographic cell in the poststratification data) for each year and district. Districts with a low variance are homogenous and
those with a high variance are heterogeneous. My measure of heterogeneity is correlated with
conservatism (R = 0.4), apparently because the most homogenous districts are majority-minority
and are in the “left tail” of ideological distribution that I identified in the last chapter; this accounts
for why, in the 2012 House elections, Democrats won the majority of votes but Republicans won
the majority of seats. Districts with cross-pressured representatives (for instance, Mississippi’s 4th,
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represented by future party-switcher Gene Taylor), and Republican districts in the South with
sizable black minorities, are the most ideologically heterogeneous. This comports with
expectations. Also comporting with expectations is the positive skewness of heterogeneity’s
distribution, which I show in Figure 5.2. Carson et al. (2007) speculate that gerrymandering (in
particular, “packing” ideologically similar voters in districts in order to protect incumbents) will
lead to a high concentration of homogenous districts. This appears to be the case. Interestingly, the
most homogenous districts are found in large states with many districts, perhaps because it is easier
for state legislators to gerrymander district lines when there are more of them to draw.
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Figure 5.2: District Average Heterogeneity, 2004 - 2010
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Because the literature hypothesizes that heterogeneity will induce candidates to appeal to
relatively extreme party subconstituents, I will include an interaction term that multiplies
heterogeneity by party subconstituent ideology. If the DVM’s predictions are accurate, then this
term will positively covary with candidate and legislative ideal points.
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Measuring elite political behavior. Candidate and legislator ideology is not directly
observable. While Congress scholarship has had an easier time measuring the representative side
of the constituent-representative relationship, I still need to make discretionary choices about how
to operationalize my dependent variables. To operationalize candidate ideology in elections, I rely
on Bonica’s (2014) Campaign Finance (CF) scores, the best and most comprehensive historical
estimates and candidate ideological positioning available. He assigns these scores on the basis of
giving patterns of campaign finance donors. Donors receive ideal points using the ratio of money
they give to conservative causes to liberal ones; candidates across all federal offices are then
assigned ideal points using the ideal points of their contributors. CF scores range from about -5
(most liberal) to 5 (most conservative). While CF scores are a godsend to Congressional
scholarship, which has limited data regarding House challengers, they nonetheless possess
limitations. For one thing, CF scores are static measures that do not vary between Congresses. For
another, anyone who has worked with the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) detailed records
of itemized transactions knows their limitations: namely, their poor documentation and noncomprehensiveness. Because campaigns are required to itemize only those individual donations of
$200—and because not all candidates, not even all primary winners, meet the fundraising filing
threshold—CF scores are available only for the most viable candidates. Nonetheless, regressing
CF scores on the district median preference still offers a good-enough test of whether candidate
campaign behavior exhibits responsiveness. Median voter ideology and party subconstituency
ideology should covary with these scores.
Where legislative ideology is my dependent variable, I operationalize legislator ideal points
using Nokken-Poole (NP) scores (Nokken and Poole 2004). These measures are available up to
the 113rd Congress. They are similar to the widely-used DW-NOMINATE scores, which are two-
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dimensional scales of legislator roll call voting given revealed preferences, with the difference that
NP scores are allowed to vary from one Congress to another.6 They are generated by, first, running
the DW-NOMINATE model and, second, generating estimates for each Congress using the same
item parameters as the DW-NOMINATE model. This approach generates ideal points (-1 is the
most liberal; 1 is the most conservative) that exhibit both inter-temporal variance and intertemporal comparability. While the measures’ original purpose was to study party defection, they
have become standard in studies that study longitudinal changes in roll call behavior. The reason
for their appeal is their generality. Older approaches to measuring roll call behavior, for instance
interest group scores, relied only on a few votes deemed important by (say) board members of the
Americans for Democratic Action. NOMINATE scores, in contrast, are generated using every roll
vote on which more than 2.5% of legislators disagreed, and so capture the entirety of a given
legislators’ voting activity. This has the salutary effect of smoothing out legislator idiosyncrasies
across policy domains.
Nokken and Poole nonetheless have critics. For one thing, it seems conceptually bizarre to
measure changing ideal points using a fixed ideal point model (Warshaw 2015). This problem
becomes apparent when we think about constituent responsiveness. Take Rep. Charlie Rangel (D
– NY 13). His constituency in 1970 was Adam Clayton Powell’s old district in Harlem, then
nearly-exclusively African American. As of the 114th Congress, Rangel represents an upper
Manhattan constituency that is more Latino than black. Any relationship between my measures of
district ideology and Rangel’s NP score might be suppressed by the fact that Rangel’s roll call

6

For the sake of brevity, I refer only to the first dimension when discussing both NOMINATE and NP scores. DWNOMINATE spatially places legislators on two dimensions. Since the middle of the 20th century at the latest,
Congressional voting is structured unidimensionally along the first dimension. The meaning of the second dimension
in recent years is less certain, with guesses ranging from racial attitudes to economic populism.
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votes in the 1970s, when he represented a totally different set of voters, will influence his more
recent ideal points.
While, in the main, NOMINATE scores (widely accepted as valid; see Bishin 2003) and
NP scores exhibit a strong linear relationship, outliers exist. These outliers’ NP scores are
uniformly more conservative than their most recently-computed NOMINATE scores, and appear
to be concentrated among the 84 Republican freshmen in the 112th Congress. This attests to the
importance of the fixed ideal points in Nokken and Poole’s procedure. Because these individuals
entered Congress when it had a conservative legislative agenda, and because I am comparing their
NP scores with a more recent iteration of their NOMINATE scores (which includes the 114th
Congress), their NP scores are greater than their most recently updated NOMINATE scores by an
average of 0.1. This is roughly the ideological space between a mainstream Republican like John
Boehner (R – OH 8) and gaffe-prone social conservative Todd Akin (R – MO 2). Again, the
outliers highlight that Congresses outside the scope of my time series affect NP scores. While the
measures are the best available ones for my purposes, a finding that they do not covary with district
ideology might raise suspicions of type II error. In other words, a finding of biennial
responsiveness in the Nokken-Poole scores is a hard test.
Controls. Because non-constituent factors influence legislative behavior, I include a
number of institutional controls that typically appear in studies explaining Congressional behavior.
One control is seniority, as legislators that entered Congress before the accelerated polarization of
recent decades will likely be more moderate than younger counterparts. Seniority might also
predict shirking, since more well-known representatives (such as senior legislators) might be freer
to enact their preferred policy preferences than relative unknowns (Burden 2004).
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The distributional Congress literature posits that committee chairs are “preference
outliers,” and systematically exhibit different roll call behavior than members of the floor (Shepsle
and Weingast 1987). Cox and McCubbins (1993) hold that institutionalized party preferences will
override personal preferences on key votes. This is particularly true if the member is in the majority
party, or if the representative belongs to the party of the president: the House-Speaker-as-partyleader or the White House may be effective in moderating representative voting behavior in the
service of a national legislative agenda. To account for these effects, ranking member of a
committee (sourced from Stewart and Woon 2011), member of the majority House party, and
member of the President’s party factor as control variables.
I also include fate in the next Congress, or a dummy variable indicating whether or not the
member of Congress is about to retire. Fate is theoretically important, since speculation exists that
retiring members, who are no longer the single-minded reelection seekers of Mayhewian
demonology, will be free from constituent sanctioning and indulge their personal preferences
(Bender and Lott 1996; Jones 2003; Poole and Romer 1993).
Because Congressional literature has traditionally held that electoral competiveness
increase responsiveness (Griffin 2006), and that uncompetitive House elections are a threat to
democratic representation (Mayhew 1974b), I code for a number of election controls. One control
is lagged election margin, or the incumbent legislator’s share of the two-party House vote in the
election to the previous Congress. Lagged electoral margin is significant on the theory that
legislators use a retrospective instead of a prospective calculus in their roll call voting behavior.
Ladewig (2010, 509) finds that historical election margins explain Congressional behavior instead
of the MVT’s “future-oriented focus of mirroring their median constituent’s preferences and
ideology.” In this case, the lagged election margin would override constituency effects and predict
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shirking behavior on the part of electorally safe incumbents, who feel free enough from constituent
control to advance their own notions of what constitutes good policy. I also include Jacobson’s
(1990) measure of challenger quality, coded 1 if the House challenger ever held elected office and
0 if not. Challenger quality is theoretically significant, as some scholars have found that viable
election challengers predict less extreme roll call voting (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001;
Burden 2004). Sulkin (2005) offers a possible explanation for this: challengers signal areas of
constituent-legislator disagreement to incumbents, who accordingly shore up their weaknesses
through altered position-taking. The last election control I use is a dummy variable for primary
competition, coded 1 if the candidate’s margin of victory in the House primary was under 30%,
and 0 if otherwise.7 Congressional scholarship has long suspected that primary competition drives
polarization, since it pulls candidate positioning away from the median voter and towards
ideologically extreme primary constituencies (Powell 1982; Gerber and Morton 1998). In this case,
primary competition should predict roll call liberalism for Democratic legislators and conservatism
for Republican ones.8
Finally, to ensure that any finding of responsiveness is not merely a function of geography,
I include a dummy control indicating whether or not the Congressional district is in the South per
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) region codes. Southern
districts systematically produce more conservative legislators controlling for party, so we expect
it to positively predict NOMINATE scores. To further ensure that candidate and legislative

7

This is, of course, a very generous interpretation of what counts as a competitive primary race. The high threshold
is necessary because most primaries are uncompetitive. According to my own data, fewer than 19% of major party
House nominees between 1978 and 2014 were nominated in primaries where the margin of victory was 30% less. That
figure drops to 11% if one considers only nominees successful in the general election.
8
Election returns were taken from Federal Communication Commission (FEC) reports. Candidates in states where
the mode of nomination is convention, such as Connecticut, Utah, and (usually) Virginia, are coded as 0. For states
(such as California and Louisiana) with blanket primaries, where voters nominate candidates in a single nonpartisan
primary rather than in multiple party primaries, I separated the returns by party to simulate major-party primaries.
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positioning is not merely a function of majority-minority districts—whose median ideology is
often several standard deviations apart from the national average, as Chapter 4 shows—I control
for the proportion of black residents to district populations, with figures derived from The
American Community Survey.

A Model of Candidate Positioning
The MVT, voters choose candidates proximately, and so candidates will try to assume the
preference of the median voters. The MVT’s basic prediction is that, when placed on the same
scale, median constituent ideal points will predict candidate ideal points, perhaps to the point
where candidates in the same election offer identical platforms. Figure 5.3 shows the linear
relationship between the median district preference imputed using the exit polls and CF scores, a
donor-based measure of House candidate ideology. Descriptively, we see that constituent ideal
points do not explain most of the variation in candidate ideal points, particularly those of
Democratic candidates. The CF scores of Democratic nominees and Republican nominees are
correlated, as the MVT would predict, but not overwhelmingly so (R = 0.34). The prima facie
evidence of the MVT from the 2004 to 2010 is therefore weak. The subconstituent scatterplots
(also in Figure 5.3), in stark contrast, show a very strong linear relationship between CF scores
and party subconstituent ideology. This would be the expectation of directional voting, though
competing explanations (for instance, that primary competition produces more extreme
candidates) must be ruled out.
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Figure 5.3. CF Scores and Voter Ideology

To better tease out the real relationships between median and subconstituent ideology and
candidate positioning, I first model candidate ideal points as a function of district median
preferences thus:

CF_scoreijk = β0k + β1k constituent_ideologyij + β2k southij + β3k blackij + β4k primary_competitionijk
+β5k incument + β6k candidate_qualityijk
𝑖𝑗

where:
CF_scoreijk = CF score of party k’s (1 = Democrat; 2 = Republican) nominee in district i and
election j

Naturally, the MVT expects that district median preferences will exercise a strong and independent
effect on candidate positioning. To test directional voting, I simply run the same model with three
added predictors. These are subconstituent ideology, heterogeneity, and subconstituent ideology *
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heterogeneity for each district i and election j. Respectively, these capture the preference of the
median voter in the candidate’s party, the variance of the symbolic ideology in a given year and
district, and an interaction between subconstituent ideology and heterogeneity. The DVM expects
both subconstituent ideology and the interaction term to covary with candidate ideology.
Because my dependent variable is comparable across years and districts, I estimate my
dependent variable using a time-series cross-sectional random effects regression with robust
standard errors clustered on jurisdiction. This corrects for serial correlation between CF scores in
the same congressional district, and immunizes the model to heteroscedasticity.
Table 5.1 displays the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the standardized beta coefficients
and standard errors of the restricted model, with only the median voter effect; Columns 3 and 4
display the entire model, with both median voter and subconstituency effects. As expected,
Democrats in the South are more systematically more conservative than their non-Southern
counterparts. Higher-quality candidates—that is, House incumbents or challengers who have
previously held elective office—are more ideologically moderate than less viable candidates.
Primary competition is insignificant for Republicans but weakly predicts Democratic
conservatism. This agrees with recent research that refutes the intuitive but empirically
unsupported thesis that House primaries exercise a centrifugal pull on nominee candidate
positioning in a given election (Peress 2013). District racial composition, against expectations,
fails to predict candidate positioning once South is controlled for.
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Table 5.1. Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 2004 to 2010
(3)
Democrats
-0.122**
-0.384**
(0.119)

(4)
Republicans
0.036
0.146
(0.178)

Party Subconstituency

0.091*
0.351
(0.150)

0.220***
1.625***
(0.320)

Heterogeneity

0.100*
19.65*
(8.936)

0.609**
101.5**
(33.05)

Party Constituent Ideology * Heterogeneity

0.095*
44.40*
(19.78)

-0.691**
-169.9**
(52.13)

Constituent Ideology

(1)
Democrats
-0.021
-0.0648
(0.0945)

(2)
Republicans
0.114***
0.469***
(0.137)

South

0.234***
0.303***
(0.0612)

0.039
0.0392
(0.0576)

0.213***
0.276***
(0.0584)

0.054
0.0545
(0.0559)

District % Black

0.068
0.208
(0.110)

0.053
0.313
(0.319)

0.022
0.0682
(0.108)

0.040
0.237
(0.306)

Competitive Primary

0.083**
0.147**
(0.0460)

-0.041
-0.0545
(0.0470)

0.081**
0.143**
(0.0455)

-0.044
-0.0587
(0.0454)

Incumbent

0.416***
0.547***
(0.0559)

-0.379***
-0.452***
(0.0545)

0.426***
0.561***
(0.0561)

-0.380***
-0.454***
(0.0527)

Candidate Quality

0.073
0.133
(0.0853)
1040
0.416

-0.083*
-0.165*
(0.0822)
907
0.273

0.077
0.140
(0.0846)
1040
0.454

-0.068
-0.136
(0.0810)
907
0.309

Observations
Overall R2

Standardized beta coefficients; unstandardized point estimates; standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered by jurisdiction.
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Most importantly, the results indicate that candidates tend to ignore the preferences of
district median voters once the preferences of party subconstituencies are held constant: for
Democrats, the median voter coefficient is significant in the wrong direction; for Republicans, it
is insignificant. As the DVM predicts, Democratic candidates in heterogeneous districts, where the
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entire jurisdiction is theoretically harder to represent, apparently make greater appeals to partisan
subconstituencies. Republican nominees seem especially responsive to partisan subconstituencies
during this time period. They are also more conservative in heterogeneous districts, though the
relative extremism of party subconstituencies does not mediate this effect in the expected direction.
The regression results indicate that, contrary to expectations of the MVT, candidates do not
necessarily position themselves spatially to capture the largest number of voters. Given the
importance of party identification in vote choice, and also “the long term exposure of most
candidates to the people and views of a single party” (Clausen 1973, 128), candidates make appeals
mainly to partisan supporters. I therefore validate my first hypotheses (H1).
Still, caution is advisable in interpreting the regression results as a wholesale falsification
of the MVT for Democrats. Attenuating the conclusion that candidate ideal points do not track
district-level ideology is the fact that the CF measure, while an innovative and well-regarded
contribution to Political Science, suffers from a few limitations. For one thing, Warshaw and
Tausanovitch (2016) find that CF scores do a poor job of predicting the policy preferences of
candidates once they take office. This is particularly true of non-incumbents who win their first
election. They offer a possible explanation: donors are limited by political geography and the pool
of viable candidates in a given district, such that their giving is not the most direct indicator of
their real attitudes. Moreover, CF scores—not unlike older measures of district-level ideology—
are static, raising the possibility that my model is not detecting changes in candidate positioning
from election to election.
Despite these reservations, we have reason to suspect that the MVT is not an accurate
depiction of House campaigns. Since the literature identifies campaigns as the mechanism whereby
election-minded elites adopt the policy stances of their constituents, we may doubt whether the
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MVT’s strong expectation of legislative responsiveness will hold. To further clarify the question
of whether representatives respond only to their partisan supporters, I will turn to my second
research question, which takes us beyond campaign behavior and towards actual policymaking.

Explaining Changes in Roll Call Ideology
Even if candidates position themselves closely to the preferences of the constituency or
subconstituency medians in their respective districts, there is no guarantee that their activity in
Congress will match their campaign appeals (Sulkin 2009). To answer whether the MVT is a good
explanation of House voting, I start (again) with descriptive statistics. Do my constituency
ideology measures predict roll call voting of elected House members? The answer is “yes.” The
correlation between DW-NOMINATE scores and my median voter scores is 0.62 for all
legislators, 0.57 for Democrats, and 0.38 for Republicans. Constituent ideology compares in
performance to CF scores, as well as recent measures of candidate positions based on voter
perceptions (Aldrich and McKelvey 1977) and Twitter followings (Barberá 2015), in explaining
variation in House member voting behavior. Figure 5.4 displays the relationships for legislators of
both parties. The bivariate relationship between subconstituent ideology and NOMINATE scores
(also in Figure 5.4) is comparable to that of the district median for Republicans, but somewhat
weaker (R = 0.36) for Democrats.
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Figure 5.3. Nokken-Poole Scores and Voter Ideology

The bivariate relationship between these constituent effects and NOMINATE scores, while
a good case for the concept validity of my exit poll measures, is not entirely helpful. We need to
know how important median district ideology is relative to other factors in House roll call voting,
most importantly partisanship. Member party alone explains most roll call votes in Congress: in
the 109th to 112th Congresses, it accounts for 92% of the variation in NP scores—which, as I
previously discussed, are NOMINATE scores that are permitted to vary from Congress to
Congress. Once this overwhelming party effect is taken into account, is there anything left to
explain?
Because NP scores, unlike CF scores, vary from Congress to Congress, they present a
unique analytical opportunity for the researcher. If longitudinal measures of public opinion exist,
it is possible to determine the sources of ideological change in the House. To construct a measure
of ideological change, I take the first difference of the jurisdiction’s NP score at time j and j - 1,
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where j is (say) the 110th Congress. To test the MVT, I can therefore model district-level
ideological change as a function of evolving public opinion, as well as relevant institutional
changes, election variables, and member traits:

∆NP_scoreij = β0k + ∆β1k constituent_ideologyij + ∆β2k majority_partyij + β3k seniorityij +
∆β4k majority_partyij + β5k seniorityij + β6k ranking_memberij + β7k retiredij + ∆β7k majority_partyij +
∆β8k party_of_presidentij + β9k democratic_house_voteij-1 + β10k seniorityij +
β11k challenger_qualityij + β12k competitive_primaryij

where:
∆NP_scoreij = Change in the NP score of district i’s representative in Congress j from Congress j
- 1.

As in the previous section, I also run an extended model with the same predictors, but with
the three constituency variables (first differenced party subconstituent ideology, first differenced
district heterogeneity, and an interaction term) that the DVM holds to be theoretically significant.
Subconstituency ideology as a first-differenced predictor is superior to the static measure
because the latter is likely correlated with the preferences of national, issue-based interest groups.
A relationship between the static measure and roll call ideology could simply mean that legislators
are reliant on the support of extreme interest groups, in which case all I would have proven is the
“resource hypothesis” (candidates shirk voter demands because they pander to extreme interest
groups in exchange for political advertising money). A finding that district-specific subconstituent
ideological change predicts changes in roll call behavior is less interpretable as a mere vindication
of the resource hypothesis.
In the case that the district switches parties in an election, the subconstituent ideology
variable is first-differenced with a legislator panel. That is, if Democrat wins a seat formerly held
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be a Republican at time j, subconstituency ideology is the difference between district Democratic
subconstituency ideology at j and j - 1. Because my dependent variable is comparable across years
and districts, I estimate my dependent variable using a time-series random effects regression with
robust standard errors. In contrast with my CF score regression, my first difference model does not
require clustered standard errors to correct for serial correlation.
Table 5.2 shows the results, and a side-by-side comparison of the MVT and DVM
conceptualizations. The DVM, in no uncertain terms, outperforms the MVT in terms of validating
theoretical expectations; the inclusion of the DVM terms raises the overall variance explained by
20%. Democratic roll call ideology is unresponsive the changing attitudes of district median voters,
whereas it responds highly to Democratic partisan ideology in heterogeneous districts. Republican
roll call ideology is weakly responsive to the constituent median, but highly responsive to partisan
preferences in heterogeneous districts. Historical district partisanship and electoral safety do not
account for these differences. Representatives’ desire to exercise influence in the chamber, for
instance moderating voting activity in order to better cooperate with the President and House
Speaker or retain a committee chair, appears to predict shirking behavior. Republicans in their last
term in office during this period also demonstrated a greater personal component in their roll call
behavior.
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Table 5.2. Legislator Roll Call Ideological Change, 109th to 112th Congresses, District Panel
(1)
Democrats
0.014
0.0354
(0.0684)

(3)
Democrats
-0.025
-0.0624
(0.0888)

(4)
Republicans
0.138**
0.502**
(0.157)

First Difference: Party Constituency Ideology

-0.196***
-0.619***
(0.118)

-0.057
-0.313
(0.200)

First Difference: District Heterogeneity

0.313***
28.12***
(5.381)

-0.598***
-74.23***
(15.45)

First Difference: Party Constituent Ideology * Heterogeneity

0.666***
106.1***
(9.531)

0.783***
104.0***
(21.65)

First Difference: Constituent Ideology

(2)
Republicans
0.193***
0.702***
(0.150)

South

-0.019
-0.0109
(0.0197)

0.094**
0.0592**
(0.0196)

-0.003
-0.00191
(0.0166)

-0.013
-0.00811
(0.0165)

First Difference: Majority Party

-0.030
-0.00886
(0.00719)

-0.214***
-0.0832***
(0.0113)

0.005
0.00149
(0.00728)

-0.122***
-0.0475***
(0.0127)

Senior Member of Congress in 2004

0.031
0.0193
(0.0156)

-0.033
-0.0308
(0.0178)

0.015
0.00919
(0.0115)

-0.029*
-0.0270*
(0.0134)

Ranking Member of Committee

0.013
0.00988
(0.0150)

-0.061**
-0.0589**
(0.0199)

0.002
0.00180
(0.0125)

-0.064***
-0.0624***
(0.0163)

Retired

0.030
0.0340
(0.0221)

-0.056**
-0.0679**
(0.0228)

0.011
0.0121
(0.0170)

-0.048***
-0.0590***
(0.0165)

First Difference: Party of President

0.245***
0.104***
(0.0152)

-0.177***
-0.109***
(0.0214)

0.184***
0.0781***
(0.0173)

-0.147**
-0.0911**
(0.0284)

0.455***
0.00611***
(0.000583)

0.393***
0.00737***
(0.000840)

0.253***
0.00339***
(0.000452)

0.149***
0.00280***
(0.000806)

Challenger Quality

-0.074
-0.0360
(0.0220)

0.089*
0.0448*
(0.0200)

-0.042
-0.0203
(0.0182)

0.079**
0.0395**
(0.0148)

Competitive Primary

-0.144**
-0.119**
(0.0414)
684
0.413

0.237***
0.199***
(0.0401)
620
0.489

-0.121**
-0.100**
(0.0344)
684
0.632

0.073
0.0609
(0.0348)
620
0.664

Lagged Democratic House Vote

Observations
Overall R2

Standardized beta coefficients; unstandardized point estimates; robust standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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In sum, when party is constant, constituency factors do explain a sizable portion of
ideological change in Congress. This is good evidence of responsiveness. Directional voting
explains much more of this change than does the MVT, which means that I can validate H2. The
model in this section includes cases where there is member turnover, meaning that H2 does not tell
us whether member replacement (a Republican House member losing her seat to a Democratic, or
alternatively a Republican House member retiring to be replaced by another Republican) or
member change (an individual representative grows either more liberal or conservative) drives
House responsiveness to party subconstituencies. The next section will explore these very
possibilities.

Do Legislators Change Their Minds?
Studies of Congress, on the basis of not only public opinion data but also in-depth interviews with
MCs, claim that legislators routinely monitor and respond to public opinion (Kingdon 1989;
Arnold 1990). Despite the fact that reelection rates are high, as well as the fact that most voters do
not pay attention to most of the happenings in Congress, observers hypothesize legislators are
aware of the fact that challengers can raise past instances of shirking in future campaigns (Key
1961; Sulkin 2005). Is this truly the case? Or, alternatively, are legislators stubborn and fixed in
their revealed preferences once they enter office (Poole 2007)? Responsiveness demands that
representatives listen to constituents. I will now judge Congress by this metric.
To test whether individual MCs respond to their constituents, I run the same model as in
the previous section, with one difference: instead of first-differencing NP score with a district
panel, I instead do so with a legislator panel. Legislators in the dataset are identified by their Poole-
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corrected ICPSR number. Representatives who changed parties (in my time series, Rodney
Alexander [LA - 5] and Parker Griffith [AL - 5] changed from the Democratic to the Republican
parties) are treated as separate individuals, such that their roll call ideology for their older party
does not contaminate their roll call ideology difference score after they switch. Because legislators
have to have served in a least prior one term (or, in the cases of special elections, to have cast
enough votes in a partial term) to receive a first differenced NP score, the legislator panel model
exclude first-year legislators and works with a smaller universe of cases. How much smaller is the
sample? According to my own hand-coded data, 217 MCs exited Congress during this period (85
lost reelection races, 57 retired, 48 ran for higher office, 9 lost re-nomination races, 9 resigned,
and 9 died). This exclusion will make it harder for my main constituent predictors to achieve
significance. However, most MCs (83.7%) remained in office from Congress to Congress, making
the legislator panel model more than feasible.
Table 5.3 displays the results. As is obvious, explaining most of the within-legislator
variance in legislative ideology is a hard task at which the model is not quite successful (the full
model explains 3% of the ideological change for Democrats and 8% for Republicans). With near
total certainty (p = 0.99), changes in median constituent ideology do not predict changes in
individual legislator ideology for Democrats, and the median change score does not approach
statistical significance for Republicans. The DVT model, on the other hand, has significantly more
explanatory power. More than any other hypothesized effect, the interaction between heterogeneity
and subconstituent attitude change predicts changed patterns in voting behavior. Thus, once again,
we find that representatives of diverse geographic constituents maximize their reelection chances
by appealing to extreme voters. For Republicans, none of the constituent variables achieve
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significance, but party subconstituent change comes the closest (p = 0.1). I can therefore validate
H3.
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Table 5.3. Legislator Roll Call Ideological Change, 109th to 112th Congresses, Legislator Panel
(1)
Democrats
0.001
0.000405
(0.0297)

(3)
Democrats
-0.117
-0.0749
(0.0444)

(4)
Republicans
0.091
0.106
(0.0852)

First Difference: Party Constituency Ideology

0.070
0.0584
(0.0574)

-0.151
-0.251
(0.158)

First Difference: District Heterogeneity

0.358***
8.264***
(2.404)

-0.161
-6.056
(14.22)

First Difference: Party Constituent Ideology * Heterogeneity

0.276**
14.59**
(5.590)

0.201
11.65
(22.71)

First Difference: Constituent Ideology

(2)
Republicans
0.069
0.0802
(0.0710)

South

0.024
0.00361
(0.00495)

0.024
0.00467
(0.00799)

0.034
0.00516
(0.00496)

0.026
0.00492
(0.00804)

First Difference: Majority Party

0.008
0.000628
(0.00369)

-0.216***
-0.0244***
(0.00605)

0.004
0.000338
(0.00414)

-0.170**
-0.0192**
(0.00686)

Senior Member of Congress in 2004

0.025
0.00382
(0.00556)

0.038
0.0102
(0.00871)

0.034
0.00525
(0.00538)

0.033
0.00880
(0.00886)

Ranking Member of Committee

-0.022
-0.00413
(0.00625)

-0.121**
-0.0327**
(0.0102)

-0.032
-0.00600
(0.00624)

-0.120**
-0.0325**
(0.0102)

Retired

0.008
0.00216
(0.0110)

-0.114**
-0.0384**
(0.0121)

0.008
0.00228
(0.0104)

-0.113**
-0.0383**
(0.0122)

First Difference: Party of President

0.040
0.00508
(0.00613)

0.005
0.00109
(0.00959)

-0.094
-0.0118
(0.00745)

0.036
0.00722
(0.0153)

Lagged Two-Party House Vote

0.042
0.00977
(0.00982)

-0.030
-0.0131
(0.0215)

0.031
0.00711
(0.0100)

-0.031
-0.0137
(0.0214)

Challenger Quality

0.049
0.00901
(0.0114)

0.086
0.0217
(0.0120)

0.050
0.00911
(0.0115)

0.084
0.0212
(0.0120)

Competitive Primary

-0.005
-0.00167
(0.0188)
594
0.00614

0.034
0.0166
(0.0232)
496
0.0682

-0.009
-0.00280
(0.0191)
594
0.0342

0.029
0.0142
(0.0240)
496
0.0766

Observations
Overall R2

Standardized beta coefficients; unstandardized point estimates; standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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I validate the hypothesis, of course, with the caveat that first-differenced NP scores are
stubbornly hard to predict when legislator is the panel variable. I identified a number of
idiosyncrasies with NP scores that pose problems for inference when they are used outside of their
original purpose (to explain party switching). To reiterate, NP scores first measures one-Congressat-a-time preferences only after first modeling legislator preferences on a fixed ideal point model
(viz., NOMINATE scores). Not surprisingly, NP scores are almost identical to NOMINATE scores
and exhibit modest Congress-to-Congress variation for each single legislator. The fixed
component of the NP estimation means that, for senior legislators, NP scores might capture
constituent effects in long ago legislative sessions. Contemplating this possibility, the appendix to
this chapter includes the legislator panel regression with an alternative measure of legislator
ideology: adjusted ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) scores. ADA scores are a popular
interest group rating, based on a scorecard of twenty yearly votes that the group’s Legislative
Review Board deems salient over a wide range of liberal causes. The deflationary adjustment
described by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) minimizes the effects of shift and stretch
between Congresses and places the numbers on the same scale. Because ADA scores are reversecoded in relationship to my constituent effects, we expect the latter’s regression coefficients to be
negative. Table 5.4 displays the results, and validates H3 for Democrats, though shows that
Republicans exhibit greater median than subconstituent responsiveness behavior. Constituent
effects may explain more variation in the ADA scores than in the NP scores owing to greater House
responsiveness on salient, high-visibility votes, but I do not here explore this possibility. My aim
is to explain responsiveness on all votes, which is why I prefer Nokken and Poole’s scaling
estimation to interest group scores.
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Discussion
The Median Voter Theorem has long been the standard explanatory framework for democratic
representation. However, scholarship has long struggled to find evidence that House
Representatives respond to the median voter in their constituencies. The thrust of my dissertation
is that all previous research has failed to generate longitudinal estimates of the ideal points of
district voters, calling their findings of either responsiveness or non-responsiveness into question.
Exit-poll-imputed measures of public opinion, on the other hand, are valid, reliable, biennial
estimates of known voter attitudes.
This chapter has presented a snapshot of House responsiveness unencumbered by the usual
methodological qualifications. Generally speaking, candidates and legislators in the last decade
did not greatly respond to the district median voter. How does one square this finding with the
longstanding consensus that MCs are beholden to public wants (Mayhew 1974a)? The answer is
that, against the traditional spatial analogy of politics, not all wants are equal. Academic and nonacademic treatments of Congress have long suspected that representatives take only the attitudes
of certain voters, particularly their ideological supporters, into account. A competing spatial model
of elections—directional voting—explains why this is the case: there is an electoral incentive to
respond to extreme opinions, particularly when the geographic constituency is diverse and
problematic to represent. (Primary challenges, an alternative explanation for candidate extremism,
did not greatly predict roll call voting relative to constituent effects). Previous research has not
found much leverage is testing this prediction, confining itself to cross-sectional studies of the
House (Clinton 2006) or Senate (Kastellec et al. 2015). Fortunately, an extension of MRP allows
me to estimate partisan subconstituencies in each year and district. My use of the subconstituency

131

measures shows that, vis-à-vis the MVT, directional voting better captures the constituent
component of representative behavior.
Therefore, even controlling for electoral safety (the “vanishing marginals,” or proliferation
of uncompetitive elections that may allow MCs to get away with extreme voting behavior) and
primary competition (yet another explanation for party polarization is the centrifugal pull of
primary elections), representatives are especially keen to respond to partisan supporters. The
“electoral connection”—the transmission of mass attitudes to those of policy elites—is skewed in
favor of partisans and not district majorities. Changes in extreme subconstituent attitudes predict
corresponding changes in legislative ideology, such that any policy the House enacts is likely to
be more extreme than that of the national policy mood. Per the expectations of directional voting,
candidates appear the most likely to respond to party subconstituencies in heterogeneous districts.
This means that smaller, rural, and generally Republican states with few or at-large Congressional
districts—heterogeneous because they are less likely “packed” with co-partisans like
gerrymandered urban jurisdictions—will elect the most extreme legislators. They will do so even
controlling for constituent public opinion in these districts.9 Homogenous districts, on the other
hand, tend to be concentrated in larger states where state legislators have a freer hand in
gerrymandering district lines simply because there are more of them to draw. In such districts,
candidates and legislators less likely to respond to partisan subconstituencies vis-à-vis the median
voter. (In these districts, of course, the median voter is at a close spatial distance from the median
partisan voter, meaning that the extra representation here afforded to median voters is not great).
Such findings pose normative challenges to students of the House of Representatives. The
institutional design of the Constitution presupposes that the House is the locus of popular

9

As an aside, I can thus hypothesize Senators who represent inherently more diverse constituencies than House
members will exhibit greater shirking behavior from the median voter than do the latter.
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sovereignty. Based on Federalist 10’s theory that majorities if unconstrained will tyrannically
expropriate the rich, the Madisonian design of the Constitution constrains the power of electoral
majorities in the House of Representatives.10 Any good high school civics student knows about
such institutional remedies as divided sovereignty and enumerated powers. New institutionalist
theories of political power, however, predict largely the opposite of Madison’s whiggish
predictions: namely, that small, geographically-concentrated, and intensely passionate minority
groups will mobilize the anti-majoritarian biases of American politics for their own undemocratic
ends (Olson 1965; Schaatsneider 1967). Likewise, Bishin (2009) has shown that identity groups
who are emotionally invested in and highly informed about a particular policy outcome, for
instance the Cuban-American population in South Florida that sustained a commercial embargo
on Cuba for many decades, will subvert the preferences of the majority of non-invested and
uninformed median voters. As Downs (1957a, 257) put it in a forgotten passage that predates
subconstituency theory, “this inequality of information always results in a corresponding
inequality of influence over government policy formation.” I have empirically extended this
insight into the House of Representatives, and to the entire corpus of American lawmaking.
Concentrated partisan subconstituencies appear to influence roll call voting generally. Thus, in
general, and not merely on a specific and time-bound policy issue, Congress fails to meet Miller
and Stokes’ straightforward expectations of democratic representation.
Finally, my findings speak to the party polarization debate. This debate, naturally, tries to
explain why since about 1980 the voting behavior of Democratic and Republican House
delegations have polarized, such that party overwhelmingly predicts a given legislator’s roll call

10

As Robert Dahl consistently reminded us, the rhetoric of the Federalist is far from representative of James
Madison’s true beliefs, which were more sympathetic to popular sovereignty than those of many early supporters of
the Constitution.
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activity. Institutional explanations for the trend, such as rule changes in the 1970s that moved the
center of gravity of policymaking away from committee chairs and towards party leaders (Aldrich
and Rhode 2009), compete with public opinion explanations. Broadly speaking, the two dominant
public opinion explanations are that polarization is mainly due to a polarized public electing
extreme candidates (Jacobson 2010; Abramowitz 2010a) or mainly due to a polarized political
class subverting the will of a silent majority (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; Fiorina and Abrams
2009). While it is undeniable that American public opinion has grown more divided—indeed,
Chapter 4 showed that the distribution of ideology change in the Congressional districts is bimodal,
with extreme districts pulling in opposite directions between election cycles—the results of this
chapter absolve district median voters from responsibility for Congressional ideological change.
Instead, partisan district minorities are the most important constituent input into the political
system. Moreover, inasmuch as there is any evidence that incumbent legislators monitor and react
to public opinion, it appears they monitor the preferences only of their supporters. (For the most
part, however, constituents express themselves via the replacement of incumbents in elections).
My conclusion will develop the implications of my findings, as well as suggest caveats for
my findings and directions for future research.
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Chapter 6. Representation in an Age of Partisanship
What I Have Done
My dissertation began with a simple question: do members of House of Representatives respond
to their constituents’ preferences? A quality representative, the conventional logic of American
democracy goes, considers the views of all constituents in her geographic constituency when
casting at least a portion of their roll call votes. Congress scholarship has historically offered few
clues as to whether this straightforward expectation holds true. In contrast to more academically
specialized inquiries—for instance, are ranking members of House committees “preference
outliers” vis-à-vis the floor?—, the responsiveness puzzle has received comparatively less direct
examination in the literature, with scholars preferring to study related but distinct cousins of
responsiveness like “policy congruence” (Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin 2010, 91). Policy
congruence may tell us if voters elect candidates who share their traits (Burden 2007). Only
responsiveness can tell us, however, if the House conforms to the norms of democratic
representation that theorists have set for it, and consequently whether citizens can effectively
participate in the decision-making that affects their lives (Dahl 1971).
A data problem has hamstrung the discipline’s capacity and willingness to tackle
responsiveness. In Chapter 2, I reviewed the House representation literature as it has unfolded
since the Behavioral Revolution of the 1960s. The dominant conceptualization of representation
in this literature is dyadic responsiveness, which lends itself to a simple empirical test: do the views
of House district constituents and House legislators covary when placed on the same scale?
Unfortunately, responsiveness scholars have been unable to test the phenomenon on their own
terms. Measuring the constituency half of the constituency-legislator dyad has proven
prohibitively difficult. The various proposed ways around the problem—survey disaggregation,
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the use of demographic or electoral proxies to stand in for district ideology, and simulations to
combine these approaches—suffer from disabling limitations. For most of its history, House
responsiveness literature has thus been forced to rely on static, unreliable, and conceptually invalid
measures of house district ideology. Whether this caused the discipline’s seminal classics, for
instance Miller and Stokes (1963) and successor pieces, to overestimate or underestimate House
responsiveness is a matter of debate. Their overall veracity, however, is questionable.
In the last ten years, multi-level regression and post-stratification (MRP) has become the
accepted method for imputing district-level public opinion. MRP combines survey disaggregation,
Bayesian inference, and demography to impute the average survey response in a given jurisdiction.
Study after study has shown that MRP outperforms every other known estimation of state and
district public opinion (Lax and Phillips 2009b; Warshaw and Rodden 2012). Should this be the
end of the story? Not content to let Political Science rest on its laurels, I answer in the negative.
MRP-imputed measures of House district ideology that have surfaced in recent years suffer from
three limitations. First, they are static and cross-sectional, and assume that district public opinion
does not change between election cycles in the face of suggestive if inconclusive evidence that it
does. Second, they aggregate the attitudes of individuals and not voters, when responsiveness
literature agrees that voting is the normal mechanism by which attitudes translate themselves into
representative behavior. Finally, third, MRP studies have narrowly focused on individual issue
attitudes rather than public opinion as whole, which means they do not tell us much about
responsiveness in general, and in a context of agenda instability.
Chapter 3 offers my alternative approach. I run MRP on symbolic ideology—a superior
variable, I argue, than issue attitudes from the standpoint of responsiveness research—using
concatenations of state and national exit polls from 2004 to 2010. The massive sample sizes of the
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exit polls—averaging to roughly 60,000 cases per election year—mean that I can impute
longitudinal measures of district public opinion that capture ideological change. The fact that exit
polls interview individuals as they leave the booth on election days mean that there is no ambiguity
about whether they are voters, and that they are a clear snapshot of public opinion: there is no
question of collapsing survey responses over many months or years. Finally, the strong probability
structure exit polls makes is a superior choice over the Cooperate Congressional Election Study
(CCES), which relies on an online survey mode whose limitations are not yet fully understood
(AAPOR 2010).
To compute district ideology, I calculate the attitudinal propensities of various
demographic and geographic groups in the exit poll. I then weight these propensities by their
distribution in a given congressional jurisdiction per the new American Community Survey. Did I
succeed in the effort of producing a valid measure? To answer, I adopted the methodological
commonplace that no measures are valid unless they tell us what we already know with certainty.
Thus, I tested the cross-validity of exit poll ideology, finding them highly correlated with accepted
measures of district-level policy mood and partisanship, as well as with House and presidential
vote. Districts with the most extremely conservative and liberal estimates correspond to pretheoretical expectations, for instance in that they are solidly partisan districts known to be products
of gerrymandering. I then tested the reliability of the exit poll measures by comparing the withindistrict variation of exit poll respondents with between-district variation. I found that individual
responses with districts are relatively homogenous, which O’Brien (1990) would take as an
indication that my aggregate measures are reliable.
Chapter 4 examines the phenomenon of ideological change in the districts. This is a topic
worth interrogating for two reasons. First, the literature contains no clear theoretical
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expectations—let alone empirical conclusions—about whether the attitude profiles of districts
change between redistricting cycles. Second, if district-level ideology is variable, then the recent
tendency of MRP scholarship to impute a single measure of district ideology using surveys
conducted over many years gravely requires revision. How do I test for jurisdictional ideological
stability? This methodological question has inspired a spirited debate in the literature, with Brace
et al. (2004) advocating a hard test that controls for national public opinion and Berry et al. (2007)
favoring an easier test. I opted to use the harder test, which entails regressing ideology on year and
district dummy variables, then using a scores test to see if the error term in each district has a
longitudinal component. If this the case, then the aggregate ideology of the district has undergone
change independently of the rest of the country.
The results of Chapter 4 show that there was heterogeneous ideological change in the
districts in the 2000s, meaning that district attitudes did not track national swings in public opinion.
At 90% confidence, over 100 districts exhibit change. Change was bimodally concentrated in
extreme and homogenous districts, particularly majority-minority districts (which became more
liberal) and rural conservative ones (which became more conservative). The finding that many
districts exhibit this behavior is surprising, given that time series features three wave elections that
should pull the districts in a uniform direction, and is a boon to observers who blame public opinion
for polarization in Congress. What explains this phenomenon? This is an even harder question to
answer than whether there is change; the state policy literature, for instance, has found that the
only states that exhibit unambiguous historical ideological change since World War II share few
commonalities. I found that demographic and socioeconomic change—particularly changes in
unemployment, education levels, and crime—appears to predict ideological change in House
districts. A longer time series is necessary to make a certain and generalizable determination about
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the source of district-level change. Nonetheless, I offer a first attempt at solving the puzzle of
subnational ideological change. Future research will doubtlessly build on my approach in this
chapter.
Finally, Chapter 5 speaks to the MRP measures’ raison d’etre: the question of House
responsiveness. If any American political institution responds to the will of voters, I argue, it
should be the House of Representatives: House legislators represent small, usually homogenous
electorates who express their wills at frequent intervals. Despite this, Congress scholarship has
been unable to reach any consensus about the nature and extent of constituent control in the House.
Findings of democratic representation are typically modest and qualified (Bishin 2009, 9),
particularly when entire corpus of House legislation is under examination (Burstein 2006). To
formulate a test of responsiveness, I turn away from empirical findings and towards formal
economic models of voting. This first of these is the venerated but oft misunderstood Median Voter
Theorem (MVT), which predicts that the median district preference will govern the outcome of
every election if all voters select candidates on a single spatial dimension (for instance, symbolic
ideology). Candidates will then spatially locate themselves near the median voter, thus capturing
the votes of the largest numbers of voters and behaving responsively. The MVT offers rosy
prospects for the democratic legitimacy of elected institutions. The newer Direction Voting Model
(DVM), on other hand, paints an arguably darker picture of civic participation. This model
supposes that voters do not care about proximity of candidates to themselves, but rather the extent
to which candidates are credibly and intensely on the same side of the ideological spectrum. If this
is the case, then candidates (and subsequently legislators) should respond to their most extreme
supporters, particularly partisan subconstituencies, at the expense of electoral majorities. This
should be doubly true in ideologically heterogeneous districts, where the median voter’s preference
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does not describe the central tendency of district ideology. This is precisely the expectation of
many classics of Congressional scholarship (Fiorina 1973), as well as an emergent literature
embedded in subconstituency theory (Bishin 2009; Bishin and Smith 2013).
In Chapter 5, I regress accepted measures of candidate positioning and House roll call
ideology on MRP-imputed measures of district median voter ideology and party subconstituency
ideology. I find that subconstituency effects, in particular the interaction of subconstituent
ideology and district ideological variance, better predict changes in elite behavior than do the
effects of geographic constituencies. Democrats appear to respond to subconstituent pressure to an
even greater extent than do Republicans, the inverse of previous findings in House responsiveness
literature (Clinton 2006). The short time series nonetheless cautions me against making sweeping
inferences about between-party differences in representation. What is clear is that member
replacement in elections is the primary mechanism by which Congress uptakes the preferences of
party subconstituents, an insight consistent with what we already know about the sources of
polarization in the House (Theriault 2006). However, the legislator panel regression showed that—
inasmuch as MCs do change their minds—changes in party subconstituent preferences predict
changes in roll call behavior to a greater extent than most institutional variables. This finding
contributes to the body of evidence that members of Congress monitor public opinion between
elections in order to forestall potential electoral challenges (Arnold 1990; Bartels 1991).
Should we trust these findings? I argue yes, for two reasons. Because I am looking at
representation across all roll call votes, where the literature has found constituent effects to be less
detectable than in studies of (say) state policy mood, and because I operationalize legislator
ideology with measures that either do not vary over the course of the legislator’s career (Adam
Bonica’s Campaign Finance [CF] Scores) or vary little (Timothy Nokken and Keith Poole’s one-
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Congress-at-a-time NOMINATE scores, or NP scores), I am confident that I have executed
difficult tests of responsiveness. That is, by design, my dependent variables are only partly
sensitive to constituent effects, minimizing the risk of type I error. When I validated my results by
regressing constituent effects on inflation-adjusted Americans for Democratic Action [ADA]
scores, a more variable but less comprehensive estimation of legislator preferences, I found similar
constituent-elite relationships with higher levels of statistical significance.
Having established confidence in my substantive conclusions, I turn now to their
implications for 1) democratic theory and 2) the empirical measurement of constituent and elite
attitudes. I conclude with a discussion of the directions my project offers to future scholarship.

Implications for Democratic Representation
A cornerstone of traditional approaches to representation is that MCs respond to the preferences
of constituents equally, and logically attend to majority instead of minority wants. In Tocqueville’s
account (2000 [1833], 103), majority public opinion—stubborn, inflexible, and potentially
despotic—reigned supreme in early America, to the point where it governed not only legislative
behavior but also the manners and mores of ordinary people:
The idea that the majority possesses the right, by its enlightenment, to govern the society
was brought to the soil of the United states by its first inhabitants. The idea, which was
alone sufficient for creating a free people, has today passed into the mores, and is visible
even in the smallest habits of daily life.1
Dahl (1956), while critical of the pure majoritarianism that fascinated and worried Tocqueville,
believed that if representatives disproportionately responded to certain interest groups, then

1

Tocqueville provided few specific examples of legislative responsiveness at either the state or national level. He
mainly pointed to the penal code, for instance the harshness of penalties towards sexual offenses. This lacuna is
forgivable because public opinion polling did not yet exist: he wrote in 1840 that the only thing harder than measuring
changes in public opinion was for stubborn Americans to change their minds in the first place. In other words, he
anticipated the data problem afflicting studies of House responsiveness by more than a century.

141

minority tyranny would replace majority tyranny as the central problem of American institutions.
Unequal access to the legislative bodying governing state power threatens every normative theory
of representation, however conceptualized (Mansbridge 2003).2
Steeped in Tocquevillian idealism, Political Science was once optimistic that equality and
majoritarianism characterized constituent influence in the House. Miller and Stokes (1963)
ambitiously set out to test—in Hanna Pitkin’s words—whether representatives “act in the interests
of the represented in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967, 209). Both Pitkin and empirical
researchers agreed that such substantive representation was the most important metric of a
legislature’s legitimacy. Everyone, after all, wants to be governed by representatives, and all social
movements claim to be representative in some way (Pitkin 1967, 2). Miller and Stokes confirmed
their own strong expectation that member recruitment (constituents elect representatives like
themselves) and the electoral connection (members fear the loss of their careers, the punishment
for shirking) would easily guarantee responsiveness.
Unfortunately, a half-century of null findings have curdled the optimism of both political
theorists and political researchers. Dahl, famous for his insistence that American institutions were
democratically responsive to a plurality of interests, later concluded that only radically
participatory democracy could address growing concentrations of unaccountable wealth and power
(Dahl 1990). On the empirical side, as methodologies outstripped in sophistication Miller and
Stokes’ early effort, researchers found that representatives’ personal traits and institutional

2

It is a simplification to equate democratic theory with a demand for total responsiveness. With the exception of
Jeremy Bentham, no serious political theorist held that legitimacy means the mechanistic enactment of every majority
preference into law (Sabl 2015). History abounds with examples where procedural and moral considerations other
than popular sovereignty defeated or ought to have defeated majority desires. Be that as it may, it cannot be the case
that a legitimate representative government pays no attention to majority wants and attends only to various
subconstituencies. While strength in numbers does not confer an indefeasible moral authority on a political coalition,
it does confer some claim (Muirhead 2006, 719), and in many instances the majority should carry the day. In other
words, while responsiveness is not a sufficient condition for democratic legitimacy, common sense dictates that some
level of responsiveness is a necessary one.
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variables like party more powerfully explain elite behavior than do constituent attitudes, however
measured. Past work has intimidated one of the reasons why this is the case: namely, that the
assumption of equality is misplaced. Representatives appeal to only the most visible and attentive
segments of the electorate (Miler 2007), for instance partisan subconstituencies (Clausen 1973;
Fiorina 1973; Fenno 1978). Despite the partisan representation hypothesis’ long history, few
studies of the House have systematically tested it, Clinton’s (2006) groundbreaking work with
National Annenberg Election Survey (ANES) data excepted.
Here is where I enter the discussion. My findings are perhaps the first longitudinal (over
several Congresses) and most precise (I have direct measurements of median party voter ideology)
validation of the partisan representation hypothesis in the House of Representatives: the only
constituent effects that influence elite behavior are those of co-partisans. Why is this? The simplest
explanation is that individual voters prefer candidates on account of ideological direction and
intensity, not proximity (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989). Partisans are doubly likely to discount
proximity (Jessee 2009; 2010). Reacting to these conditions, candidates rationally adopt extreme
views to increase the turnout of potentially enthusiastic supporters, at a minimal cost to the support
of moderates (Adams and Merrill 2003; Peress 2011). The MVT’s prediction that party platforms
will converge does not hold as a result. While Downs allowed that “parties … must create enough
product differentiation to make their output distinguishable from that of their rivals, so as to entice
voters to the polls” (1957b, 152), this cannot account for strong and growing substantive
polarization at the level of House and Senate candidates (Cameron, Kastellec, and Park 2013).
Once in office, reelection-minded MCs “filter” their responsiveness behavior by partisan
identification (Kastellec et al. 2015). Polarization at the site of mass-elite linkage reverberates in
policy. Since MCs are responding to the party median voter and not to the geographic median
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voter, entire Congressional party delegations are likely to exhibit extreme party voting, and even
narrow party majorities in the chamber will cause gridlock in conditions of divided government.
District majorities, on the other hand, are denied influence over legislation: their votes do not shape
or constrain the policies that affect their lives.
The partisan representation I identify violates the most important tenet of Robert Dahl’s
polyarchy model: that all groups have more or less equal chances of achieving control of
policymaking. More recent conceptualizations of political legitimacy in the deliberative
democracy school also work at cross-purposes with my dissertation. Deliberative democracy aims
to make political outcomes more justifiable by channeling them through discussion characterized
by equality, reciprocity, reasonableness, freedom from power, accountability, and a focus on
consensus (Mansbridge 1999, 221-227). In contrast, parties are hierarchical organizations that
have winning as their goal, make particularistic appeals that alienate large segments of the
population, and inspire affective loyalties that render individuals unwilling to hear the other side
or to reach a consensus about truth. It is the votaries of these nondeliberative parties who appear
to govern what policy elites say and do.
My research points to a yawning gap expectation and fact. How might normative political
theorists bridge it? I identify three possibilities: resignation, resistance, and restructuring.
Resignation. One longstanding reaction to the finding that policymakers are unresponsive
is to give up on the expectation that representatives will attend to their constituents’ wants equally.
We might call this school “democratic realism.” This school holds that expectations must be
grounded in empirical certainties about the enduring nature of citizens. Because citizens are largely
ignorant about policymaking, and because members of the House of Representatives—whom
Tocqueville famously termed a “sea of mediocrity”—are equally ignorant about what the public
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wants, genuine policy responsiveness is an almost impossible prospect (Wahlke 1971). Interest
groups and ideologically extreme partisans are better suited to mobilize the elitist bias of American
institutions and achieve their goals than are median voters of districts and states. Taken to an
extreme, this line of reasoning would cast the once-vaunted concept of representation as utopian
and as firmly belonging in the dustbin of history. In the words of Achen and Bartels (2016, 268),
“abandoning the [conventional] theory of democracy is a prerequisite to both greater intellectual
clarity and real political change.” Idealist-turned-realist Walter Lippmann took things even further
and spent the 1920s arguing that scholars abandon the idea of public opinion itself, and not merely
the idea that government ought to respect it..
Resigners leave us with few tools for evaluating democratic institutions and outcomes.
What is Congress’s role, if not to meet the demands of the public? Maass (1983, 5), anticipating
the deliberative democrats, held that Congress could not justify itself as a body that “simply
aggregates and reconciles narrow group or individual interests,” and must instead through
consensus formation make policy consistent with “broader community interests.” Unfortunately,
the “common good” is not a helpful criterion in Political Science. Maass humbly declines to offer
a determinative definition of the “common good,” instead claiming that Congress itself defines
and advances it through organic legislative processes. More ambitious than modern observers was
John Stuart Mill (1861), no skeptic when it came to the best way to live and govern. He held that
the task of representative government should not be to make or implement law, but rather to act as
an intelligence gathering arm of the Executive. Its tasks would include disinterestedly researching
policy alternatives, overseeing Executive decisions, and enlarging the moral capacities of the
citizenry by showcasing debates at a high intellectual level. Mill’s account of representation may
remain unsurpassed in its scope and novelty, but the institutional purpose he would set for the
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Legislative is incompatible with both the Constitution’s investment of popular sovereignty in
Congress and the basic tenets of American political culture.3 Less original and intelligent critiques
might take the supposed impossibility of responsiveness as a case for insulating government from
public opinion, and of placing well-informed elites in charge of policy. (Estlund [2009] uses the
word “epistocracy” to reject this view). As Dahl’s (1956) criticism of the Federalist notes, the
primary effect of this move is to leave undisturbed hierarchies of wealth and power in society. In
sum, the conceptual confusion left in the wake of renouncing responsiveness makes it an
unattractive option.
Resistance. My findings, deflationary as they are in relation to traditional democratic
theory, lend themselves to a totally different interpretation. We might resist the temptation to
rethink the concept of representation. Sticking to this view, we simply acknowledge that American
institutions require radical restructuring if they are to approach both theoretical and popular
expectations for democracy. Nonpartisan redistricting, open “top-two” primaries like those
recently enacted in California, and centralized party organizations able to discipline copartisan
extremists are oft-proposed reforms to empower centrist electoral majorities vis-à-vis hyperpartisans (for an excellent overview over these “good government” remedies, see Persily 2015).
Civic education that enables majority constituencies to monitor their representatives just as
competently as intense subconstituencies, as well as higher voter turnout (via, say, automatic voter
registration) that dilutes the latter’s electoral influence, are other possibilities. Putnam (2000)
thinks that “bridging” social capital at the community level will (through the nostrum of problem-

One might argue that the emergence of the so-called “Imperial Presidency” (which relegated Congress to simply
administering the president’s program for much of the 20 th century), as well as the experience of post-communist
nations (where the center of political gravity shifted away from parliaments and towards sprawling administrations
overseeing admission to the European Union), proved Mill correct about the general incapacity of legislatures to
govern directly. This is the subject for another dissertation.
3

146

oriented, face-to-face discussion) narrow the ideological space between partisan subconstituencies
and the rest, and engender greater responsiveness at every level of government. While I have
clarified the problem of non-responsiveness, evaluating these and other solutions the problem is a
task beyond my academic and personal competence. Psephologists and sociologists can devote
themselves to identifying the best and most practical ways to incentivize responsive, moderate
candidate position-taking.
Restructuring. Partisan polarization, and by extension the phenomenon of partisan
representation I found, have existed for at least two generations and have deep roots. Neatly
reversing the trend and the distorting effects it has wrought on representation is not a likely
prospect in the near future. Without surrendering the demand for responsiveness, democratic
theory could still take steps to reconcile itself with today’s partisan realities. By undertaking
restructuring, it can close the gap between theory and fact, and make principled but realistic
demands of legitimacy on extant institutions.
What might a chastened theory of democratic representation look like? For starters, it could
take a more indulgent attitude towards partisanship in lieu of its typical blanket condemnation.
Whereas observers usually interpret the disproportionate influence of “extreme” partisans as the
dark side of American civic engagement (Fiorina 1999), we might allow that the sources of partisan
influence—their high levels of engagement and sophistication relative to political independents
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997)—are not signs of personal pathology, but rather virtues. Having
done so, we see that “there is no necessary reason why the median voter-preferred policy is more
‘desirable’ than that advocated by same-party constituents” (Clinton 2006, 407, emphasis added).
Nancy Rosenblum’s (2008) highly original attempt to reconcile partisan identification and
democratic citizenship opens a new avenue for Political Theory. Instead of depicting party
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platforms as violating the norms of public reason that alone confers legitimacy in a pluralistic
society, Rosenblum acknowledges that they offer partial conceptions of justice that take the
interests of many groups within parties’ vast coalitions into account. If we follow her tack, the
project of political representation changes. It absolves itself from the futile task of ensuring that
policies conform to the individual choices of rational voters free of party affiliation, and embraces
the challenge of working with (and not against) party constituencies so that they might reconcile
their ideological intensity with norms of consensus-seeking. The hope is that partisans can discard
the stereotype of the “true believer” and embrace a more reflexively-critical ethic of partisanship:
passion tempered by deliberation. In this way, the preferences of the median voter and median
party voter could be brought closer, enhancing democratic responsiveness in the House and Senate.
Rosenblum’s defense of deliberative partisanship is not only consistent with my findings
about the importance of party to voting and representation, but also has the advantage of moving
pluralism—an ineluctable feature of every well-ordered society (Rawls 1993)—from the margins
to the center of theorizing. This seldom-explored theoretical direction takes us on the road to a
workable concept of representation in the age of contentious pluralism, and it is a road that in my
view is the most promising of the three I delineate.

Shortcomings of Research
I turn now from the culture of theorizing to the science of empirical measurement. What
does my dissertation say about attempt to quantify constituent processes in Congress? Recall that
dyadic representation is interpretable as the relationship between demand—what constituents
want—and supply—what elites do to meet demand. In this section, I will thus discuss the
implications of my findings to measures on both sides of the equation.
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The demand side. My findings tell us three things about received measures of public
opinion: the need for longitudinal data, the need for more informative measures of public opinion
than national policy mood, and (finally) the need for further efforts to solve the n problem.
First, the finding that district electorates are labile between elections militate against a nearuniversally accepted practice of MRP scholarship. Namely, it calls into question the use of static
measures in studies of dyadic representation. Scholars have previously relied on static measures
of district ideology to predict House voting behavior, or alternatively relied on redistrictinginduced constituency change to incorporate dynamic variables into their analysis (Glazer and
Robbins 1985; Leveaux-Sharpe 2001). The assumption of attitude stability is untenable. House
electorates undergo changes in public opinion between redistricting cycles, particularly in the
many districts in which gerrymandering “packs” partisan co-identifiers. MRP can therefore only
definitively add to our understanding of representation if it can harness large enough ns to estimate
district ideology for one Congress at a time.
Second, the finding the district ideology is not only labile, but also changes independently
of national trends, problematizes popular measures of national public opinion. The heterogeneity
of ideological change makes it hard to confidently speak of a single national policy mood. To be
sure, Stimson (1999) would allow that there is wide geographic variance in public opinion, and
that policy mood is simply a global measure that in effect averages state- and district-level opinion.
However, I found that one of the key expectations of the mood literature was unfulfilled. Whereas
the policy mood is supposed to act as a “powerful undercurrent propelling Americans’ views
across a range of policy issues” (Best 1999, 721), this current did not propel most Congressional
districts to undergo the same rate and direction of ideological change, even during three national
wave elections and two majority party changeovers in the House. The district-specific dynamics
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of ideology raise the specter of non-responsiveness in an era where, in order to strengthen their
position vis-à-vis the Executive, MCs have appealed to national constituencies, emphasized nonlocal issues, and raised out-of-district campaign funds (Pietryka 2012). Future research should
consider the possibility that the nationalization of campaigns has produced a democratic deficit in
the House.
Finally, third, the thrust of my dissertation is that MRP literature has an n problem. Recall
that previous scholarship typically imputes district-level measures using the CCES. Exit polls are
superior because of their larger sample sizes, and because they are immeasurably more
representative of electorates. Table 6.1, which compares the weighted frequency tabulations of
presidential vote in Maine in the exit polls and CCES, illustrates an example of this advance. The
exit poll sample is a reasonable approximation of the statewide electorate. In contrast, the CCES
over-reports Republican presidential voters by 3%. Furthermore, its estimates fall within a vastly
wide confidence interval. Despite the CCES’s goal of district comprehensiveness, measurement
error is even higher at the district level—so high that the raw tabulations convey little useful
information, which necessitates MRP in the first place.
Table 6.1. 2008 Two-Party Presidential Vote in Maine, Exit Polls and CCES
Obama (D)
McCain (R)
Total
Election Results

Statewide Exit Poll

CCES

58.83%

41.17%

100%

59.51%
n = 969
Margin of error = ±4.79%
55.94%
n = 102
Margin of error = ±15.01%

40.49%
n = 553
Margin of error = ±6.35%
44.06%
n = 84
Margin of error = ±16.56%

100%
n = 1,522
100%
n = 186

What does this mean for MRP imputation? It means that CCES-derived measures will, at
the multi-level modeling stage, fit imprecise random slopes for states and districts given the
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differences between the estimated electorate and the true electorate. The low ns also mean that the
effects of MRP’s probability adjustment, which incorporates jurisdictional demographics, will be
great. In that case, the measures employed by the newest generation of MRP responsiveness
literature bear similarity to the demographic operationalizations of district ideology that formerly
dominated the literature; without larger ns, MRP represents only a partial advance over older
approaches. Exacerbating the n problem is my substantive finding: the constituents that “matter”
are subsets of the voting public, and estimating their attitudes place even greater requirements on
the data than do district-level constituencies.
However, even the exit polls do not solve the n problem. Particularly during midterm
elections and in large states like California and New York, concatenations of state and national
exit polls still did not achieve adequate coverage in every congressional district. Some districts
contained only a handful of cases. If we take as a given that no adequately large-n, comprehensive
panel study of Congressional districts is ever to exist, where do we go from here?
Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) have put together the American Ideology Project,
which builds on the renewed academic interest in sub-national public opinion. Their approach is
to concatenate many datasets, for instance the ANES and CCES, and to generate ideology scores
using Item Response Theory (IRT). Their ambition is at once greater than my research project
(their interest is studying responsiveness at the municipal level) and less: they only generate
measures by decennial districting cycle. While I trust that their data is valid and reliable, we have
already seen that voter preferences systemically differ from the participants in such studies, and
that constituent measures require year-to-year precision to capture dynamic responsiveness.
One solution may be to concatenate the exit polls with other datasets, but also add a twist
that addresses the voter problem. Much as the NEP weights exit poll cases by actual election
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returns, would it not be possible to fit models using CCES and ANES responses—and those in exit
poll datasets as well—in a way that makes them representative of House district electorates?
Model-fitting functions available for R contain options for prior weighting: that is, each respondent
can be assigned integer weights to correct for under- and over-representation. This forces R to
converge on a model that treats (say) an under-represented Maine Democratic respondent in the
2008 CCES (see Table 6.1) as ten cases, and an over-represented Republican as nine cases. In this
way, where exit polls are lacking in geographic coverage or survey items (for instance, the exit
polls do a poor job of including biennial measures of attitudes other than ideology), we might make
phone and internet surveys shares the virtues of the exit polls.
The n problem, which has plagued Congress scholarship since the era of The American
Voter, still persists. Even after fifty years, researchers have still not exhausted every avenue around
the case deficit. The discussion above, I hope, illuminates some of those ways.
The supply side. My dissertation has explored the “demand” side of the responsiveness
equation. Chapter 5 nonetheless intimated that measures on the supply side—that is, point
estimates of what legislators do in response to demand—require more scholarly interrogation.
For background, my main dependent variable is derived from an extremely popular twodimensional scale of roll call votes called DW-NOMINATE. Recent scholars have argued against
using such general measures in tests of legislative responsiveness, arguing that they are
incomparable with any conceivable measure of district public opinion (Bafumi and Herron 2010).
It is better, they say, to compare individual roll call votes with individual constituent preferences.
However, I have argued such criticisms overlook that issues usually have short lifespans. Issues
that do persist still create difficulties for public opinion research over time. Moreover, it stretches
credulity to think that MCs, who can neither predict changes in the inherently unpredictable issue
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agenda nor poll their own constituents’ issue attitudes, will know what specific policies their
constituents want at all times. The best, generalizable test of responsiveness is to see if many roll
call votes covary with the sum of district attitudes.
To perform this test, there is a need for measures of roll call voting that is at once
comprehensive across issue domains, vary between Congresses, and are comparable across time.
Interest group scores vary from Congress to Congress, but are not comparable over time
(Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999). DW-NOMINATE estimates are comparable across all 114
Congresses, but are static for each legislator. NP scores aspire to solve this problem, and
incorporate both variability and comparability. They nonetheless have flaws. The most glaring of
these is that they capture roll call voting throughout legislators’ entire careers: in technical terms,
Nokken and Poole estimated one-Congress-at-a-time ideology on the assumption that fixed DWNOMINATE scores—computed by scaling roll call votes on two dimensions all the way back to
the First Congress and revealing binary preferences—explained the outcomes.
Three problems emerge when we start engaging in thought experiments. First, if a member
entered Congress in the 1970s, then his NP scores are likely tainted by decades-old constituent
effects. Even if public opinion is static, the frequent redrawing of districts means that senior
legislators are responding to different sets of issue attitudes over the course of their careers. This
calls into question whether NP scores are comparable to longitudinal measures of district ideology,
which are far less stable than House roll call scores. Second, rules in recent Congresses have
undergone changes, which have tended to increase party leaders’ control over committee
assignment and policy agenda. Long-serving legislators whose terms of office predate these
changes once casted roll call votes in a remarkably different institutional context. This affects not
only how they voted, but also what they voted on in the first place. The fixed component of NP
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measures thus introduces measurement error, because not every roll call score is subject to the
same institutional effects. Finally, third, there is the potential for agenda-setting bias. Take the
issue domain of race as an example. A notable feature of Congress up until the middle of the last
century was its systematic prevention of civil rights legislation from the reaching floor votes. The
finding that Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans exhibited more liberal voting behavior
than today’s conservative Republicans, and hence that Congress has polarized in the last four
decades, is perhaps in part an artifact of the fact that Southern Democrats like Senators James
Eastland and John Stennis seldom had to vote against commitments to civil rights. The agenda
problem is particularly problematic, since the imperative to avoid agenda-setting effects is one of
the main reasons to prefer NOMINATE scores over less comprehensives measures of legislator
policy preferences.
Perhaps a solution is to compute the NP scores using only roll call votes in (say) the past
decade. Legislators could receive ideology scores that are comprehensive over all votes during a
redistricting cycle. In this way, responsiveness research receives the best of both worlds:
comprehensive measures of legislator ideology that span all policy domains and that are computed
in the same institutional, public opinion, and policy agenda context.4 These measures would be a
closer elite counterpart of my constituent ideological measures than currently available NP scores.
Purged of extraneous roll call votes that antedate my time series, they would likely show greater
sensitivity to changes in public opinion. Future research could test this expectation.

4

Keith Poole was generous enough to extend his help to my dissertation committee, but the quite unreasonable
complexity and specificity of our request (for one-Congress-at-a-time NOMINATE scores that scale only those roll
call votes from the 109th to the 112th Congresses) led to a communication breakdown.
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Future Directions
In addition to improving the measures employed in the later chapters of this dissertation,
how else might researchers build on my work? I identify three: clarifying the partisan electoral
connection, broadening and deepening our understanding of exit poll datasets, and using MRP to
build an integrated model of representation.
Clarifying the partisan electoral connection. I found that 1) representatives respond mainly
to copartisans and 2) directional voting is a likely reason for their so doing. Future work is
necessary to specify the precise conditions that give rise to partisan representation. I speculate that
in the context of growing ideological constraint among partisan identifiers (Layman and Carsey
2002), a growing relationship between ideology and House vote (Jacobson 2013), and partisan
redistricting that increases between-district and within-district polarization (Carson et al. 2007),
there are ever-greater electoral incentives for legislators to respond to copartisans. Another
possibility is that budget deficits and recent rules changes in the House—most notably, Congress’s
elimination of earmarks and downsizing of the Appropriations Committee’s role—have
undermined the ability of House incumbents to maximize their reelection chances via the
securement of particularized material benefits to their districts. We might now wonder if symbolic
ideological appeals to partisan subconstituencies have replaced the “pork barrel” as a the
predominant incumbency-maximizing strategy: to paraphrase one Congressional staffer, MCs now
offer constituents pure interest group scorecards instead of highway overpasses (Linkins 2014). If
this is the case, then the decline of cross-pressured legislators (say, Democrats who represent
majority Republican jurisdictions) is hardly mysterious. A task of Political Science will be to see
just how well distributional politics describes or fails to describe the organization of Congress in
the 21st century.
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Primaries are an another popular explanation for polarization at the campaign and
institutional levels. Projecting the travesty of the 2016 presidential nomination race onto another
branch of government, political journalists have implicated a supposedly rising number primary
challenges in the growing partisan divisiveness and gridlock of recent years (Rauch 2016). Primary
challenges, a common strand of reasoning goes, force incumbents to appeal to tiny and
ideologically extreme electorates before pivoting back to more moderate position-taking in the
general election. Successful ideologically-motivated challenges, or the inability of incumbents to
successfully “run to the center” after publicly committing themselves to a number of extreme
positions in the primary, import extremism into roll call voting. My findings cast doubt on this
common wisdom. Primary competition, operationalized as the nominee’s margin of victory in the
primary, exercised no independent effect on candidate and legislator ideal points after I
incorporated constituent effects in the models. Similarly, other scholars have failed to find a link
between primaries and elite behavior (Hirano et al. 2010), or find in the historical record any
evidence that House primaries are becoming more frequent and salient (Boatright 2013). Future
research that incorporates MRP point estimates—does the interaction of MRP-imputed party
ideology and primary competition affect candidate ideology?—may definitively expose what hand
(if any) House primaries have in negative political phenomena.
Extending and broadening exit poll data. Even I have made the first systematic attempt to
place exit polls in dialogue with Congressional literature, I concede that I have not made the fullest
use of the data towards this end. For one thing, while state and national exit poll datasets with the
ns necessary for biennial MRP estimation are available all the way back to 1984, they sadly do not
contain usable district identifiers. Could it still be possible to extend the time series backwards? I
think the answer is yes. As the datasets contain identifiers for precincts (randomly coded to
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maximize anonymity) and state sub-region, someone with a surplus of computational talent and
patience could compare the weighted precinct- and subregion-level frequencies of election results
with published election returns. They could then approximately recreate congressional district
identifiers. By expanding the public opinion data’s scope, a researcher could speak to the
responsiveness question with more generalizable, less time-bound answers than I now offer.
I also only used the general election exit poll datasets. I have therefore been limited to
testing formal theories of voting in the general elections, a relatedly well-trodden path in the
literature. Tantalizingly, historical primary exit poll datasets exist, and have received even less
academic treatment than the November ones. These may offer a rare chance to directly measure
the attitudes of primary electorates, which (as I previously remarked) many have held to exercise
a distortive effect on campaigns and government. Are primary electorates systematically different
than district and party median voters in the generals? Are these—and not the party
subconstituencies operationalized in my dissertation—the real loci of candidate and legislator
attention?
What of future election years? Unfortunately, when I say that exit polls are rich in research
possibilities, honesty compels to add that they face sour prospects. New modes of early voting are
becoming popular, meaning that growing numbers of voters are beyond the reach of exit poll
interviewers. Because large numbers of people will have already voted before election day (Sproul
2008), and because the pool of undecided swing voters is shrinking (Berg 2012), the samples of
phone polls conducted in the last week of the election cycle will increasingly resemble the
electorate. Exit polls run the risk of becoming expensive redundancies. Highlighting this risk, the
National Election Pool drastically reduced the sampling frame of the 2012 presidential election
poll at the eleventh hour (Cohen and Clement 2012). Moreover, if and when Internet voting
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becomes available, the entire survey mode will instantly become obsolete. Almost in anticipation
of this phenomenon, experts see in new Internet panel studies and analyses of social media
networks the future of public opinion research. Warren Mitofsky’s high-tech and cutting-edge
approach to reporting elections in the late sixties now strikes many people as stodgily oldfashioned.
The prospects of electoral research using the exit polls sound grim, but I still believe my
project to be a beginning and not an end. Though designed for journalists, exit polls possess
advantages to the social scientist that no other survey, including the CCES, possesses: large and
frequent historical samples, selected using a robust probability structure, of known voters
interviewed in person. Political Science has an interest in their survival and accessibility. My
research has shown that, when combined with the power of MRP, exit polls yield important
insights about democracy in the House of Representatives. Whether we learn all that this peculiar
store of voter information has to teach depends on our own efforts.
An integrated model of representation. As I remarked at various points, the purview of
responsiveness literature is limited. It only analyses a portion of what members of Congress do:
how they vote. MCs make other decisions as well, including how active to be, and what issues to
focus on (Hall 1996; Sulkin 2005). A complete theory of House representation must therefore
embrace more than legislative ideology. Responsiveness is also an imperfect indicator of
democracy, because it is possible to imagine perfectly responsive legislators who—in a political
system where sovereignty is divided—enact policy at odds with what most people want (Eulau
and Karps 1977). Future MRP research might impute the priorities of district electorates and
ascertain whether legislator policy attentiveness in the form of bill sponsorships and committee
assignments, and not merely their revealed preferences, responds to constituent preferences.
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Scholars must also look at the output of Congress as a whole and examine, as past research has
done at the level of statehouse politics, whether it is congruent with the demands of geographic
and partisan voting constituencies. The definitive book on House representation in our still-young
century remains to be written.
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Appendix to Chapter 5

Table 5.4. Adjusted ADA Score Change, 109th to 112th Congresses, Legislator Panel
(1)
Democrats
-0.043
-4.518
(4.383)

(3)
Democrats
0.012
1.245
(7.057)

(4)
Republicans
-0.298***
-41.15***
(9.064)

0.026
3.510
(9.108)

-0.166
-32.70
(18.29)

First Difference: District Heterogeneity

-0.411***
-1556.3***
(461.2)

-0.489
-2216.3
(1580.9)

First Difference: Party Constituent Ideology * Heterogeneity

-0.300**
-2609.4**
(898.8)

0.825*
5737.4*
(2282.3)

First Difference: Constituent Ideology

(2)
Republicans
-0.137**
-18.87**
(7.079)

First Difference: Party Constituency Ideology

South

-0.061*
-1.513*
(0.706)

-0.051
-1.151
(0.693)

-0.066*
-1.643*
(0.752)

-0.056
-1.273
(0.740)

First Difference: Majority Party

0.006
0.0773
(0.599)

0.096
1.292
(0.706)

-0.026
-0.324
(0.664)

0.081
1.089
(0.935)

Senior Member of Congress in 2004

0.043
1.084
(0.703)

-0.012
-0.381
(0.646)

0.037
0.917
(0.729)

-0.010
-0.320
(0.646)

Ranking Member of Committee

-0.009
-0.276
(0.752)

-0.008
-0.253
(0.590)

-0.003
-0.105
(0.770)

-0.015
-0.475
(0.649)

Retired

-0.122**
-5.497**
(1.924)

0.045
1.804
(1.717)

-0.123**
-5.534**
(1.919)

0.044
1.776
(1.698)

First Difference: Party of President

0.279***
5.752***
(0.940)

-0.019
-0.441
(1.343)

0.411***
8.473***
(1.304)

0.153
3.622
(2.218)

Lagged Two-Party House Vote

0.044
1.671
(1.466)

-0.010
-0.518
(2.102)

0.058
2.179
(1.486)

-0.013
-0.692
(2.117)

Challenger Quality

-0.030
-0.883
(1.315)

-0.015
-0.473
(1.128)

-0.028
-0.825
(1.300)

-0.015
-0.497
(1.128)

Competitive Primary

0.036
1.856
(2.625)
582

-0.033
-1.941
(1.898)
486

0.031
1.600
(2.747)
582

-0.041
-2.371
(1.657)
486

Observations
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Overall R2
0.106
0.0228
0.133
Standardized beta coefficients; unstandardized point estimates; robust standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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